

Access to History
for the **IB Diploma**

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The Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–79

Michael Scott-Baumann

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Access to History
for the IB Diploma

The Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–79

Michael Scott-Baumann

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Dedication

Keith Randell (1943–2002)

The *Access to History* series was conceived and developed by Keith, who created a series to 'cater for students as they are, not as we might wish them to be'. He leaves a living legacy of a series that for over 20 years has provided a trusted, stimulating and well-loved accompaniment to post-16 study. Our aim with these new editions is to continue to offer students the best possible support for their studies.

Introduction

This book has been written to support your study of prescribed subject 2: The Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–79 of the IB History Diploma Route 2. This first chapter gives you an overview of:

- ★ the content you will study for the Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–79
- ★ how you will be assessed for Paper 1
- ★ the different features of this book and how these will aid your learning.

1 What you will study

The Jewish state of Israel was created out of the land of Palestine in May 1948 and was immediately invaded by the armies of neighbouring Arab states. There were to be four major wars between Israel and its Arab neighbours over the following 25 years. Today, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs remains at the core of many crises in the Middle East.

The wars between Israel and the Arabs provide the main focus of this book, but it also examines the plight of the Palestinians who were displaced, the development of the state of Israel and of Arab nationalism and the impact of superpower involvement. It ends with the signing of a peace deal between Israel and the first Arab state, Egypt, to recognize the Jewish state.

The creation of the state of Israel

Your study will include the following:

- Jewish and Arab claims to Palestine and British rule in the region in Chapter 1.
- The end of British rule and the partition of Palestine leading to civil war in Chapter 2.
- The first Arab–Israeli war 1948–9 in Chapter 3.

The Arab–Israeli wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973

Your study will include the following:

- The Suez Crisis of 1956 and the roles of Britain, France, Israel, the USA, the USSR and the United Nations (UN) in Chapter 4.
- The causes, course and consequences of the Six Day War of 1967 and the October War of 1973 in Chapter 5.

Zionism, Arabism and the Palestinian problem

Your study will include the following:

- Jewish immigration and the development of the state of Israel in Chapter 6.
- President Nasser of Egypt and the growth of Arab nationalism in Chapter 6.
- The Palestinian diaspora and the emergence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Chapter 7.

The role of the superpowers, the UN and the first Arab–Israeli peace treaty

- The involvement of the USA, the USSR and the UN in Chapter 8.
- The significance of the Egyptian–Israeli peace agreements of 1978–9 in Chapter 9.

2 How you will be assessed

The IB History Diploma can be studied to either Standard or Higher Level. It has three papers in total: Papers 1 and 2 for Standard Level and a further Paper 3 for Higher Level. It also has an internal assessment that all students must do.

- For Paper 1 you need to answer four source-based questions on a prescribed subject. This counts for 20 per cent of your overall marks at Higher Level, or 30 per cent of your overall marks at Standard Level.
- For Paper 2 you need to answer two essay questions on two different topics. This counts for 25 per cent of your overall marks at Higher Level, or 45 per cent of your overall marks at Standard Level.
- For Paper 3 you need to answer three essay questions on two or three sections. This counts for 35 per cent of your overall marks at Higher Level.
- For the Internal Assessment you need to carry out a historical investigation. This counts for 20 per cent of your overall marks at Higher Level, or 25 per cent of your overall marks at Standard Level.

Prescribed subject 2: The Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–79 is assessed through Paper 1. Paper 1 of the IB History Diploma examination has five sources and four questions. The sources are from primary and secondary sources and while the majority are written, visual sources are almost always present. The visual source could be a chart, graph, table, map, cartoon, poster, stamp or photograph.

Examination questions

The four questions on the examination paper assess different skills and knowledge. You must answer all four and have one hour to do so. The question types are as follows.

Question 1: Direct questions

Question 1 is worth 5 marks and has two parts, both of which test your reading comprehension abilities on two different sources. You need to answer both parts of the question by reviewing the source material and paraphrasing information from the sources. There is detailed guidance on how to answer question 1 on pages 44–5. An example of this type of question might be:

Example 1

What, according to Source C, were the reasons Great Britain, France and Israel invaded Egypt in 1956?

Example 2

What does Source E say about the role of the United Nations prior to 1967?

Question 2: Comparing and contrasting sources

Question 2 is worth 6 marks and asks you to compare and contrast two sources. Comparing means that you explain the similarities between the sources, while contrasting explains how they are different. You should aim to have about three similarities and three differences. There is detailed guidance on how to answer question 2 on pages 74–5. Examples of this type of question might be:

Example 1

Compare and contrast the views of Sources B and C regarding the outbreak of war in 1973.

Example 2

Compare and contrast the reasons for Israel's 1967 victory according to Sources B and E.

Question 3: origins, purpose, value, limitations

Question 3 is worth 6 marks and asks you to explain the value and limitations of two sources with reference to their origin and purpose.

- The origins of a source are its author or creator. This should also include the date, publisher and type of delivery, which could be a book, speech, propaganda poster or diary entry.
- The purpose of the source explains what the author was trying to do, such as explaining the impact of an event or conveying a certain type of information.

The values and limitations will vary according to each source. A value could be that the author of the source witnessed the event or is an acknowledged scholar. An example of a limitation could be that an author was involved in events and therefore may be less objective. You should try to explain at least two values and two limitations per source, although this may not always be possible. There is detailed guidance on how to answer question 3 on pages 125–7. Examples of this type of question might be:

Example 2

With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source C for historians studying the massacre at Deir Yassin.

Example 2

With reference to their origin and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Source B and Source E for historians studying the Camp David accords.

Question 4: essays integrating knowledge and sources

Question 4 is worth 8 marks and requires you to use all the sources in the examination and to integrate them into an essay that also contains your own knowledge. There is detailed guidance on how to answer question 4 on pages 142–3. Examples of this type of question might be:

Example 1

Using these sources and your own knowledge, explain how Nasser became the prime proponent of Arab socialism.

Example 2

Using these sources and your own knowledge, discuss the conditions Palestinian refugees faced after 1948.

The appearance of the examination paper

Cover

The cover of the examination paper states the date of the examination and the length of time you have to complete it: one hour. Please note that there are two routes in history. Make sure your paper says Route 2 on it. Instructions are limited and simply state that you should not open it until told to do so and that all questions must be answered.

Sources

Once you are allowed to open your examination paper, you will note that there are five sources, each labelled with a letter. There is no particular order to the sources, so Source A could potentially be a map, a speech, a photograph or an extract from a book. Source A is no more or less important than Source B and so on. If you see brackets, [], then this is an explanation or addition to the source by the creators of the examination and not part of

the original source. Sometimes sources are shortened and you will see an ellipsis, three full stops or periods (...), when this happens.

Questions

After the five sources the four questions will appear. You need to answer all of them. It is better to answer the questions in order, as this will familiarize you with all the sources to be used in the final essay on question 4, but this is not required. Be sure to number your questions correctly. Do not use bullet points to answer questions, but instead write in full sentences when possible. Each question indicates how many marks each question is worth.

3 About the book

Coverage of course content

This book addresses the key areas listed in the IB History Guide for Route 2: Twentieth-century world history prescribed subject 2: The Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–79. Chapters start with an introduction outlining the key questions they address. They are then divided into a series of sections and topics covering the course content. Throughout the chapters you will find the following features to aid your study of the course content.

Key and leading questions

Each section heading in the chapter has a related key question that gives a focus to your reading and understanding of the section. These are also listed in the chapter introduction. You should be able to answer the questions after completing the relevant section.

Topics within the sections have leading questions that are designed to help you to focus on the key points within a topic and give you more practice in answering questions.

Key terms

Key terms are the important terms you need to know to gain an understanding of the period. These are emboldened in the text the first time they appear in the book and are defined in the margin. They also appear in the glossary at the end of the book.

Sources

Each chapter contains several sources with accompanying questions. The sources are also used with the exam-style questions at the end of the chapters. The range of sources used will expose you to many different types of sources that you may find in the examination.

Key debates

Historians often disagree on historical events and this historical debate is referred to as historiography. Knowledge of historiography is helpful in reaching the upper mark bands when you take your IB History examinations. There are a number of debates throughout the book to develop your understanding of historiography.

Theory of Knowledge (TOK) questions

Understanding that different historians see history differently is an important element in understanding the connection between the IB History Diploma and Theory of Knowledge. Alongside most historiographical debates is a Theory of Knowledge style question that makes that link.

Summary diagrams

At the end of each section is a summary diagram that gives a visual summary of the content of the section. It is intended as an aid for revision.

Chapter summary

At the end of each chapter is a short summary of the content of that chapter. This is intended to help you to revise and consolidate your knowledge and understanding of the content.

Skills development

At the end of Chapters 2–7 is:

- Examination practice in the form of Paper 1-style questions.
- Suggestions for learning activities, including ideas for debate, essays, displays and research which will help you to develop Paper 1 skills and a deeper understanding of the content.

Some chapters also provide:

- Examination guidance on how to answer different question types, accompanied by a sample answer and commentary designed to help you to focus on specific details.

These are all intended to help you to develop the following skills in order to achieve examination success:

- *Source analysis.* This book allows you to become familiar with the works of many historians and primary source material. It teaches you to analyse all types of sources and gives you the opportunity to review their strengths, weaknesses, origins, purpose, values and limitations.
- *Integrating sources into essays.* Integrating sources into essays requires that you know how to write a good essay. This book gives guidance on writing good essays that integrate sources.

End of the book

The book concludes with the following sections:

Timeline

This gives a timeline of the major events covered in the book which is helpful for quick reference or as a revision tool.

Glossary

All key terms in the book are defined in the glossary.

Further reading

This contains a list of books, websites, films and other resources which may help you with further independent research and presentations. It may also be helpful when further information is required for internal assessments and extended essays in history. You may wish to share the contents of this area with your school or local librarian.

Internal assessment

All IB History diploma students are required to write a historical investigation which is internally assessed. The investigation is an opportunity for you to dig more deeply into a subject that interests you. There is a list of possible topics at the end of the book that could warrant further investigation to form part of your historical investigation.

Jews, Arabs and the British in Palestine before 1945

This chapter investigates the background to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Above all, it examines the Jewish and Arab claims to the land of Palestine. It then looks briefly at why and how Britain and France took control of much of the Middle East after the First World War before focusing on the effects that British rule in Palestine had on both Jewish and Arab populations. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- ★ What was the Jewish claim to Palestine?
- ★ What was the Arab claim to Palestine?
- ★ Why did British rule in Palestine lead to Arab rebellion in 1936?
- ★ To what extent did the British side with the Zionists during the mandate?

1 The Jewish claim to Palestine

▶ **Key question:** *What was the Jewish claim to Palestine?*

The Jewish people lived in the land of Palestine from about 1500BC. In the time of Jesus – first-century AD – Palestine was ruled by the Romans. In AD70 and again in AD135 the Jews rebelled against their Roman rulers. Roman soldiers crushed both revolts, destroyed the city of Jerusalem, including the Jewish temple, and expelled most of the Jews.

The Jewish diaspora

Many thousands of Jewish people fled to neighbouring countries and, over the next 200 years, they settled in almost every part of the Roman Empire, particularly in southern Europe. The Jews thus became a scattered people and only a few thousand remained in Palestine. Many of those who lived in the **diaspora** became merchants and farmers, bankers and craftsmen. Some became wealthy and gained important positions in the governments of the new lands in which they lived. Nevertheless, Jewish people kept alive their religious traditions, building synagogues for worship and celebrating Jewish festivals and holy days.

What was the impact of the expulsion of the Jews from Palestine?

KEY TERM

Diaspora The dispersal of people into many different parts of the world.

Anti-Semitism in Europe

The Jews were often persecuted. Almost all Europeans were Christians and they often forced the Jews to live in separate areas. The Jews were not allowed to vote or even to buy their own land. Then, when persecution increased in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Jews were expelled from much of western Europe and many settled in Russia and Poland.

In the nineteenth century, the country with the largest Jewish population was Russia. When the Tsar (emperor) was assassinated in 1881, there were anti-Jewish riots. Many people in the government blamed the Jews for the assassination and the new Tsar's government encouraged the persecution of the Jews. This systematic, officially condoned form of persecution was known as a **pogrom**. Synagogues were burned down, Jewish homes were attacked and thousands of Jews were killed. Many Russian Jews fled to western Europe and the USA. But, even there, Jews often found that they were not treated as equals and that they were sometimes suspected of being disloyal or untrustworthy. All these various forms of anti-Jewish behaviour are known as **anti-Semitism**.

KEY TERM

Pogrom An officially encouraged, or at least, officially condoned campaign against the Jews.

Anti-Semitism Feelings or actions showing prejudice or hatred towards Jews.



What are the benefits and limitations of using Source A for the historian studying why the Jews wanted a homeland of their own?

SOURCE A

A print showing an attack on a Jew in the late nineteenth century in Kiev, Russia. Notice how the authorities ignore it.



The origins of Zionism

In 1896, Theodor Herzl published a book called *The Jewish State*, in which he argued that European Jews could not expect an end to anti-Semitism and should seek a state of their own, 'large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation'.

SOURCE B

An excerpt from *The Jewish State* by Theodor Herzl, 1896, quoted in *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* by Charles D. Smith, published by Bedford/St. Martin's, Boston, USA, 2007, page 54. Herzl was an Austrian Jew living in Paris.

Are we to get out now, and where to? Or may we remain, and how long? Let us first settle the point of staying where we are now. Can we hope for better days? I say we cannot hope for change in the current feeling. Even if we were as near the hearts of princes as are their other subjects, they could not protect us. They would only feed popular hatred by showing us too much favour ... We must not imagine the departure of the Jews to be a sudden one. It will be gradual, continuous and will cover many decades. The poorest will go first to cultivate the soil. They will construct roads, bridges, railways and telegraph installations, regulate rivers and build their own dwellings; their labour will create trade, trade will create markets and markets will attract new settlers.

'Next year in Jerusalem'

For hundreds of years Jews dreamt and prayed that they would be able to celebrate 'Next Year in Jerusalem'. By the beginning of the twentieth century, an increasing number of Jews in Europe and America were, like Herzl, demanding a Jewish national home. By 1914, when the First World War broke out, these people were all agreed that this homeland would have to be in Palestine. This was the **Promised Land**, where the Jews (or **Israelites**) had lived some 2000 years before and where several thousands still remained.

Not all Jews wanted to return to the 'Land of Israel'. Most wanted to stay where they were: in France, Britain, Germany, Russia or wherever they were living, but a small number, especially from Russia, made their way to Palestine. They bought land there and started to farm and build homes. These people and all those who believed in a Jewish national homeland were called **Zionists** after Mount Zion, a mountain near Jerusalem. Between 1880 and 1914, 60,000 Zionists settled in Palestine so that they formed nearly 10 per cent of the population.

The Balfour Declaration 1917

During the First World War (1914–18), British Zionists, led by Chaim Weizmann, worked hard to win the support of the British government for a Jewish homeland. In 1917, they received a great boost. The British were

What were the origins of Zionism?

Why, according to Herzl in Source B, can the Jews not expect protection by the governments of the countries in which they live? Why could the creation of a Jewish homeland not happen quickly?

KEY TERM

Promised Land The land of Palestine which Jews believed God had promised to them.

Israelites The name by which Jews were known in ancient times, hence the 'Land of Israel' was their Promised Land.

Zionists Those who advocated the creation of a Jewish homeland and, later, an independent state, in Palestine.

What was the importance of the Balfour Declaration?

bogged down in the fighting with Germany and they were very keen to bring the USA into the war. They believed that US Jews could influence their government's actions. This was one of the reasons why the British government declared its support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The declaration was made in the form of a letter to Lord Rothschild, a leading British Jew, in November 1917. As well as declaring the British government's support for a Jewish homeland, it emphasized the importance of safeguarding the rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine (that is, the Arabs).

SOURCE C


An excerpt from the letter to Lord Rothschild by Lord Balfour, November 1917, quoted in *The Middle East 1914–1979* by T.G. Fraser, published by Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1980, page 18. Lord Balfour was British Foreign Secretary. His letter became known as the Balfour Declaration.

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice [harm] the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The British were very careful with their wording of the declaration. They expressed their support for a Jewish homeland, not a state. However, for the next 30 years, many Jews regarded the declaration as a promise from the British government to help set up a Jewish state.



Does the letter in Source C read like a promise? If so, a promise to do what? What does it say about the non-Jews in Palestine?



SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The Jewish claim to Palestine

2 The Arab claim to Palestine

► **Key question:** What was the Arab claim to Palestine?

Originally, the Arabs lived in the desert area that is today mostly Saudi Arabia (see the map below). They all spoke the same language, Arabic. In the seventh century AD, most of the Arabs were converted to the religion of Islam. They became followers of the **Prophet Muhammad** and became known as Muslims. From their homeland in Arabia, they swept across the Middle East and North Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries, spreading their new religion and their language. Palestine was one of the regions they took over. Today, the Arabs form the majority of the population in the Middle East.

KEY TERM

Prophet Muhammad

Born in the Arabian city of Mecca c.570. For Muslims, he is the messenger and prophet of God.


Arab civilization and Ottoman conquest

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Arabs produced one of the world's richest and most powerful civilizations. They made important discoveries in mathematics and medicine, while their mosques are still some

← What was the impact of Ottoman conquest?

SOURCE D

The Arab empire in the eighth century. By 730, a century after the Prophet Muhammad's death, Islam had spread from Spain in the west to the borders of north India in the east.



What does the map in Source D tell you about the Arab empire in the eighth century?



KEY TERM

Ottoman The name of the Turkish dynasty, named after its founder, Osman. In the sixteenth century, the Turkish Empire conquered much of south-east Europe and the Middle East.



Who is the 'oppressive tyrant' in Source E? How does the writer think the Arabs should achieve their independence? What evidence is there to suggest that the writer does not wish to see several independent Arab nations emerge?

To what extent was the First World War a turning point in the struggle for Arab independence?

KEY TERM

High Commissioner The most senior British diplomat in another country, like an ambassador, representing the British government.

of the most beautiful buildings in the world. Their merchants bought and sold goods in Europe, Africa and Asia, and their lands grew rich. However, the Arab world suffered defeat at the hands of the Mongols at this time.

In the sixteenth century, the **Ottoman** Turks (who were also Muslims but not Arabs) conquered much of the Middle East. The Arabs were forced to pay taxes and provide soldiers for their Turkish masters. In the late nineteenth century, a minority of Arabs, mostly intellectuals, tried several times to remove their Ottoman rulers. Their aim was to re-establish Arab rule in the Middle East, including Palestine. In 1913, the first Arab National Congress was held and, a year later, the Arab Nationalist Manifesto was published. This called for independence from Turkey and unity among the Arabs (see Source E).

SOURCE E

An excerpt from the Arab National Manifesto quoted in *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* by Sylvia Haim, published by University of California Press, Berkeley, USA, 1962, page 83.

Arise, O ye Arabs! Take out the sword from the scabbard. Do not let an oppressive tyrant, who only despises you, remain in your country; cleanse your country from those who show their hatred to you, to your race and to your language.

O ye Arabs! You all dwell in one land, you speak one language, so be also one nation and one land. Do not become divided amongst yourselves.

→ The Arabs and the First World War

The First World War was a turning point in the Arab struggle for independence as well as in the Jewish struggle for a homeland. Again it was the British who played a crucial role. Turkey fought on the German side against Britain and its allies. The British were afraid that their supplies of oil from Persia (or Iran, as it is known today) might be cut off by the Turks. The British navy was beginning to make more use of oil, as opposed to coal, to fuel its ships at this time. So they decided to encourage the Arabs to rebel against their Turkish rulers and seek independence.

The British **High Commissioner** in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, exchanged several letters with Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, between July 1915 and January 1916. Hussein was Guardian of Mecca and Medina, the two holiest sites of Islam (in what is today Saudi Arabia). As such, he was the most important Arab Muslim leader. McMahon promised Hussein that if the Arabs fought against the Turks, the British would support Arab independence and advise the Arabs how to establish their government, as shown in Source F.

SOURCE F

An excerpt from a letter from Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein, 24 October 1915, quoted in *The Middle East 1914–1979* by T.G. Fraser, published by Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1980, pages 12–13. Sir Henry McMahon was the British High Commissioner in Egypt from 1915 to 1917.

It is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf [the British government] the following statement, which I am confident that you will receive with satisfaction.

Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs ... When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only ...

Do you think Source F constitutes an unreserved promise to support Arab independence?



Sharif Hussein replied 12 days later, as shown in Source G.

SOURCE G

An excerpt from a letter from Sharif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 5 November 1915 quoted in *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict* by Charles D. Smith, published by Bedford/St. Martin's, Boston, USA, 2007, page 100. Hussein was the Sharif of Mecca from 1908 to 1924.

With great gratification have we received your note ...

Your advocacy of speedy action seems to us to entail risks as well as advantages ... [but] the moment the Arabs feel confident that, when the time comes for the conclusion of peace in Europe, Great Britain and her allies will not leave them in the lurch face to face with Germany and Turkey, but that they intend to help them and advocate their case effectively in the peace negotiations, from that moment will Arab participation in the War undoubtedly serve the Arab interest.

In Source G, what does Hussein see as the main risk, for the Arabs, of fighting against the Turks?



In 1916, an Arab army was raised and led by Emir (Prince) Faisal, the son of the Sharif of Mecca. The army blew up Turkish trains and disrupted the flow of military supplies to the Turkish soldiers. This became known as the Arab Revolt. The activities of this Arab army are well known because an English army intelligence officer, Major T.E. Lawrence (see photo, page 16), who became known in Britain as 'Lawrence of Arabia', fought with the Arabs. In 1918, Faisal and his Arab soldiers were allowed by the British to march in and take over the city of Damascus, in Syria, from the Turks.

The Sykes–Picot Agreement 1916

The Arabs felt that they had fought for their independence from the Turks and now deserved complete self-government. Arab leaders were therefore angered when they heard that Britain and France had secretly agreed, in 1916, to carve up Turkey's Arab lands after the war and share them out



How does Source H suggest why Lawrence became known as 'Lawrence of Arabia'?

SOURCE H

A photograph of Major T.E. Lawrence, who became known in Britain as 'Lawrence of Arabia'.



between themselves. This agreement is known as the Sykes–Picot Agreement after the British and French politicians who signed it. Under the agreement, some Arab land would be directly ruled by Britain or France while the rest would be Arab states with either Britain or France having some indirect control over them. Why did the British make this agreement?

- The war in Europe (against Germany) was not going well and it was vital for Britain to maintain a strong alliance with France, its main ally in the war.
- Both Britain and France had extensive trading links with the Middle East.
- Britain wanted to protect the Suez Canal that they jointly owned and operated with the French. The Canal was the main route to Britain's empire in India and to the recently discovered oil fields in the Persian Gulf (see the map on page 17). Britain already controlled Egypt and saw Palestine as an additional buffer zone to protect the Canal and the route to the east.

To sum up, Britain and France wished to maintain their power and influence in the Middle East and they saw the Sykes–Picot Agreement as an important step to achieving this.

British and French mandates in the Middle East

Arab fears were confirmed in 1920. The **League of Nations** announced that Britain and France were to be given **mandates**, or orders, to govern certain countries in the Middle East until the Arab people were considered ready to govern themselves. Britain was given mandates over Palestine, Transjordan (later known as Jordan) and Iraq, and British troops and government officials

KEY TERM

League of Nations An international organization set up in 1919 to preserve peace and settle disputes; it was dominated by Britain and France.

Mandate An order or command, in this case from the League of Nations, giving Britain and France control of Arab lands previously ruled by Turkey. Britain and France were to prepare the Arab lands for eventual self-government.

took control of these lands. France was granted mandates over Syria and Lebanon.

Lawrence ('Lawrence of Arabia') felt that Hussein had been humiliated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the subsequent mandates. Hussein was head of the Hashemite family who were descended from the Prophet Muhammad. At the end of the war, Lawrence had advised the British government to establish Hussein's son, Faisal, as King of Syria. However, Syria was a French mandate and the British, now the strongest power in the Middle East, seemed to attach more importance to their alliance with France than their promises to Hussein. In 1921, the British agreed to French forces invading Syria and expelling Faisal from the throne he had held for two years.


Instead, the British made Faisal King of Iraq and recognized his older brother, Abdullah, as the emir, or ruler, of Transjordan (he became king in 1946). The two Hashemite princes thus became rulers of the semi-independent Arab states of Iraq and Transjordan, both of which were British mandates. These countries became two of the main pillars of Britain's empire in the Middle East after the First World War.

What does Source I suggest about British and French intentions in the Middle East after the war?



SOURCE I

A map of the Middle East after the First World War showing the British and French mandates.



Arabs were converted to Islam in seventh century AD and, after that, Palestine was largely inhabited by Arab-speaking Muslims

Much of the Islamic world, including Palestine, was conquered by Turks in the sixteenth century

First World War was a turning point for Arabs because:

- Turks were defeated by Britain and allies, with Arab support
- Arabs believed they were promised independence by Britain
- Britain and France agreed to share out Middle East lands after war
- Britain and France dominated Middle East after war through mandates

Arabs felt let down, particularly by the British, as they were not granted full independence

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The Arab claim to Palestine

3

British rule in Palestine 1919–36

▶ **Key question:** Why did British rule in Palestine lead to Arab rebellion in 1936?

In 1917, British troops entered Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine, driving out the Turks. Three years later Britain was given a mandate to govern Palestine and, for the next 30 years, Britain was to rule the area. In 1922, the League of Nations confirmed that Britain was responsible for establishing a Jewish national homeland while protecting the rights of *all* of those living in Palestine. This is shown in Source J.

SOURCE J

An excerpt from the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, 24 July 1922, quoted in *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict* by Charles D. Smith, published by Bedford/St. Martin’s, Boston, USA, 2007, page 109.

The Mandatory [Britain] shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race or religion.



What similarities in content are there in Source J and in Source C (page 12)?

Yet in 1919, at the Versailles peace conference, Lord Balfour had written in a note that establishing a Jewish homeland was far more important than considering the wishes of the Arab majority. This is shown in Source K.

SOURCE K

An excerpt from Balfour's note quoted in *Conflict in the Middle East: Israel and the Arabs* by Michael Scott-Baumann, published by Hodder Murray, London, UK, 2007, page 9. Lord Balfour was British Foreign Secretary from 1916 to 1919.

In Palestine we do not propose to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country. The four great powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions in present needs, in future hopes of far profounder importance than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land. In my opinion, that is right.

Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources J and K. How do you account for the differences?



Arab–Jewish riots

The Arabs of Palestine felt that they had simply exchanged Turkish rulers for British ones. Like the Arabs of Syria and Iraq, they were frustrated and disappointed that they had not been given their independence. They were even more angered by increasing Jewish immigration and the fact that Jews were buying land in 'their' country. Much of the land was bought from big Arab landowners, many of whom were absentee landlords living in cities like Jerusalem and Damascus. Furthermore, Arabs who had worked on the land, as tenants, were evicted because, very often, only Jews were employed to work on Jewish-owned farms.

The Jews only bought land in a few areas of Palestine but, in these areas, the Arabs claimed they were being driven out. They also accused the British of being pro-Zionist. The British allowed the Jews to build their own Zionist education system, believing that the Jews were 'mature' enough to do so because of their European background and modern education. They also employed a higher proportion of Jews than Muslims in the government of Palestine. The British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, was Jewish. To the Arabs, the British seemed to be favouring the Jews.

In 1921, violence erupted in the town of Jaffa (see Source L on page 20), a busy sea port. Jaffa was different from other Arab coastal towns because it was the main port of arrival for Jewish immigrants. Just to the north of the town was Tel Aviv, the largest Jewish settlement in Palestine. In May 1921 fighting broke out in Tel Aviv between rival Jewish groups, between communists and non-communists. The fighting spread into Arab Jaffa and led to Arab attacks on Jews and their property. After two days of rioting, 200 Jews and 120 Arabs were dead or wounded.

Why were Palestinian Arabs angry about Jews immigrating to Palestine after the First World War?



What do you think is most significant about the Jewish settlement areas shown in Source L?

SOURCE L

A map showing the main areas of Jewish settlement in Palestine in the 1920s.



The British response to the riots

The British authorities immediately stopped all Jewish immigration and the Palestinian Arabs were told that only a part of Palestine was to be made into a Jewish national home. Soon afterwards immigration began again but the British insisted it would be limited. The Arabs asked the British government to make Palestine independent as they hoped that the Arab majority would be able to dominate the Jewish minority. When Winston Churchill, a government minister, visited Palestine in 1921, a group of Arab leaders asked him to refute the Balfour Declaration and stop immigration. Churchill replied: 'You ask me to reject the Balfour Declaration and to stop immigration. This is not in my power and it is not my wish.'

The British government seemed unable to satisfy either Jews or Arabs in Palestine. The rate of immigration slowed down in the 1920s, and yet the Jewish population still doubled in the 10 years after the war. By 1929 there were a million Arabs and 160,000 Jews living in Palestine whereas, in 1919, there had only been 60,000 Jews (see Source N on page 22).

In 1929 violence erupted again. This time it started in the city of Jerusalem, which is a holy city for both Muslims and Jews. In the 1920s there was continuous tension in the city, particularly over who controlled the holy places (which you can see in Source M). In August 1929, riots broke out and Arab crowds attacked Jews inside and outside the city. The attacks spread throughout Palestine and 133 Jews were killed over four days. One hundred and sixteen Arabs were also killed, mostly by British police while trying to stop the anti-Jewish violence.

British government inquiries into the riots identified Arab fear of Jewish immigration and Jewish land purchase as the root cause of violence and concluded that the Arabs were afraid of losing their country as more and more of them became 'landless and discontented'. The British therefore planned to restrict immigration and land sales. This caused uproar among the Jews in Europe and the USA as well as in Palestine. So intense was Zionist pressure on the government in London that the plan was put aside.

How might Source M help to explain Arab–Jewish tension in Jerusalem?



SOURCE M

Two of the most holy places are shown in this photograph. The Mosque of the Dome of the Rock was built on the rock from which Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven. Just below it, in the foreground, is the Western or 'Wailing' Wall, which Jews believe to be the last remaining part of the ancient Jewish Temple.




What was the impact of soaring Jewish immigration in the 1930s?

→ **Nazi anti-Semitism and Jewish immigration**

Violence between Jews and Arabs, although not so widespread, continued in the early 1930s, especially after 1933. In that year, Adolf Hitler's Nazi Party came to power in Germany and Nazi anti-Semitism drove many Jews abroad. Thousands fled to Palestine, and by 1939 there were nearly 450,000 Jews in the country. The British were in an impossible position: if they allowed unrestricted immigration, Arab fears and violence would increase. But if they stopped or controlled immigration, the world would accuse them of inhumanity, of not caring for the Jews who were being persecuted by the Nazis.

SOURCE N

Jewish and Arab populations in Palestine 1919–47.



In which decade, according to Source N, did the Jewish population come to exceed 25 per cent of the total population of Palestine? How do you explain this rapid increase?

How did the views of Weizmann and Jabotinsky differ?

→ **Zionism, the Arabs and the British**

At the Paris peace conference, held at Versailles in 1919, the British Zionist Chaim Weizmann was asked what was meant by a Jewish national home. He replied: 'To make Palestine as Jewish as England is English.' But he did not speak openly of a Jewish 'state' so as not to be accused of trying to make the Jewish minority become the masters of the Arab majority. He knew there was a limit to how far he could push the British. As president of the World Zionist Organization, he knew that if the Jewish national home was to survive it needed the continued support of the British rulers of Palestine. Therefore, he continued to stress the importance of Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine, building the foundations for a Jewish state, rather than Zionist political organization, let alone military organization, in Palestine.

 KEY TERM

Jewish Agency The governing body of the Zionist movement in Palestine during the British mandate.

Jewish National Fund A body created by the World Zionist Organization to buy land for Jewish settlement in Palestine.

Yishuv A Hebrew word meaning 'settlement and community'; it was used to describe the Jewish community during the mandate.

Weizmann's policy was increasingly challenged by Vladimir Jabotinsky, a Russian-born Jew, and his followers. Like Weizmann, Jabotinsky knew that the support of the British was essential if the Jews were to achieve a state of their own but he knew the Arabs would not accept a Jewish state and he believed in building an 'Iron Wall' of Jewish military force. He said that peaceful coexistence with the Arabs might be possible but only after the Jews in Palestine had built a force strong enough to break Arab resistance to Zionism.

Although interpretations of Zionism among its leaders may have differed, Jewish organizations in Palestine proved to be increasingly effective. The **Jewish Agency**, which represented and was, in practice, the government of the Jewish population in Palestine, channelled increasing amounts of money into the purchase and settlement of land. The **Jewish National Fund** was specifically responsible for developing Jewish settlement through taxation and donations. Furthermore, with money flowing in from Jews overseas, the **Yishuv**, as the Jewish settlement in Palestine was known, grew increasingly prosperous.

British rule imposed on Palestine after war and confirmed by League of Nations mandate

Jewish immigration in 1920s led to:

- Arabs losing land
- outbreaks of Arab–Jewish violence in 1921 and 1929
- British reports recommending restrictions on immigration but Zionist pressure on British government prevented implementation

Nazi anti-Semitism in 1930s contributed to increased Jewish immigration to Palestine

Jewish community in Palestine grew increasingly prosperous

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

British rule in Palestine 1919–36

4

The Arab Rebellion and British partition plan

▶ **Key question:** *To what extent did the British side with the Zionists during the mandate?*

KEY TERM

Arab Higher Committee

A committee of Palestinian Arab leaders, formed in 1936, that attempted to direct the Arab Rebellion. It was composed of different, often rival, factions.

Haganah The Jewish Defence Force, which was set up in the 1920s and was later to form the basis of the Israeli army.

What was the impact of the Arab Rebellion?

Arab resistance

The strike was largely unsuccessful. Arab workers in Jewish businesses who went on strike were simply replaced by Jewish workers while Arab employees of the British government lost their ability to influence government policies if they went on strike. In one of the places where a strike was successful, in the port of Haifa, the result was the further development of the largely Jewish port of Tel Aviv.

Widespread fighting broke out in the countryside. It started gradually, with isolated incidents: Arab farmers fought to prevent being evicted from land bought by Jews; villagers attacked Jews cultivating traditional village land sold to Jews by an absentee Arab landlord. Then armed Arab bands attacked Jewish settlements. Within a month, over 20 Jews had been killed. By mid-summer, Palestine was caught up in a civil war that was to last for three years and cost thousands of lives. The British responded harshly. They hanged several Arab leaders, exiled others and destroyed houses suspected of containing Arab terrorists or arms. They also helped to train and organize the Jewish Defence Force, the **Haganah**.

Orde Wingate was a British officer who trained and led 'special night squads' of Jewish units to attack Arab rebels and to search Arab villages for weapons. Wingate was an effective military leader, but also a very cruel one (see Source O).

SOURCE O

An excerpt from *Gideon Goes to War* by Leonard Mosley, 1955, quoted in *The Arab–Israeli Conflict* by S.J. Perkins, published by Macmillan, London, 1987, page 28. Mosley was a British journalist and historian.

Wingate went up to the four Arab prisoners. He said in Arabic, 'You have arms in the village. Where have you hidden them?' The Arabs shook their heads. Wingate reached down and took sand from the ground. He thrust it into the mouth of the first Arab and pushed it down until he puked. 'Now', he said, 'Where have you hidden the arms?' Still they shook their heads. Wingate turned to one of the Jews and, pointing to the coughing Arab, said, 'Shoot this man'. The Jew looked at him and hesitated. Wingate said in a tense voice, 'Did you hear? Shoot this man.' The Jew shot the Arab. The others stared in horror at the dead body. The Jewish boys looked in silence. 'Now speak,' said Wingate. They spoke.

What light does Source O throw on Britain's role in the Arab Rebellion?



In May 1936, David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the Jewish Agency, recognized that the Arab Rebellion had widespread support and that it was the beginning of a national movement. In a speech to members of the agency, he said: 'We and they [the Arabs] want the same thing: We both want Palestine. And that is the fundamental conflict.' He concluded that only war, not negotiation, would resolve the conflict. He did not use the term 'Iron Wall' but he recognized that only force would enable the Jews to establish an independent state in Palestine.

The Peel Commission 1937

In 1937, at the height of the rebellion, the British government set up an inquiry, led by Lord Peel. In their report, the Peel Commission stated that co-operation between Arabs and Jews was impossible, as can be seen in Source P.

Why did the British decide on, and later reject, the partition of Palestine?

SOURCE P

An excerpt from the Peel Commission's report, July 1937, quoted in *The Middle East 1914–1979* by T.G. Fraser, published by Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1980, page 22.

About 1,000,000 Arabs are in strife with some 400,000 Jews. There is no common ground between them. The Arab community is predominantly Asiatic in character, the Jewish community largely European. They differ in religion and language. Their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct, are as incompatible as their national aspirations. These last are the greatest bar to peace.

The War [of 1914–18] inspired all Arabs with the hope of reviving in a free and united world the traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews similarly are inspired by their historic past. They mean to show what the Jewish nation can achieve when restored to the land of its birth. National assimilation between Arabs and Jews is thus ruled out.

For what reasons, according to the report in Source P, are the Arabs and Jews opposed to each other?



KEY TERM

Partition Division into two or more parts.



In your own words, explain what the author of Source Q sees as the main foundations of the Arab claim to Palestine.

The report recommended the **partition** of Palestine into two separate states, one Jewish and the other Arab. The Arabs rejected the plan. One Arab point of view was expressed by George Antonius, who was unusual in believing that a moderate number of Jews were welcome in Palestine but definitely believed that Palestine should be an independent Arab state (see Source Q).

SOURCE Q

An excerpt from *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* by George Antonius, published by Hamish Hamilton, London, UK, 1938. George Antonius was a Christian Arab diplomat and author.

The Arab claims [to all of Palestine] rest on two distinct foundations: the natural right of a settled population, in great majority agricultural, to remain in possession of the land of its birthright; and the acquired political rights which followed from the disappearance of Turkish sovereignty and from the Arab share in its overthrow, and which Great Britain is under a contractual obligation to recognise and uphold.

The Zionist response to the partition plan

The Jewish Agency agreed to the partition plan even though they wanted more land than they were allocated under it. But even then, many Palestinian Jews foresaw that they would have to fight to defend a Jewish state. They knew that the Arabs would never agree to it. Furthermore, some Jewish leaders wanted *all* Palestine to be made into a Jewish state.

One of these was Ben-Gurion. He accepted the plan because he knew that the Jews were not yet strong enough to demand more. But he always hoped for more: he assumed that an independent state would allow for unlimited Jewish immigration, the development of a strong economy and the organization of a powerful army. Then, after that, as he said in a letter to his son, Jews would be able to settle in all parts of Palestine (see Source R).

SOURCE R

An excerpt from a letter from Ben-Gurion to his son, October, 1937, quoted in *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* by Avi Shlaim, Penguin, London, UK, 2000, page 21. Ben-Gurion was the leader of the Jewish Agency.

I am certain we will be able to settle in all the other parts of the country, whether through agreement and mutual understanding with our Arab neighbours or in another way.

So, although the official policy of the Jewish Agency was to accept a Jewish state in *part* of Palestine, alongside an Arab one, Ben-Gurion and some other leaders hoped for a Jewish state in *all* of Palestine.

The fighting between Arabs, Jews and British forces lasted for three years. Eventually, with the help of more troops, better weapons and transport, the British forces were able to regain control of Palestine. By that time, in 1939,



What do you think Ben-Gurion meant by the words 'in another way' in Source R?

the Arabs had suffered considerable casualties and the Palestinian Arab leadership had effectively been destroyed. These and subsequent losses (see Source S) were to have a dramatic impact on the Palestinians' ability to defend themselves in the civil war that emerged in 1947–8.

SOURCE S

An excerpt from 'The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure' by Rashid Khalidi, an essay in *The War for Palestine* edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001, page 27. Khalidi is an American–Palestinian Professor of History at Columbia University in New York, USA.

Over 10% of the Arab male population was killed, wounded, imprisoned or exiled ... The British also confiscated large quantities of arms and ammunition during the revolt, and continued to do so during later years. These heavy military losses were to affect the Palestinians profoundly a few years later when Britain handed the Palestine question over to the United Nations, and it became clear that an open battle for control of the country between Arabs and Jews would take place.

What does the author of Source S see as the most significant effects, on the Palestinians, of the Arab Rebellion?



The British government White Paper 1939

By 1939, when the rebellion ended, the British government had given up all further ideas of partition. The Second World War (1939–45) was approaching and Britain feared the growth of friendship between Arab leaders and Germany. Britain needed to keep the Arab countries on its side so that oil supplies from the Middle East would continue to reach it. The government issued a special report called a **White Paper**. This declared that Britain wanted an independent Palestine within 10 years. This would be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab one but one in which Arabs and Jews shared responsibility for governing the country. Meanwhile, Britain would continue to rule Palestine. The White Paper also said that Britain would restrict Jewish immigration (see Source T).

SOURCE T

An excerpt from the 1939 British government White Paper, issued on 17 May 1939, quoted in *The Middle East 1914–1979* by T.G. Fraser, published by Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1980, pages 23–4.

For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed ...

In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted.

After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.


KEY TERM

White Paper A government document making recommendations for discussion.

Why would Zionists see Source T as a betrayal by the British? How would Arabs have viewed the White Paper?



Not surprisingly, the Jews were furious. To them, this was an act of betrayal by the British.



SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The Arab Rebellion and British partition plan

Chapter summary

Jews, Arabs and the British in Palestine before 1945

From the late nineteenth century, a number of European Jews started to emigrate to Palestine hoping to establish a Jewish homeland. Then, in the First World War, the British sought to enlist the support of the following:

- Zionists, by making the Balfour Declaration, which promised British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine
- Arabs, so that they would fight against the Turks in the hope of achieving independence at the end of the war

- France, by secretly agreeing with it to distribute Turkey's Arab colonies between themselves at the end of the war.

The Arabs felt betrayed by the British, who took control of Palestine after the war and allowed more Jewish immigration in the 1920s and 1930s. The Arabs feared losing their land and, when an Arab rebellion erupted in 1936, the British suppressed it and appeared to side with the Jews. Then, as the Second World War approached in 1939, the British angered the Jews by deciding to abandon their support for a Jewish state and to impose strict limits on immigration.



Activities

During the British mandate in Palestine, there were several serious outbreaks of violence between Palestinian Arabs and Zionists. The British authorities often responded by sending out a group of officials to determine the causes of the violence and offer recommendations.

In small groups, investigate each of these. These commissions of inquiry were sent to Palestine in 1921, 1929, 1937, 1938 and 1946. Try to determine the following:

- 1** Why was the commission sent out?
- 2** What recommendations did it make?
- 3** Were the recommendations carried out?

The final years of the British mandate in Palestine 1945–8

This chapter focuses on the final years of British rule in Palestine, particularly on why, and with what effects, the British decided to hand over responsibility for Palestine to the United Nations. It explains how the plan to divide Palestine into Arab and Jewish states led to a civil war during which 300,000 Arabs left what was to become the state of Israel. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- ★ How did the Zionists lay the groundwork for independence and prepare for an independent state?
- ★ Why did the partition plan lead to civil war?
- ★ Did the Palestinians leave voluntarily or were they expelled?

1 Terrorism and the end of British rule in Palestine 1945–8

► **Key question:** How did the Zionists lay the groundwork for independence and prepare for an independent state?

What was Zionist policy in Palestine during the war and how did it change after the war?

→ British and Zionist policy in Palestine

The Jews in Palestine were represented by the Jewish Agency (see page 23) and it shaped Zionist policy in Palestine. In effect, it was a state within a state. In 1937, the Jewish Agency had agreed to the British plan to divide Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. Then, in 1939, the British decided *not* to partition Palestine. This was a setback to Jewish hopes for a separate Jewish state but the Zionists were not about to give in. They began to campaign against the British policy.

During the Second World War

Nevertheless, on the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, most Palestinian Jews decided to support Britain in the fight against Nazi Germany. Many fought in the British army which, in the long term, would enable them to gain valuable military experience and, even, weapons.

Volunteers from Palestine were organized into the Jewish Brigade. This would serve them well when the state of Israel was created in May 1948.

From 1939 onwards, the British were preoccupied with winning the war against Germany. They gave little thought to the future of Palestine and maintained their policy of controlling Jewish immigration so as not to antagonize the Arabs. Then, in 1944, towards the end of the war, a British government committee discussed partition again only to abandon the idea after Lord Moyne, a government minister, was murdered by the **Stern Gang**, a Jewish terrorist organization.

During the war, the official Jewish policy in Palestine was to support the British war effort while continuing to campaign against the White Paper policy of 1939 that had opposed the idea of a separate Jewish state and sought to control immigration. This was summarized by David Ben-Gurion (see Source A).

SOURCE A

An excerpt from a speech by Ben-Gurion, quoted in *A History of Modern Palestine* by Ilan Pappé, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004, page 118. Ben-Gurion was the leader of the Jewish Agency.

We shall fight alongside the British army against the Germans as if the anti-Zionist White Paper of 1939 did not exist, and fight against the White Paper as if the war with Germany did not exist.

After the Second World War

When the war ended, in 1945, the British announced that there would be no change in their policy in Palestine: that is, there would be no big increase in immigration and no separate Jewish state. But the war had toughened the Zionists: six million Jews had been killed in the Nazi **Holocaust** and the Zionists were not in a mood to be patient. They were convinced that they had justice on their side and that international public opinion was coming round to support the idea of an independent Jewish state. In August 1945, the Zionist conference decided on a policy of active opposition to British rule in Palestine. Their leaders ordered the Haganah, the Jewish defence force, to co-operate with **Irgun** and the Stern Gang, two secret, underground Jewish organizations. British military bases, railways, trains and bridges in Palestine became the target of these terrorist groups.

US support for a Jewish state

The Zionists also decided that the USA, not Britain, was now the country they needed to have on their side. Only the USA, one of the two **superpowers** that emerged after the war, could put enough pressure on Britain to agree to a separate Jewish state and to leave Palestine. The Zionists

KEY TERM

Stern Gang A Zionist terrorist group founded in 1939.

Holocaust The extermination of nearly six million Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War.

Why do you think the policy outlined in Source A is so astute?



KEY TERM

Irgun A small secret Zionist organization which had been formed in 1937 to protect Jewish settlements from attack during the Arab Rebellion of 1936–9 and, from 1945, fought for a Jewish state in *all* of Palestine.

Superpowers The two biggest powers, the USA and the USSR, after the Second World War.

Why was US support so important for the Zionists?

had the support of the Jewish population in the USA who could, in turn, put pressure on the US government. There were four and a half million Jewish Americans, two million of them in New York city alone. By the end of the war, nearly all of them were Zionists, convinced of the need to establish an independent Jewish state for the millions of Jewish refugees who had survived the Nazi Holocaust in Europe.

As early as May 1942, when news was only just beginning to emerge of the Nazi extermination of the Jews, the US Zionist conference had declared their support for a 'Jewish commonwealth' in *all* of Palestine. This became known as the Biltmore Declaration after the name of the hotel in New York in which the conference was held.

KEY TERM

Lobby To campaign for the support of, and put pressure on, members of a law-making body so as to shape its policy.

After the war, US Zionists, often joined by Jewish leaders from Palestine, launched a propaganda offensive: they addressed meetings, held rallies, placed advertisements and, above all, **lobbied** members of the US government and Congress, in order to win support. In April 1946, the US president, Harry Truman, called on the British government to allow the immediate entry of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. Six months later, he came out in support of the partition of Palestine.

Why and how did the Zionists resort to terrorism in Palestine?

→ Jewish terrorism

Meanwhile, in Palestine itself, the Zionists targeted the British. The reasons are not hard to see. The British authorities stopped boatloads of illegal Jewish immigrants from landing in Palestine. The British knew that Jewish immigration angered the Arabs and, when violence broke out between Jews and Arabs, British troops and police had to keep order. The British realized that further Jewish immigration would be resisted by the Arabs and lead to civil war, so they refused to agree to any increase in immigration. The Haganah, for their part, did all they could to obstruct the British and to assist illegal immigration.

The Palestinian Arabs continued to oppose the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine. They feared that such a state would be filled with immigrants from Europe who would demand further expansion and a larger Jewish state incorporating all of Palestine. Besides, the Arabs felt that the West should take responsibility for the victims of the Holocaust. After all, the Holocaust had been carried out in the West. The Arabs felt that the western powers should find a home for the Jews in another part of the world.

Bombing of the King David Hotel 1946

Jewish attacks on British forces now increased, sometimes in retaliation for death sentences passed on Jewish fighters. In April 1946, six British soldiers were murdered in one incident and, in July 1946, Irgun carried out their most spectacular act of terrorism – the attack on the King David Hotel in

Jerusalem. This hotel housed the British military headquarters in Palestine. It was protected by barbed wire, machine guns and patrolling soldiers. At noon on 22 July 1946, a lorry drove up to the entrance of the hotel kitchen. Men dressed as Arabs got out and unloaded their cargo of milk churns. They rolled them into the building. No one guessed that the milk churns contained high explosives or that the men were members of Irgun. At 12.37p.m. the explosion tore through the building killing 91 people, including 15 Jews.

Other terrorist acts

Terrorist incidents like these weakened the morale of the British, both in Palestine and at home. They also led to frustration and anger at what the British saw as support for terrorism from US Zionists. After the killing of 20 British soldiers in the officers' club in Jerusalem in February 1947, the British prime minister, Clement Atlee, complained of a report he had heard that the mayor of New York had launched a Zionist drive to raise £2 million for the purchase of 'men, guns and money'. The British leader protested that 'the guns which are being subscribed for in America can only be required to shoot at British soldiers in Palestine'.

The British decision to hand over Palestine to the United Nations

In the summer of 1947 two incidents finally convinced the British that they should withdraw from Palestine. One was the hanging of two British soldiers in revenge for the execution of three Irgun members: a photograph of the two men hanging from a tree appeared on the front page of several British newspapers (see Source B, page 34). The other incident involved a ship called *The Exodus* which was carrying 4500 refugees from Europe. It was prevented, by the British authorities, from landing its passengers in Palestine and was sent back to Europe. This incident attracted widespread publicity, winning much sympathy for the Jewish refugees, and was thus a huge propaganda success for the Zionists. As a result of actions like these, the British authorities came in for world-wide criticism.

The British were also exhausted after the Second World War, with food shortages and rationing at home, and could hardly afford to keep 100,000 troops and police in Palestine. After 30 years of ruling Palestine, the British government decided that it would hand it over to the United Nations (UN) in May 1948.


Why did the British decide to withdraw from Palestine?



What impact might Source B have had on British public opinion?

SOURCE B

This photograph appeared on the front page of the *Daily Express* in August 1947. It shows two British soldiers who had been hanged by members of Irgun.



SUMMARY DIAGRAM

Terrorism and the end of British rule in Palestine 1945–8

2 The UN partition plan and civil war

► **Key question:** Why did the partition plan lead to civil war?

As early as February 1947, the British government sought the advice of the UN, which had been formed at the end of the Second World War. The UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was set up to investigate, and then make recommendations on how to resolve, the Palestine problem. The UNSCOP report was completed in August (see Source C).

SOURCE C

An excerpt from the report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), August 1947.

The basic conflict in Palestine is a clash of two intense nationalisms ... there are now in Palestine some 650,000 Jews and 1,200,000 Arabs who are dissimilar in their ways of living and, for the time being, separated by political interests which render difficult full and effective political co-operation ... It is recognised that partition has been strongly opposed by Arabs, but it is felt that opposition would be lessened by a solution which definitively fixes the extent of territory to be allotted to the Jews with its implicit limitation on immigration. The fact that the solution carries the sanction of the United Nations involves a finality which should allay Arab fears of further expansion of the Jewish state.

What, according to the UNSCOP report in Source C, might lessen Arab opposition to partition?



UN votes for partition, November 1947

In November, the **UN General Assembly** voted to accept the recommendations of the UNSCOP report by 33 votes to 13 (with 10 abstentions). The main recommendation was to divide Palestine and set up both a Jewish and an Arab state. The areas that were more Jewish (in population and land ownership) were to be allocated to the Jewish state and those which were mainly Arab to the Arab state. However, although the Jews only made up one-third of the population and owned less than 10 per cent of the land, they were to be given 55 per cent of the overall territory. As you can see in Source D (page 36), the suggested partition resulted in a criss-cross arrangement with 'kissing points' at the intersections. The UN thought, rather optimistically, that this would force the two sides to co-operate. The holy city of Jerusalem was to be an international zone governed by an international force.

The Arab response

The Arab Higher Committee, representing the Palestinian Arabs, rejected the UN partition plan, especially as the Jews were to be given the larger area and many of the Palestinian cities designated as part of the Jewish state, such as Haifa and Jaffa, contained large Arab majorities.

What was the response to the UNSCOP report?

KEY TERM

UN General Assembly

The main body of the UN in which every member state is represented.



Look at Source D. What problems might you expect in a state that is divided into three parts?

SOURCE D

A map showing the UN partition plan.



Read Source E. On what grounds did the Arab Higher Committee reject the partition plan?

SOURCE E

An excerpt from the Palestinian Arab response to the UNSCOP proposals for partition conveyed to the UN in September 1947 by Jamal al-Husseini, the leader of the Arab Higher Committee.

The Zionists claimed the establishment of a Jewish National Home by virtue of the Balfour Declaration. But the British Government had no right to dispose of Palestine which it had occupied in the name of the Allies as a liberator and not a conqueror. The Balfour Declaration was in contradiction with the Covenant of the League of Nations and was an immoral, unjust and illegal promise.

The solution lay in the Charter of the United Nations, in accordance with which the Arabs of Palestine, who constituted the majority, were entitled to a free and independent state ... Once Palestine was found to be entitled to independence, the United Nations was not legally competent to decide or impose the constitutional organisation of Palestine, since such action would amount to interference with an internal matter of an independent nation.

The Jewish response

The Jewish Agency in Palestine officially accepted the plan despite the exclusion of Jerusalem from the Jewish state: the Jews in Palestine were pleased that they now had international support for the idea of a Jewish state.

SOURCE F

An excerpt from the Jewish response to the UNSCOP proposals for partition, October 1947, conveyed to the UN by Rabbi Hillel Silver of the Jewish Agency.

The plan proposed that the City of Jerusalem should be established as a separate unit. But modern Jerusalem contained a compact Jewish community of 90,000 inhabitants, and included the central national, religious and educational institutions of the Jewish people of Palestine ... It was the ancient capital of the Jewish nation and its symbol throughout the ages ...

If that heavy sacrifice was the inescapable condition of a final solution ... then the Jewish Agency was prepared to recommend the acceptance of the partition solution ... subject to further discussion of constitutional and territorial provisions.

Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources E and F about the UN partition plan.



Not all of the Jews in Palestine were happy with the plan: not only was Jerusalem excluded from the Jewish state but many Jewish settlements were to be included in the Arab state. David Ben-Gurion said: 'tens of thousands of our youth are prepared to lay down their lives for the sake of Jerusalem. It is within the boundaries of the state of Israel just as Tel Aviv is'. Others, like those in the Irgun and Stern Gang, went further. Menachem Begin, leader of Irgun, announced: 'the partition of the homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized. It will not bind the Jewish people. Jerusalem was and will for ever be our capital. **Eretz Israel** will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And for ever'.

Civil war in Palestine, November 1947 to May 1948

A few days after the UN voted for partition, the Arab Higher Committee proclaimed a three-day strike that led to outbreaks of violence against Jewish civilians. However, the Jewish Agency and its forces were ready to respond. They had always known that the Arabs would resist the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. In December 1947, when the British announced that they would leave Palestine in May 1948, the fighting between Arabs and Jews intensified. At first, the Jewish forces acted defensively: they sought to hold on to and defend the land they had been allocated by the UN. However, they soon also went on the offensive and fought to gain control of Jewish settlements in the land allocated to the Arabs and of the roads leading to them.

KEY TERM

Eretz Israel The Land of Israel, as in the Bible. In effect, this meant the whole of Palestine, not just the area allocated to the Jewish state by the UN.

← **Why was there a civil war in Palestine?**

The Palestinian Arabs were still suffering from the British repression of 1936–9 (see pages 24 and 27) and lacked a unified leadership. In fact, the dominant Palestinian leader, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the mufti (Muslim religious leader) of Jerusalem, was in exile in Lebanon although he still claimed to lead the nationalist movement.

SOURCE G

An excerpt from ‘The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure’ by Rashid Khalidi, an essay in *The War for Palestine* edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001, page 30. Khalidi is an American–Palestinian Professor of History at Columbia University in New York.

The Palestinians entered the fighting which followed the passage of the UN Partition resolution with a deeply divided leadership, exceedingly limited finances and no centrally organized military forces. They faced a Jewish society in Palestine which, although small relative to theirs, was politically unified, had centralized institutions [for example, the Jewish Agency and Haganah], and was exceedingly well-led and extremely highly motivated.

In 1948, soldiers from Syria and Iraq began to cross into Palestine to help the Arabs. This was no surprise to the Jewish leaders. They fully expected neighbouring Arab states to invade Palestine when the British left and the new Jewish state came into existence. So they resolved to secure control over Jewish territory. In March, the Haganah came up with Plan Dalet (Plan D), the aim of which was to:

- take over any installations evacuated by the British, especially military bases
- expel as many Palestinians as possible from the future Jewish state.

Already, by February 1948, many of the Palestinian élite, such as landowners and businessmen, had left Palestine. This contributed to feelings of insecurity among the Arab masses, especially in the villages, and encouraged others to leave. Then, in April 1948, Jewish forces began the forcible expulsion of Arabs from villages inside what was to become the Jewish state. Nearly all of the villages along the coast from Tel Aviv to Haifa were cleared of their Arab populations. Armed Jewish forces surrounded each village on three sides, forcing the villagers to flee through the fourth side. If the people refused to leave, they were often forced on to lorries and driven away to Transjordan. Similarly, Jewish forces took over mixed Arab–Jewish towns like Jaffa and Haifa. In Haifa, where explosions were set off by Jewish forces in Arab areas of the city, nearly all of the Arab population of 100,000 fled the city.

Deir Yassin, April 1948

There was a particularly bitter struggle to control the roads leading to Jerusalem and massacres of civilians were carried out by both sides. Some of the massacres by Jewish forces were in retaliation for Palestinian attacks on



To what extent do you think Source G explains why, in the author's later words, 'the outcome of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict of 1947–8 was thus a foregone conclusion'?

Jewish settlements or on convoys trying to supply the Jewish population of Jerusalem. However, the targets for Jewish attacks were not random: they were carefully chosen. They were intended to rid the future Jewish state of as many Arabs as possible. In the weeks before the British withdrawal from Palestine, some of the bloodiest fighting took place in and around Jerusalem. A particularly highly publicized and well-known incident took place, in April 1948, in the village of Deir Yassin. It was inside what was to be Arab territory under the UN plan and it was the last village on the western side of Jerusalem whose Arab inhabitants had not fled. On 9 April, Irgun fighters, led by Menachem Begin, attacked the village and killed 245 inhabitants. They said they believed it was an Arab headquarters. Begin himself wrote an account of the fighting and of its effects (see Source H).

SOURCE H

An excerpt from *The Revolt* by Menachem Begin, published by Nash, New York, USA, 1951. Menachem Begin led the Irgun fighters in the attack on Deir Yassin.

The civilian population of Deir Yassin was actually given a warning by us before the battle began. ... A substantial number of the inhabitants obeyed the warning and they were unhurt. Our men were compelled to fight for every house. ... And the civilians who had disregarded our warnings suffered inevitable casualties. Throughout the Arab world and the world at large, a wave of lying propaganda was let loose about 'Jewish atrocities' ... The Arabs began to flee in terror, even before they clashed with Jewish forces. ... Arab propaganda spread a legend of terror amongst Arabs and Arab troops, who were seized with panic at the mention of Irgun soldiers. The legend was worth half a dozen battalions to the forces of Israel.

What do you think Begin meant by 'The legend was worth half a dozen battalions to the forces of Israel' in Source H?



A young Haganah officer wrote an account of what he witnessed (Source I).

SOURCE I

An excerpt from an account by Meir Pa'el quoted in *The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East* by David Hirst, published by Futura, London, UK, 1978, page 126. Meir Pa'el wrote this at the time. Twenty-four years later, when he retired from the Israeli army, he released his report.

It was noon when the battle was over and the shooting stopped. Things had become quiet, but the village had not surrendered. The Irgun and LEHI [Stern Gang] men came out of hiding and began to 'clean' the houses. They shot whoever they saw, women and children included; the commanders did not try to stop the massacres ... I pleaded with the commander to order his men to cease fire, but to no avail. In the meantime, 25 Arabs had been loaded on a truck ... and murdered in cold blood.

Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources H and I about the incident in Deir Yassin.



A foreign observer wrote about the effects of the massacre (Source J).



With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source H (page 39) and Source J for historians studying the effects of the massacre at Deir Yassin.

SOURCE J

An excerpt from the report of Jacques de Reynier, quoted in *Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians* by David Gilmour, published by Sphere, London, UK, 1980, page 69. De Reynier was the French head of the International Red Cross in Palestine. He visited Deir Yassin the day after the incident.

The affair of Deir Yassin had immense repercussions. The press and radio spread the news everywhere among Arabs as well as Jews. In this way, a general terror was built up among the Arabs ... Driven by fear, the Arabs left their homes to find shelter among their kindred [relatives]; first isolated farms, then villages, and in the end, whole towns were evacuated.

By 14 May 1948, when the British finally withdrew from Palestine, over 300,000 Arabs had fled from what was to become the new Jewish state. This was a victory for the Jews but a disaster for the Arabs.

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The UN partition plan and civil war

November 1947: UN voted to partition Palestine

- Official Zionist policy: accept partition although some wanted all of Palestine for Jewish state
- Palestinian Arabs rejected partition



Civil war, November 1947 to May 1948

- Massacres committed by both Arabs and Jews
- Jewish forces expelled Arabs from land allocated to state of Israel

3

Key debate

► **Key question:** Did the Palestinians leave voluntarily or were they expelled?

The day after the UNSCOP report was formally accepted in November 1947, the fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine intensified. Most historians agree that both sides were guilty of carrying out attacks which were then followed by retaliations and, in this way, the fighting escalated.

By the time the British left Palestine in 1948 and the state of Israel was proclaimed, over 300,000 Arabs had fled from what was to be the independent state of Israel. Ever since, there has been continuing debate over whether the Palestinians were expelled or chose to leave.

The Zionist interpretation

The conventional Zionist interpretation is that Jewish military actions after November 1947 were largely defensive. They were designed to defend Jewish settlements and the roads linking them, especially the more isolated settlements like those in the Negev desert. Jewish forces were particularly keen to keep open the roads to Jerusalem where there were about 2500 Jews living in the Old City (eastern Jerusalem). Those roads were often narrow and they were bordered by many Arab villages. Jewish armed forces fought particularly hard for control of these roads as the Jews living in Jerusalem were so vulnerable: they were regularly besieged so that they were cut off and ran short on basic supplies. This explains why some of the most intense fighting took place on the roads leading to Jerusalem and in nearby villages like Deir Yassin. No one side was more to blame for the intensity of the fighting and, if it caused thousands of Arabs to flee to neighbouring Arab states, then that was because they felt they would be able to return with invading Arab armies when the British left and the state of Israel came into existence.

In the case of coastal towns like Haifa and Jaffa, so the standard Zionist history goes, thousands of Arabs followed the example of their leaders, both civilian and military, and fled. Furthermore, their leaders called on them, in the press and on the radio, to leave, assuring them that they would be able to return with conquering Arab armies and reclaim their property and their livelihoods.

Alternative explanations for the Arab exodus have been offered ever since. A few of them have come from Israeli historians. However, those Israeli historians who challenged the standard interpretation laid themselves open to accusations of being unpatriotic, of betraying those who gave their lives for their country and who ensured that the state of Israel was able to defend itself and survive once those Arab armies did invade. The standard Zionist interpretation remained predominant, both in Israel itself and in the West, for many years. (Interpretations in the Arab world had, not surprisingly, been more anti-Israeli from the start.)

SOURCE K

An excerpt from *Getting It Straight: Israel in Perspective* published by the Britain/Israel Public Affairs Centre (BIPAC), London, UK, 1984. This is an example of the standard Zionist interpretation.

If the Arabs were so attached to their land, why did they leave it during a crisis? The blame must belong to Arab leaders who, expecting a quick victory by their combined armies over Israel, encouraged Arabs to leave Palestine, promising that on their return they would be able to claim the property of the Jews as well. Arab propaganda led them to fear what would happen to them if they stayed, and threatened that they would also be considered traitors to the Arab cause.

Who, according to Source K, is responsible for the Arab flight?



KEY TERM

Revisionist A revised interpretation is one based on a critical re-examination of historical facts.

The revisionist interpretation

From the 1980s, a number of new, more critical explanations for the Arab exodus were published, both in Israel and the West. The emergence of these new, **revisionist** interpretations is partly explained by the release of official Israeli government documents. Like the British, the Israelis had adopted a 30-year rule which meant that many previously secret papers were declassified and open to scrutiny by historians after 30 years. Thus documents dealing with the final years of British rule became available from the late 1970s.

These newer interpretations, by Israeli historians like Benny Morris, challenged the conventional Israeli interpretation. They pointed out that the Haganah and the Jewish Agency condoned, or certainly turned a blind eye to, some of the operations carried out by Irgun and the Stern Gang. The Jewish Agency *did* reprimand the perpetrators of the Deir Yassin massacre but, as Menachem Begin admitted, the effect of the massacre was to make tens of thousands more Palestinians flee from surrounding Arab villages in the few weeks between the massacre and the proclamation of the state of Israel.

SOURCE L

An excerpt from 'Revising the Palestinian exodus of 1948' by Benny Morris, an essay in *The War for Palestine* edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001, page 38. Morris is Professor of History at Ben-Gurion University in Israel.

The refugee problem was caused by attacks by Jewish forces on Arab villages and towns and by the inhabitants' fears of such attacks, compounded by expulsions, atrocities, and rumours of atrocities.



What, according to Source L, caused the refugee problem?

The newer, more critical histories also interpreted what happened in large coastal towns like Haifa and Jaffa, which were to be part of the Jewish state, rather differently. They pointed out that Jewish armed forces were determined to persuade as many Arabs as possible to leave so as to ensure that the forthcoming Israeli state was predominantly Jewish. Jewish loudspeakers broadcast into the Arab quarters news of what had happened in Deir Yassin. The forces of Irgun and the Stern Gang threw bombs into crowded Arab quarters and thus aided the Haganah forces in their less overtly violent campaign (Plan D) to expel as many Arabs as possible. The Jewish mayor of Haifa may have called on Arab inhabitants to stay put and remain but there is no recorded evidence of Arab leaders calling on their people, by loudspeaker or radio (as many histories had claimed), to flee from their homes. Source M is an example of the kind of primary source material on which revisionist interpretations were based.

SOURCE M

An excerpt from ‘The other exodus’, an article by Erskine Childers, *The Spectator*, London, UK, 12 May 1961. Childers was an Irish journalist.

I next decided to test the charge that the Arab evacuation orders were broadcast by Arab radio – which could be done thoroughly because the BBC monitored all Middle East broadcasts throughout 1948. The records, and companion ones by a US monitoring unit, can be seen at the British Museum.

There was not a single order, or appeal, or suggestion about evacuation from Palestine from any Arab radio station, inside or outside Palestine in 1948. There is a repeated monitored record of Arab appeal, even flat orders, to the civilians of Palestine to stay put.

How useful is Source M for a historian studying the causes of the Arab flight?



Conclusion

A consensus among historians has begun to emerge in recent years. Most agree that there was not a specific, detailed plan or an explicit order for the systematic expulsion of Palestinians, even if some individual local commanders interpreted Plan D in that way. However, Plan D did create an atmosphere which, in the opinion of revisionist Israeli historian, Ilan Pappé, writing in 2004, ‘paved the way for the ethnic cleansing operation in Palestine’.

One reason why the historical debate over the Arab exodus has been so intense is because it touches on the core of Israel’s image of itself. Most Israeli commentators, whether historians or political leaders, were keen to portray Israel as the innocent victim, rather than the conqueror, in the events of the years 1947–9. At the end of Chapter 3, you will see how this has influenced the debate over the outcome of the war which ensued once the state of Israel was proclaimed.

TOK

Can you think of examples, from other historical periods, when a nationalist version of history has been used in the process of nation-building? (History, Ethics, Language, Emotion and Reason.)

Chapter summary

The final years of the British mandate in Palestine 1945–8

The Jews in Palestine largely supported the British during the Second World War. Then, when it ended,

they went on to the offensive in order to end British rule in Palestine and achieve a state of their own. In the face of increasing hostility from Palestinian Jews, the British decided to hand over Palestine to the UN which, in turn, decided on partition. Civil war between Arabs and Jews ensued and, by the time the British finally went, about 300,000 Palestinian Arabs had left what was to become the Jewish state of Israel.



Examination advice

Paper 1 question 1: how to answer direct questions

Question 1 on the IB History Diploma examination is in two parts. Each part involves reading comprehension and simply asks you to tell the examiner what the sources say. Each of the questions will ask only about one source. You will often see questions that ask you to convey the message or meaning of a source. This is asking you to explain what the source is saying.

Question 1 requires no prior knowledge, just the ability to read and understand sources. When you start your examination, you will receive five minutes of 'reading time' when you cannot actually touch your pen and start writing. Use the time wisely and read question 1a to see which source it is asking about. Once you understand which source the question is about, read the source and then think of your response. When the five minutes are up, you may begin writing and you should be ready to answer the question immediately.

Question 1 is worth 5 marks out of the total of 25 for all Paper 1. This means it is worth 20 per cent of the overall mark. Answering questions 1a and 1b should take about five minutes of the actual examination time.

How to answer

In order to best answer the question, you first have to determine what the question is asking you about the source and what type of source it is. The vast majority of sources are fragments of speeches, quotes from various historians or historical figures, or any other type of written source. There are, however, visual sources that can be asked about as well, such as photographs, charts, maps, cartoons and diagrams.

When you start your answer, it is good practice to use the wording in the question to help you to focus your answer. For example:

Question	Begin your answer with...
What does Source X suggest about the 1947 UN Partition Plan?	Source X suggests that ...
What, according to Source X, was the significance of the 1947 UN Partition Plan?	According to Source X, the significance of the UN plan was ...
What is meant by, 'The basic conflict in Palestine is a clash of two intense nationalisms', according to Source C?	According to Source C, 'the basic conflict' is ...

After starting your answer, understand that you should paraphrase what the original source stated. This means you should explain what the source says, but in your own words. Sometimes this is impossible because the words used in the source may be so specific that there is no other way to say them.

If this occurs, make sure you put quotation marks around the phrases which you are copying from the source.

The total number of marks available for question 1 is 5. One part is worth 3 marks and the other 2 and this will be clearly indicated on the examination paper. If a question is worth 2 marks, try to have at least two specific points to your answer. If a question is worth 3 marks, have at least three points. If possible, include one extra point in each answer in case one is incorrect.

Example

This question uses Sources E and B found in this chapter on pages 36 and 34.

- a) According to Source E, how had Palestinian rights been violated? (3 marks)
- b) What is the message conveyed in Source B? (2 marks)

It has just been announced that your reading time has begun on the IB History Paper 1 examination. Find the Paper 1 questions at the back of the examination booklet and read question 1a. It asks you to explain what Source E says about how Palestinian rights had been violated. You cannot touch your pen for five minutes, so go to Source E in the booklet and read it. Once you are allowed to pick up your pen and start writing, do so. Hopefully your answer will read something like this:

1a) According to Source E, Palestinian rights had been trampled on by the Balfour Declaration. The author, a Palestinian leader, believed the Declaration was a violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as being an 'immoral, unjust and illegal promise'. Furthermore, because the Palestinians were entitled to a state according to the UN Charter, the UN could not impose a decision on the Palestinians that went against their rights.

1b) The message conveyed in Source B is that Jewish terrorists in the Irgun were targeting British soldiers in Palestine. The photograph, published in a British newspaper, suggests that the Irgun was willing to do anything to achieve their goals. Hanging British soldiers also served as a warning to the British military and might force the British public to demand the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine.

Questions 1a and 1b were worth a combined 5 marks. Both answers indicate that the student read and understood what each source stated or portrayed. Question 1a was worth 3 marks. The answer for 1a contains at least three different points to address the question. Question 1b was worth 2 marks. The answer has more than two points to answer the question.

Each answer repeated part of the question, using phrases such as 'According to Source E' and 'The message conveyed in Source B is'. This helped the answer focus on the question.

Both sources are paraphrased in the answers.

Both 1a and 1b are answered in paragraph form and not bullet points.

Each answer states the origin of the source. While this is not required, it helps you build a better paragraph and may help you later when you are asked to discuss the origins of two of the sources.



Examination practice

The following are exam-style questions for you to practise, using sources from the chapter. Sources can be found on the following pages:

- Source B: page 34
- Source C: page 35
- Source D: page 36
- Source F: page 37
- Source H: page 39
- Source I: page 39
- Source J: page 40
- Source K: page 41
- Source L: page 42
- Source M: page 43

SAMPLE QUESTION 1s

- 1 What, according to Source C, were the Palestinian objections to the partition of Palestine?
- 2 What does Source D suggest about how Palestine was to be divided?
- 3 What, according to Source F, were the reasons why Jerusalem should be allotted to the Jews?
- 4 According to Source H, why did Arabs flee after what took place at Deir Yassin?
- 5 According to Source I, what evidence was there that a massacre occurred?
- 6 What, according to Source J, were the effects of the events at Deir Yassin?
- 7 What were the results of the journalist's investigation in Source M?

SAMPLE QUESTION 2

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 74–5.

Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources K and L regarding the flight of Palestinians in 1948.

SAMPLE QUESTION 3s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 125–7.

- 1 With reference to their origins and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Sources B and C for historians studying the lead-up to Israel's war for independence.
- 2 With reference to their origins and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Sources H and I for historians studying what took place at Deir Yassin.

SAMPLE QUESTION 4

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 142–3.

Using Sources H, I, J, K and L and your own knowledge, assess the reasons why Palestinians might have fled their villages.



Activities

Because Paper 1 is based on five sources, it is excellent preparation for you to work with different types of sources, both written and visual.

- 1** In groups of three, try to locate sources on one of the following:
 - the King David Hotel bombing
 - the US government's support for the Zionist cause 1945–8
 - the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948.
- 2** You should try to find a photograph, a contemporary newspaper account, an excerpt from a speech or memoir of one of the participants and a historian's view of one of the above items.
- 3** Put these sources together for your classmates, along with questions that might be asked similar to those found above.
- 4** In your group, discuss possible answers to the questions you have been given.
- 5** Write out answers to the questions, trying to keep within a 5–7-minute time frame.
- 6** Which answers are the most thorough and why?

The establishment of Israel and the war of 1948–9

This chapter examines what happened when the British finally left Palestine and the neighbouring Arab states invaded the new state of Israel. It outlines the war that followed and its outcome. It then examines why there was no peace treaty and assesses the historical debate about the reasons for Israeli victory. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- ★ Why was the struggle for Jerusalem so important for the Israelis?
- ★ What was the impact of the war on Israelis and Palestinians?
- ★ How did Israel win the war?

1 The war of 1948–9

▶ **Key question:** Why was the struggle for Jerusalem so important for the Israelis?

On 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the birth of the new state of Israel. The next day, armed forces from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt invaded. The state of Israel was thus born in war and its first aim was survival. Israel's War of Independence was to consist of three phases of fighting, interspersed by United Nations (UN) ceasefires.

Who won the battle for the control of Jerusalem?

→ The first phase of fighting, 15 May to 10 June 1948

In the south, an Egyptian army of 10,000 men crossed the border near the coast and attacked some isolated Jewish settlements in what was deemed to be part of the Arab state. In the north, Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese troops crossed the border but were resisted by Jewish settlers and most of the invaders were forced to withdraw. They lacked ammunition and were the least experienced of the Arab forces.

KEY TERM

Arab Legion The British-trained army of Transjordan.

The major conflict was the battle for Jerusalem, just as it had been in the final days of the British mandate. King Abdullah of Transjordan moved his **Arab Legion** to defend the Old City, the eastern part, of Jerusalem. His army was the one that the Israelis were keenest to defeat, for two main reasons. First, they wanted to gain control of all of the city of Jerusalem, including the Old

City that contained the Jewish holy places. Secondly, they knew that the Legion was the most effective and best trained Arab army and they believed that, if they could defeat it, then the other Arab armies would collapse. However, the Israelis were not able to defeat the Legion and the Israeli offensive was halted. Nevertheless, the Israelis did gain control of West Jerusalem without a big struggle and were thus able to feed and protect the Jewish population in that part of the city. The Arab inhabitants fled or were forced out.

Ceasefire, June 1948

On 10 June, the UN persuaded the warring parties to agree to a ceasefire. The Jordanians and Lebanese were willing to open peace talks but the Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis were not. During the lull, the Israelis secured fresh supplies of weapons from Eastern Europe, mainly from Czechoslovakia. (Britain had been the main supplier of arms to Egypt, Jordan and Iraq but was unwilling to disobey the UN embargo on supplying arms to the warring sides.) The Israelis used the ceasefire to recruit and retrain more men as well as to reorganize and rearm their forces. This gave them a significant advantage and, when the Egyptians broke the truce, the Israelis went on the offensive and seized the initiative from the Arab forces.

The second and third phases of fighting

The second phase of fighting, 9–18 July 1948

In the second phase of fighting, the Israeli priority was to try to widen the corridor leading to Jerusalem, taking land allocated to the Arabs in the process. They were particularly keen to control this territory in order to forestall any UN peace plan that might force them back to the borders which had been drawn in the 1947 partition plan (see page 36). They were largely successful but the Arab Legion held the Old City of Jerusalem. What the Arab Legion did not attempt was to seize land allocated to the Jewish state. In the south, the Israelis resisted further Egyptian advances in the Negev (see the map on page 50) while, in the north, they gained control of the whole Galilee region, including land that had been allocated to the Arabs. In the 10 days of fighting in this second phase of the war, Israel improved its position and was to retain the initiative for the rest of the war.

The assassination of the UN mediator, September 1948

In September, during the second truce, the special UN mediator, Count Bernadotte from Sweden, came up with a peace plan: it gave added land to the Arabs in the south and more land to the Israelis in the north but Jerusalem was still to be an international city, under UN control, and the Arab refugees were all to have the right to return home. The next day Bernadotte was assassinated by the Stern Gang. The new Israeli government was keen to maintain international support and ordered the dissolution of the Stern Gang and Irgun. Some of their members were then incorporated into the **Israeli Defence Force (IDF)**.

How were the Israelis able to take the initiative?

KEY TERM

Israeli Defence Force (IDF) The Israeli armed forces, most of whose members had been in the Haganah.

The third phase of fighting, 15 October 1948 to 7 January 1949

In mid-October, Israel broke the second ceasefire and concentrated on defeating the Egyptians in the south. This they did, even pursuing the Egyptian army over the border into Egypt. They agreed, under US pressure, to withdraw from Egyptian territory but they remained in complete control of the Negev when the final ceasefire was arranged in January 1949.

SOURCE A

A map showing Israeli gains in the 1948–9 war.



Look at Source A. How significant were Israel's territorial gains?



First phase of war, May–June 1948

- Israelis resisted invasion from north
- Failed to defeat Arab Legion but gained control of West Jerusalem

**Second phase of war, July 1948**

- Israelis re-equipped and reorganized during ceasefire
- Israelis gained land in north and kept control of West Jerusalem

**Third phase of war, October 1948 to January 1949**

- Israelis defeated Egyptians

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The war of 1948–9

2 The results of the war

▶ **Key question:** What was the impact of the war on Israelis and Palestinians?

Israel emerged from the war exhausted but well organized. The new nation had lost 6000 lives, which amounted to nearly one per cent of the entire Jewish population of 650,000. However, the Israelis now controlled 79 per cent of what had been the British mandate of Palestine, rather than the 55 per cent allocated to the new state by the UN (see Source A). On top of the 300,000 Palestinian Arabs who had fled from their homes by the time the British left Palestine in May 1948, another 400,000 fled by the end of the war in 1949. They had become refugees, having fled or been driven from their homes. Most ended up in Gaza or what became known as the West Bank (see Source A). This flight, and the events of 1947–9 as a whole, have become known in Arabic as the *nakba*, the catastrophe or disaster.

For the Israelis, this had been the war of national liberation. They had survived their first great test and were confident of their future as an independent nation. A US Zionist, Nahum Goldmann, wrote of the psychological effects of the Israeli victory (see Source B, page 52).

KEY TERM

Nakba An Arabic word for 'catastrophe' or 'disaster', used to refer to the 1948–9 war, the loss of Palestine and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem.



What, according to the writer in Source B, had Israelis learnt from their victory in the war? How was this to shape Israel's policy towards the Arabs?

SOURCE B

An excerpt from *The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann*, published in New York, USA, 1969, pages 289–90, quoted in *The Iron Wall* by Avi Shlaim, Penguin, London, UK, 2000, page 40. Shlaim is an Israeli–British historian and describes Goldmann as a ‘moderate’ Zionist.

It seemed to show the advantages of direct action over negotiation and diplomacy ... The victory offered such a glorious contrast to the centuries of persecution and humiliation, of adaptation and compromise, that it seemed to indicate the only direction that could possibly be taken from then on. To tolerate no attack ... and shape history by creating facts so simple, so compelling, so satisfying that it became Israel's policy in its conflict with the Arab world.

What was agreed under the armistices?

→ Armistice agreements

Between January and July 1949 **armistice** agreements were signed, under UN supervision, between Israel and each of the neighbouring Arab states.

KEY TERM

Armistice An agreement to stop fighting.

Armistice with Egypt

The first agreement was between Israel and Egypt. It confirmed their pre-war borders while the Gaza area of Arab Palestine (see Source A, page 50) came under Egyptian military rule.

Armistice with Jordan

King Abdullah of Transjordan and the Israeli government were keen to reach agreement with each other and did so in April. The King wanted his forces to keep control of the West Bank, the name given to the Palestinian Arab land on the west bank of the river Jordan (see Source A). This area would now be governed as part of his kingdom. In this way, most of Arab Palestine, including the Old City of Jerusalem, now became part of the new, enlarged kingdom of Jordan, as the state became known. The Israelis were keen to make peace with the King so that they could keep control of the newer, western part of Jerusalem. They preferred a partitioned Jerusalem to the international zone that the USA and the UN wanted.

Armistice with Syria

Reaching agreement between Israel and Syria took longer. When the fighting in the north had ended, Syrian forces were in control of some territory that had been allocated to the new Jewish state. In July 1948, the UN negotiated that the Syrians would withdraw from the ceasefire lines if the vacated area became a demilitarized zone. This meant that Israel could not station any troops or weapons there. This agreement left Israel free of Syrian troops on its territory while providing a buffer zone between the two sides.

The elusive peace

The armistice agreements were supposed to lead to permanent peace treaties but there was to be no such treaty between Israel and an Arab nation for nearly 30 years. The two key issues on which no agreement could be reached were borders and refugees.

Some Arab states were willing to negotiate over borders but all of them stuck to the policy formulated by the **Arab League** on refugees: that Israel had created the problem and the refugees had the 'right to return' to their homes or to be compensated by Israel. The Israelis, for their part, claimed that the Arabs had created the refugee problem by invading Israel and starting the war. The Israelis would only negotiate if it was agreed that most of the refugees should be settled *outside* Israel.

There were further obstacles to permanent peace. First, public opinion in the Arab countries was intensely bitter over the defeat and in its hatred of Israel. Arabs viewed Israel as an outpost of Western colonialism in the heart of the Arab world. Secondly, for the Israeli government, peace with its Arab neighbours was desirable but it was not worth the price of giving up any territory or agreeing to the return of large numbers of Palestinian refugees. Besides, the Israelis believed that time was on their side: the UN would get used to the new, expanded borders of the Israeli state and to the idea of a divided Jerusalem rather than push for the international control that they had originally envisaged for the city in the plan of 1947. In other words, Israel decided that it did not need permanent peace with the Arabs or a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. Its priorities were now to build the new state, implement large-scale Jewish immigration and consolidate their independence.

Why was there no peace treaty?

KEY TERM

Arab League A regional organization created in 1945 to represent the interests of Arab states and to promote political, economic and cultural co-ordination among them.

Israeli victory secured survival of new state and gained more land

700,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees before and during the war:

- *Nakba*, or catastrophe, for Palestinians

Armistices agreed but no peace treaty

- Jordan took control of West Bank
- Egypt took control of Gaza

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The results of the war

Key debate

▶ **Key question:** *How did Israel win the war?*

There is wide variation in how historians explain the outcome of the first Arab–Israeli war. Put simply, there is the Zionist interpretation, which is still largely taught in Israeli schools today, and there is the revisionist interpretation. In the past 30 years, historians have gained access to and analysed Israeli government documents from the time of the war. Several Israeli historians, such as Benny Morris, and British–Israeli historian Avi Shlaim, have produced a new interpretation of how Israel won. This ‘new’ history focuses on two main areas: on the military balance between the two sides and on the war aims of the Arabs.

KEY TERM

Coalition A union of two or more groups for a specific purpose.

The Zionist interpretation

This interpretation goes like this: the war was a struggle between tiny Israel and a huge Arab **coalition** made up of several armies. Israel was fighting for its own survival against Arab forces that were united in their aim of destroying the new state. Israel was the tiny David fighting against a massive Arab Goliath. Furthermore, Israel had far fewer weapons, fewer soldiers and was poorly equipped and yet, against all the odds, it won the war through the heroic efforts, tenacity and courage of its people. This is the popular, heroic interpretation. It is mostly based on fact but on selectively chosen facts. An example is given in Source C.

SOURCE C

An excerpt from *The Arab–Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East* by Chaim Herzog, published by Arms and Armour Press, London, UK, 1982, pages 106–7. Herzog was an Israeli historian who had, previously, been an army officer, diplomat and politician.

Israel’s victory was the result of the self-sacrifice and determination of a people to fight for its existence. The spirit that animated its people and the courage it reflected were the function of a rare form of determined and inspiring leadership ... David Ben-Gurion [was] a powerful, charismatic leader with sufficient courage to lead against the most impossible odds. ... The disadvantages under which the Israeli Army operated during the War of Independence – its weakness in manpower, its lack of modern weapons ...

The revisionist interpretation

It is certainly true that, at the start of the war, the Israelis only had about 30,000 soldiers and that their weapons were inferior. But they built up the army to about 65,000 by July and had nearly 100,000 in arms by



What disadvantages, according to Source C, did the Israelis face in the war and what factors accounted for their victory?

December 1948. The total number of Arab troops involved in the fighting was similar at the start and was also built up during the war but not as quickly as that of the Israelis. With regard to weaponry, the Israelis were poorly equipped at the start but, particularly during the first truce in June–July 1948, they gained access to much more equipment from Europe and thus were better armed for the rest of the war. In short, the stronger side won.

The Israelis also had other military advantages. About 25,000 Israelis had fought in the British army in the Second World War and gained valuable experience in training, organization and technology. The only Arab force that was as well trained and disciplined was the 10,000 soldiers of the Arab Legion of Transjordan (which was partly financed by Britain and was led by British officers).

War aims

The Jews in Palestine, particularly under the leadership of Ben-Gurion, had recognized, for several years, that they would need to use force to establish their new state. In this, they were united. The Palestinian Arabs, on the other hand, lacked strong, united leadership. Furthermore, they had never really recovered from the losses they suffered during the rebellion of 1936–9 (see page 27), as shown in Source D.

SOURCE D

An excerpt from ‘The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure’ by Rashid Khalidi, an essay in *The War for Palestine* edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001, page 29. Khalidi is an American–Palestinian Professor of History at Columbia University in New York.

When the Palestinians faced their most fateful challenge in 1947–49, they were still suffering from the British repression of 1936–39, and were in effect without a unified leadership ... The Palestinians still had no functioning national-level institutions, no central financial apparatus ... and no centralized military force.

How does the author of Source D account for Palestinian weakness in 1947–9?



The governments of the neighbouring Arab states had begun to plan for invasion only in April 1948. They had agreed on a plan and King Abdullah of Transjordan claimed to be commander in chief. But the Arab leaders were not united in their goals and each tended to fight for their own particular interests, which often meant to gain control of a piece of Palestinian territory for themselves. There was very little co-ordination of their efforts in the war and both the Egyptian and Syrian governments were deeply suspicious of King Abdullah's aims. The lack of unity and co-ordination on the Arab side is shown in Source E (page 56).



Why do you think 'the Arab states were either afraid to intervene or did not wish to intervene', as stated in Source E?

SOURCE E

An excerpt from 'Israel and the Arab coalition in 1948' an essay by Avi Shlaim in *The War for Palestine* edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001, page 100. Shlaim is a British–Israeli historian and Professor of History at Oxford University.

Conflict between the Arab states and lack of co-ordination between their armies in Palestine gave Israel the freedom to choose the time and place of the second offensive [against Egypt in December 1948]. Egypt appealed to its Arab allies for help but its appeals fell on deaf ears ... Without exception the Arab states were either afraid to intervene or did not wish to intervene.

King Abdullah and the Israelis

The case of King Abdullah of Transjordan is particularly significant. Before the war he had held a secret meeting with one of the Palestinian Jewish leaders. He had let it be known that he did not think the Palestinian Arab state could survive on its own. He thought it would be too weak and he wished to attach it to his state. He saw himself as the leader of an enlarged Arab state (and, in this, he had some support from the British). He also led Jewish leaders to believe that he would *not* invade territory allocated to the new Jewish state. No actual agreements were made at this meeting but a mutual understanding was established.

When the war started, Abdullah's Arab Legion advanced to defend the Old City, the eastern part, of Jerusalem against the Israeli offensive and they held on to it throughout the war. Yet the Arab Legion made little effort to stop the Israelis seizing West Jerusalem. Nor did the Legion invade the territory of the new Jewish state. Furthermore, the Arab Legion remained neutral when the Israelis fought Egyptian forces and did not join in support of Egyptian forces in the second and third phases of the war.

In other words, the army from Transjordan invaded what was to be the new Arab state but it never invaded Jewish, Israeli territory. Its aim was to gain control of most of Arab Palestine (on the western side of the river Jordan), which it did, but not to destroy the state of Israel. Israel was able to exploit its understanding with Transjordan in order to break the chain of hostile Arab states, deepen the divisions in the Arab coalition and pick off its Arab opponents one by one. The fact that Israel and Transjordan were 'the best of enemies' is largely ignored in the heroic interpretation of the war which sees the little Israeli David pitted against the united Arab world of Goliath.

Conclusion

Most historians now, including several Israeli ones, would subscribe to the revisionist interpretation. However, few would doubt that the Israelis had shown a high degree of unity, discipline and tenacity in fighting for the survival of their newly independent state.

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How can mathematics be used to build (or weaken) an argument in History? (Mathematics, Social Sciences, Language, Reason.)

Chapter summary

The establishment of Israel and the war of 1948–9

The state of Israel was born in war in May 1948. The fighting took place in three phases with the most bitter

conflict centring on control of Jerusalem. During the intervening ceasefires, the Israelis re-equipped their armies so that they were gradually able to gain the upper hand. The eventual outcome was Israeli victory and, with it, Israeli control of more Palestinian land. The UN brokered armistice agreements between the combatants but the Arab states, bitter in defeat, refused to recognize the state of Israel.



Examination practice

The following are exam-style questions for you to practise, using sources from this chapter. Sources can be found on the following pages:

- Source A: page 50
- Source B: page 52
- Source C: page 54
- Source D: page 55
- Source E: page 56

SAMPLE QUESTION 1s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 44–5.

- 1 What, according to Source C, were the reasons for the Zionists' victory in 1949?
- 2 According to Source E, why were the Arabs defeated by 1949?
- 3 What is the message conveyed by Source D?

SAMPLE QUESTION 2

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 74–5.

Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources C and D about Israel's victory in 1948–9.

SAMPLE QUESTION 3

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 125–7.

With reference to their origins and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Sources C and D for historians studying the reasons the Zionists were victorious in the 1948–9 war.

SAMPLE QUESTION 4

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 142–3.

Using Sources A–E and your own knowledge, explain how the Zionists were able to defeat the Arabs and create their own state.



Activities

- 1 Examine the map on page 36 and the one in this chapter on page 50. Compare and contrast the gains Israel made in the 1948–9 war to what the UN proposed in its partition plan. Which areas that were supposed to be under Palestinian Arab control became part of the new state of Israel?
- 2 List the differences between Herzog's interpretation of Israel's victory in Source C (page 54) and Avi Shlaim's in Source E (page 56). What might explain such different interpretations?
- 3 Find two opposing viewpoints in newspaper accounts from 1948 about the results of the war. List the main points each article raises. Are there any similarities?

The Suez Crisis of 1956

The new state of Israel survived its first war, but within 10 years it went to war with its largest Arab neighbour, Egypt. President Nasser of Egypt together with Britain and France were involved. This chapter examines the causes and consequences of what became known, in the West, as the Suez Crisis. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- ★ Why did Nasser nationalize the Suez Canal?
- ★ Why, and with what effects, did Israel, Britain and France attack Egypt?
- ★ Why did the USA pressure the British and French to withdraw their military forces from Egypt?

1 Nasser and the origins of the Suez Crisis

▶ **Key question:** *Why did Nasser nationalize the Suez Canal?*

Israel and its Arab neighbours

The Arab states were stung by their defeat against Israel in 1949. Their peoples felt bitter about their humiliation: it showed how weak and divided they were. It made them bitterly anti-western. The Arabs felt that the USA had bullied the United Nations (UN) into creating the new state of Israel. They now suspected that the western powers, such as Britain, France and the USA, would use Israel as a base from which to keep an eye on the Arab states. There was no peace treaty between Israel and any of the Arab states and the ceasefire lines (see page 52) continued to be a source of tension and sometimes fighting.

← What were the causes of tension on Israel's borders?

Israel and Syria

In 1949, the UN had persuaded Israel and Syria to agree to a demilitarized zone along their border. This zone was inside the territory of the new state of Israel and it contained many Arab villages. The Israelis tried to force the Arabs out of some of these villages and develop Jewish settlements. The Syrians objected to this. There were frequent incidents of shelling by both sides. There were also disputes over Israel's attempts to divert the waters of the Jordan river in order to irrigate dry parts of the new state.

Israel and Jordan

There was similar tension along the border between Israel and what now became known as the state of Jordan (see the map on page 50). The latter was made up of what had been Transjordan together with the West Bank of the Jordan River now added to it. In 1951, King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated by a Palestinian who feared the King would make a separate peace treaty with Israel. After a short reign by his unstable son, his grandson, Hussein, became King in 1953.

The expanded state of Jordan now included a million Palestinian Arabs who were granted full rights as citizens of Jordan. They included many who had fled from their homes in what was now the state of Israel and who were determined to return. However, every time they crossed the border into Israel, there were Israeli **reprisals**. In their reprisals, the Israeli military forces usually targeted Arab villages that they suspected of helping the infiltrators. The government of Jordan tried to restrain the Palestinians from carrying out raids into Israel but the Israelis were not satisfied and, in October 1953, after an Israeli woman and her two children were killed, the Israeli forces attacked the Jordanian village of Qibya, blowing up 45 houses and killing more than 50 of the inhabitants, most of whom were women and children.

Israel and Egypt

Despite the ferocity of the Qibya reprisal raid, it was on Israel's border with Egypt that the most frequent killings occurred. There were 300,000 Palestinians in the narrow coastal area known as the Gaza Strip (see the map on page 50). At the end of the war in 1949, this area came under Egyptian military control. The majority of its inhabitants were refugees, forced to flee from their homes between 1947 and 1949. Many of them were set on returning to their homes, especially those who had left villages just across the border. There were frequent raids into Israel. Some of these were carried out by Palestinian fighters, or *fedayeen*, who attacked Israeli settlements but the vast majority were by unarmed Palestinians. Often they wanted to visit relatives, reclaim their possessions, harvest their crops or just graze their animals on what was now Israeli land. However, as on the Jordanian border, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) retaliated with reprisal raids. These raids and reprisals intensified in the mid-1950s. To understand the reasons for this increased tension and the outbreak of a second Arab–Israeli war, we need to examine what happened in Egypt after the end of the 1948–9 war.

Why and how was the Egyptian monarchy overthrown?

→ Egypt and the rise of Nasser

Along with millions of other Arabs, the Egyptians felt bitter about their defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1949. Egypt was the largest Arab state and it had a long, proud history. It was also strategically important: it was the bridge between Africa and Asia. Even more importantly, the Suez Canal, which passed through its territory, was the main trading link between Europe and the east. It was a particularly vital link for Britain, which had

KEY TERM


Reprisal An act of retaliation against an enemy to stop him from doing something again.

Fedayeen Men trained to carry out raids (literally, 'those who sacrifice themselves').

many military bases in the east and which depended on supplies of oil from the Persian Gulf.

SOURCE A

A map of the Suez Canal oil route from the Middle East to Europe.



SOURCE B

An excerpt from an article 'Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis' by Robert Rhodes James, published in *History Today*, Volume 36, Issue 11, London, UK, November 1986, page 10. Rhodes James was a British historian and biographer of Anthony Eden.

Over two-thirds of the fuel supplies of Western Europe (60 million tons) passed through it [the Suez Canal], as did nearly fifteen thousand ships a year, one third of them British; three-quarters of all Canal shipping belonged to NATO countries. Britain's total oil reserves were only six weeks. ... Eden had told Khrushchev [the Soviet leader] bluntly in their talks earlier in the year ... that oil supplies were so vital that Britain would fight for them.

How do Sources A and B convey the importance, to Britain and western Europe, of the Suez Canal?



 KEY TERM

Imperialism The practice of extending a country's power and influence over other territories.

USSR Communist Russia and states under its control, also known as the Soviet Union.

Cold War The term used to describe the political hostilities in the era 1945–91 between capitalist and communist countries, in particular between the USA and the USSR. The conflict was primarily diplomatic, but serious military confrontation did break out on numerous occasions.

The Suez Canal

The Suez Canal had been built by the French and British in the 1860s. Or rather, the British and French used Egyptian labour to build it and thousands of Egyptians died in the process. Over 80 years later, in the 1950s, it was still so important to the British that they had 70,000 troops stationed in the Canal zone. This was intolerable to many Egyptians. They saw it as an example of British **imperialism**. They felt they could only be truly independent once the British had left what they believed was Egyptian territory.

Many Egyptians blamed their government and, in particular, King Farouk for their country's weakness. He had divorced his popular queen and was said to lead a decadent lifestyle while his government was believed to be corrupt and manipulated by the British. Some Egyptians, especially in the army, blamed the government for their defeat by the Israelis in 1949. Many of the younger army officers accused the authorities of supplying them with poor equipment and incompetent commanders.

Nasser and the Egyptian revolution

Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of a number of young officers who came from a poor background but had received an education and risen up through the ranks of the army. A group of these young officers, who called themselves the Free Officers, secretly planned to overthrow the government. They took their time, building up support within the army while avoiding being uncovered or captured by the security police. In July 1952, they struck. They took over the key government buildings and announced the success of the revolution over the radio. They allowed the King to flee the country. He had lost much respect, especially as he spent much of his time in expensive European resorts on the Mediterranean.

The head of the new government was General Naguib, one of the more respected of the senior army officers and, when Egypt became a republic in 1953, he became President. However, the most powerful member of the new government was Colonel Nasser. He had never forgotten the dying words of a comrade in the 1948–9 war: 'Remember the real battle is in Egypt.' He believed the first part of this battle had now been won with the removal of the King's government. The second part was to make his country truly independent and that meant freeing Egypt of British troops.

In 1954 Nasser became President and, after long discussions, he persuaded the British to withdraw their troops from the Suez Canal zone. Britain, like the USA, still wished to keep on good terms with Nasser. They wanted Arab support in the Middle East against the **USSR**: this was the period when both sides in the **Cold War** sought to win friends abroad and extend their influence. The western powers wanted an alliance with Egypt as it was the strongest, most developed Arab nation and because the Suez Canal passed through its territory.

SOURCE C

Egyptian army Free Officers in Cairo 1952. Colonel Nasser, seated at the table just to the right of centre, was one of the army officers who overthrew the unpopular royal government of Egypt in 1952. In 1954 he became President of Egypt.



What image of the leaders of the revolution does the photograph in Source C convey?



The Israeli attack on Gaza, February 1955

Nasser wanted Egypt to be neutral and was not willing to join an anti-Soviet alliance. This worried the West. The Israelis were also worried, but for different reasons. They wanted to hit back at Egypt for encouraging Palestinian raids into Israel: they wanted to teach Nasser a lesson and, perhaps, remove him from power. The Israeli leader, Ben-Gurion, said to his cabinet: 'It is definitely possible to topple him and it is even a *mitzvah* [sacred obligation] to do so. Who is he anyway, this Nasser-Shmasser?'

One way to undermine him was to show him up as militarily weak. This way he would be cut down to size, to a mere 'Nasser-Shmasser'. In February 1955, Israeli troops attacked and destroyed the Egyptian army headquarters in Gaza and killed 35 Egyptian soldiers. For the next three days Palestinian refugees in Gaza ran riot and demanded: 'Arms, give us arms, we shall defend ourselves!' In Cairo, the Egyptian capital, the crowds wanted revenge too.

The Israeli attack on Gaza was, as intended, humiliating for Nasser. He knew that it could have a very damaging effect on his leadership of Egypt and his image in the wider Arab world. His forces now began to arm and train *fedayeen* **guerrillas** to carry out attacks in Israel. However, what he needed most was weapons to strengthen Egypt's army and deter any further Israeli attacks. He had already approached the USA and had been rebuffed. Now he urgently needed to secure Soviet arms. This he did through the USSR's

Why did the Israelis attack Gaza?

KEY TERM

Guerrillas Soldiers who avoid fighting in open battle when possible; they prefer to use tactics like ambushes and hit-and-run raids.

Communist ally, Czechoslovakia. The Czech arms deal was announced in September 1955.

What was the importance of the Aswan Dam?

→ The Aswan Dam

The Czech arms deal was a shock to the West, as well as to Israel. However, Britain and the USA thought they could still control Nasser because he depended on them for money to build the Aswan High Dam. This was a huge project on the River Nile which would create hydroelectric power for Egyptian industry and allow vast areas of agricultural land to be irrigated. It was proclaimed as a symbol of the new, dynamic Egypt which would allow the country to modernize and become stronger.

Meanwhile, Nasser continued to show that he would not be pushed around and that Egypt was determined to be neutral. In May 1956, he recognized Communist China. At this time, western countries did not allow China to take its place at the UN and claimed that Taiwan, which was non-Communist, represented China. In July 1956, the USA and Britain decided to cancel their loans to Egypt for the building of the Aswan Dam. Perhaps they hoped to persuade Nasser to be more co-operative. Maybe they thought they could force the Egyptians to replace him.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal

Yet again, however, Nasser shocked the West. He decided on a bold and defiant move to prove that Egypt really was independent. In front of a huge crowd, in Alexandria, on 26 July 1956, he announced that the Suez Canal was 'our Canal'. He told the crowd: 'We dug the Canal with our lives, our skulls, our bones, our blood.'

SOURCE D

An excerpt from Nasser's speech, 26 July 1956, quoted in *The Middle East 1914–1979* by T.G. Fraser, published by Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1980, page 89.

The Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian company, subject to Egyptian sovereignty. When we nationalized the Suez Canal Company, we only nationalized an Egyptian limited company, and by doing so we exercised a right which stems from the very core of Egyptian sovereignty. What right has Britain to interfere in our internal affairs? ...

Egypt will maintain freedom of shipping in the canal ... We shall maintain our independence and sovereignty. The Suez Canal Company has become our property and the Egyptian flag flies over it. We shall defend it with our blood and strength, and we shall meet aggression with aggression and evil with evil.


KEY TERM

Nationalize To transfer from private to government ownership.

Nasser decided that Egypt would **nationalize** the Suez Canal Company and Egyptians would run it themselves. They would use the profits to build the Aswan Dam. He said that Britain and France could 'choke on their rage'. This daring act thrilled the whole Arab world.



What reasons does Nasser give, in Source D, for taking control of the Canal?

**SUMMARY DIAGRAM**

Nasser and the origins of the Suez Crisis

2 Britain, France, Israel and the Suez War

► **Key question:** *Why, and with what effects, did Israel, Britain and France attack Egypt?*

Britain and France were furious. The British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was determined not to let Nasser 'have his thumb on our windpipe'. The British and French withdrew their pilots who guided ships through the Canal. But the Egyptians kept it running and the traffic increased. Eden sought to win the support of the US government as shown in Source E on page 66.

The French saw Nasser as 'Hitler on the Nile'. They were determined not to **appease** Nasser as they had appeased Hitler in the 1930s. They had already agreed to sell Israel over 70 fighter planes and 200 tanks. Now they held secret meetings with the Israelis in order to plot Nasser's downfall. The French had an added reason for wishing to topple Nasser: they accused him of sending weapons and other aid to support the Algerians in their fight for independence from France.

KEY TERM

Appease To make concessions in order to avoid conflict.



Compare and contrast the reasons given in Sources D (see page 64) and E for Nasser's nationalization of the Canal.

SOURCE E

An excerpt from *Full Circle* by Anthony Eden, published by Cassell, London, UK, 1960. British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, wrote to US President Eisenhower in September 1956.

The seizure of the Suez Canal is, we are convinced, the opening gambit [move] in a planned campaign designed by Nasser to expel all western influence and interests from Arab countries. He believes that if he can get away with this ... his prestige in Arabia will be so great that he will be able to mount revolutions of young officers in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iraq ... Then new governments will in effect be Egyptian satellites if not Russian ones. They will have to place their united oil resources under the control of a united Arabia led by Egypt and under Russian influence. When that moment comes Nasser can deny oil to western Europe and we here shall all be at his mercy.



What is the message of the cartoon in Source F? How useful is this source for a historian studying the causes of the Suez Crisis?

SOURCE F

This cartoon was published in Britain in 1956 after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.



The Israelis become involved

In October, the British joined the French and Israelis. On 24 October, the British and French Foreign Ministers secretly met the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, in France. Ben-Gurion wished to end the border raids from Gaza and force Egypt to recognize the state of Israel. He also wanted to break the Egyptian **blockade** of the Tiran Straits that prevented Israeli ships from reaching the port of Eilat (see the map on page 68). Furthermore, he was worried about the increasing military strength of Egypt and the fact that the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan had been put under the same command. Britain, France and Israel held further high-level meetings. Although it was denied at the time, a joint campaign against Egypt was being planned. It was decided that Israel would attack Egypt, then Britain and France would intervene 'to separate the belligerents'. They would call on the combatants to withdraw from the Canal area. Israel would agree while Egypt, of course, would refuse because it was Egyptian territory. Britain and France would then occupy the Canal zone, Nasser would be discredited and fall from power.

The following two sources (G and H) give contrasting accounts of the planning for war by Israel, Britain and France.

SOURCE G

An excerpt from *Diary of the Sinai Campaign* by Moshe Dayan, published by Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, UK, 1966. This is an extract from Dayan's diary for 25 October 1956. Dayan was an Israeli army general.

Planned meetings, some with people overseas, started about two months ago. This is now the position:

1. *The Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, has approved the campaign and its aims.*
2. *Our forces will attack at dusk on 29 October 1956 and we must capture the Sinai peninsula in seven to ten days.*
3. *The plan is based on the assumption that British and French forces are about to act against Egypt.*
4. *According to information in our possession the Anglo-French forces aim to attack on 31 October 1956. Their aim is to get control of the Suez Canal Zone.*

SOURCE H

An excerpt from the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*, 2 November 1956.

Defying the United Nations' Charter and international law, the Anglo-French imperialists have attacked the independent Egyptian Republic. They are trying to seize the Suez Canal and to occupy Egypt. The Israeli attack on Egypt was just the first step in the plot by England, France and Israel to spread their control to all Arab states.

Why did the British and French make a secret agreement with the Israelis?

KEY TERM

Blockade The blocking of a place or region by troops or ships to prevent goods or people reaching it.

What level of planning by Israel, Britain and France is suggested by Source G?



With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources G and H for historians studying the causes of the Suez War of 1956.



What happened in the Suez War?

→ The fighting over Suez

On 29 October 1956, Israeli forces invaded Egypt. They advanced across Sinai towards the Suez Canal (see the map below). The next day, the governments of Britain and France ordered Egypt and Israel to cease fighting and withdraw 10 miles (16 km) from the Canal. If either side refused, the British and French would use force. The Israelis were still a long way from the Canal and they agreed but the Egyptians, as expected, refused. After all, it was *their* canal.

On 31 October, British and French planes bombed Egyptian airfields and destroyed most of their airforce. They also bombed Port Said, the city at the northern end of the Canal (see Source J). On 5 November, British and French troops landed at Port Said and advanced along the Canal. Egypt responded by sinking ships, which had been filled with concrete, in order to obstruct the British and French advance along the Canal.

SOURCE I

A map showing the course of the 1956 Suez War.



What does the map in Source I suggest about the importance of the Straits of Tiran to Israel?



SOURCE J

A British tank in Port Said at the northern end of the Suez Canal in 1956. The city was bombed by the British navy before troops landed.



Why do you think the British bombed Port Said? What impact would scenes like the one in Source J have had on Egyptian public opinion?



At the UN, the Arab states condemned the Anglo-French action. They halted oil supplies to the West. Even worse, for Britain, was the fact that its strongest ally, the USA, condemned the action. The US government was furious that Britain and France had used force. The USA believed that the Anglo-French action would lose the support of Arab states at a time when the USA was keen to make friends in the Arab world and prevent any extension of Soviet influence in the region. The US government threatened to cut off financial aid to Britain, which would ruin the economy, and to withhold oil supplies. The USSR went further and threatened to use military force. On 6 November, the UN declared a ceasefire and later ordered the British and French to withdraw. A UN emergency force was sent to the Canal to supervise the ceasefire.

Winners and losers in the Suez War

Nasser, hero of the Arab world

Nasser, the Egyptian leader, became the hero of the Arab world. He had stood up to Britain and France, who had dominated the Middle East for so long. He had gained complete control of the Suez Canal and of a large quantity of British military stores. With US aid, the Canal was cleared and

Who won and who lost the Suez war?

reopened in April 1957. Although Egypt lost territory when the Israelis captured Sinai, the Israelis were persuaded, by the USA, to withdraw early in 1957. Besides, Nasser could claim that the Egyptian army had only been defeated because the Israelis had British and French support. He summarized Egyptian gains later (Source K).

SOURCE K

An excerpt from *Towards Freedom* by Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1959. Nasser recorded what he believed Egypt had gained.

After Suez, we were able to take over all the foreign property in our country and therefore the Suez War regained the wealth of the Egyptian people to be used in the interests of the Egyptian people. Then, of course, it was clear for the Egyptian people that they could defend their country and secure its independence.



Read Source K. To what extent had Nasser achieved his ends?

The Israelis

The Israelis also made gains. The speed of their victory over Egyptian forces in Gaza and Sinai had proved that the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) was the strongest army in the Middle East. When they withdrew from Sinai, UN troops moved in to guard the border between Egypt and Israel. In particular, UN forces were sent to Gaza to prevent more raids on Israel and to Sharm-el-Sheikh to guard the passage of Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran.

SOURCE L

An excerpt from *The Story of my Life* by Moshe Dayan, published by Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, UK, 1976, page 13. Dayan was the Israeli army general at the time of the Suez Crisis.

It may be said right away that the three main purposes were achieved: our ships could now use the Gulf of Aqaba [leading to the port of Eilat]; an end to fedayeen terrorism; and the prevention of a joint attack on Israel by the Egypt–Syria–Jordan military command. In addition, the victory in Sinai meant that Israel emerged as a state that would be welcomed as a friend and ally. Further, Nasser learned to respect the power of Israel's army.



Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources K and L about the results of the Suez War.

Britain and France

The undoubted losers of the Suez War were Britain and France. The war was hugely divisive, both among the public and in government circles. Eden completely misjudged the reaction of the US government and, with his health deteriorating, was forced to resign as prime minister two months later. According to the *Sunday Times* newspaper, on 16 January 1977, Eden 'was the last prime minister to believe Britain was a great power and the first to confront a crisis which proved beyond doubt that she was not'.

The British and French had underestimated the Egyptians. They made two big miscalculations: they had thought that the Egyptians would be incapable

of managing the Canal on their own and they had also thought there would be a popular uprising against Nasser once the fighting started. In fact, the Egyptians showed that they could manage the Canal efficiently and Nasser's popularity soared. The British and French had failed to regain control of the Canal and they had failed to overthrow Nasser. The British lion was forced to slope off with its tail between its legs. The long period of Anglo-French domination of the Arab world was ending.

SOURCE M

An excerpt from *The Arabs: A History* by Eugene Rogan, published by Allen Lane, London, UK, 2009, page 304. Rogan is a lecturer in Middle Eastern History at Oxford University, UK.

For Egypt, the Suez Crisis was the classic example of a military defeat turned to political victory. ... The very act of survival was deemed a major political victory. ... Nasser knew that his nationalisation of the Suez Canal would face no further challenge and that Egypt had achieved full sovereignty over all of its territory and resources.

Read Source M. To what extent was the Suez Crisis 'a military defeat turned to political victory'?



The impact on the wider world

One of the main effects of the Suez Crisis was to make many of the Arab states more anti-western than ever. Not only had Britain and France tried to overthrow the government of the leading Arab nation but they had used Israel to do so. Now, more than ever before, Israel looked like an outpost of western imperialism. The Arabs became more willing to seek Soviet aid. The USSR now began to supply most of Egypt's weapons and to pay for the building of the Aswan Dam and many other projects. However, Nasser did not want Egypt to be tied to the USSR and he was certainly not a communist. He wanted Egypt and the other Arab states to be neutral. (This is discussed more fully in Chapter 6.)

SOURCE N

An excerpt from *Cold War to Détente 1945–80* by Colin Bown and Peter Mooney, published by Heinemann, London, UK, 1981, page 65. Bown and Mooney are British historians.

The Suez incident was a bonus for the Soviet Union and little short of a disaster for the West ... It seriously damaged Anglo-French and Western prestige in the Middle East; the leading Arab opponents of continued Western dominance in the area, Egypt and Syria, turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for the arms and aid that they needed, which the West was reluctant to supply. Suez gave the USSR a foothold in the Middle East.

Using Sources K, L, M and N, as well as your wider knowledge, analyse the results of the Suez War.



Anglo-French fury at nationalization of the Suez Canal led to secret meetings with Israel who wanted:

- to stop raids from Egypt
- to force Egypt to recognize Israel
- to break Israeli blockade of Straits of Tiran

British, French and Israeli attacks on Egypt

UN, US and Soviet condemnation of Anglo-French action

UN ceasefire and Anglo-French withdrawal

Results of Suez War:

- Nasser seen as Arab hero for 'victory' over western domination
- Israel demonstrated its military power and gained access to Straits of Tiran
- Many Arab states became more anti-western
- USSR became Egypt's main ally

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

Britain, France, Israel and the Suez War

3

Key debate

► **Key question:** Why did the USA pressure the British and French to withdraw their military forces from Egypt?

The US government agreed with the British and the French that Nasser was a threat to western interests in the Middle East. Even when US President Eisenhower was advising Britain to explore all diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis caused by Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, he acknowledged that force might have to be used to make Nasser 'disgorge'. So why was the USA so swift and so harsh in their condemnation of the Anglo-French military action?

The approach of US elections led to US pressure on Britain and France

One argument is that presidential elections were due to be held in the USA on 6 November 1956 and that Eisenhower did not want his European allies to take military action before that date. In his election campaign he presented himself as the president who had brought about an end to the

Korean War in 1953 and he wanted to be re-elected on a platform of peace. He did not want to inflame public opinion prior to the election. Twice in September 1956, Eisenhower wrote to the British Prime Minister Eden telling him that US public opinion was not ready to support the use of military force. When the US idea of setting up an international Suez Canal Users' Association to run the Canal was presented to the Egyptians and not immediately rejected in early October, Eisenhower issued a statement that 'it looks like here is a very great crisis that is behind us'. This naive, optimistic statement is most likely explained by his desire to maintain his image, just weeks before the election, as the president who stood for international peace and stability. This explains why the USA moved so quickly in the UN to condemn Anglo-French military action, launched just days before the election, and to threaten sanctions against Britain and demand the withdrawal of British and French forces.

SOURCE O

An excerpt from *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars*, by Ritchie Ovendale, published by Pearson, Edinburgh, UK, 2004, page 183. Ovendale is a British historian specializing in the history of the Middle East.

Where the British Cabinet miscalculated was on the importance of the timing of the presidential election. Macmillan [a British minister] failed to emphasise [US] warnings on this. It has been claimed that as military action appeared likely – and the US knew this both through Central Intelligence Authority sources and through military exchanges between both joint chiefs of staff – Eisenhower specifically asked Eden to delay the operation until after the presidential election of 6 November.

For what is British cabinet minister Macmillan criticized in Source O?



The US government feared an anti-western backlash

The USA sympathized with Britain and France's desire to recover control of the Canal (or at least receive compensation for its nationalization) but were furious that they had not kept the US government fully informed of their military plans, particularly of their secret planning with the Israelis.

The USA knew that nationalization of the Canal was popular both in Egypt and among other Arab peoples who resented years of British domination of the Middle East. They also knew that Israel's involvement would further inflame Arab opinion and that the USSR would be able to exploit the increased anti-western feeling that would result. All in all, they were swift to force Britain and France to withdraw their forces so as to limit the damage done to western, and specifically, US interests in the Middle East. According to historian Avi Shlaim: 'Britain was doubly guilty: guilty of aggression against Egypt and guilty of calculated deceit against its great ally.'

Conclusion

The timing of the US presidential election certainly had an influence on US attitudes towards the Anglo-French action. The bombing of Egyptian

To what degree was the US pressure due to ethical considerations and how much was due to practical political calculations? Is it possible to know? (History, Ethics, Reason, Political judgement.)

T
O
K

airfields and the simultaneous Israeli invasion had hugely destabilizing effects just days before Eisenhower stood for re-election on a platform of peace and stability. However, it is unlikely that the US government would have supported military action, especially as part of a ruse worked out with the Israelis, even if there had not been an election. The USA knew that fusing the Canal crisis with the Arab–Israeli conflict would antagonize Arab opinion and, potentially, unite the Arab world in support of Nasser. Increased anti-western feeling would then be a gift to the USSR because it would lead Arab states to look to the Soviets for military and financial aid.

Chapter summary

The Suez Crisis of 1956

The Arabs were bitter in defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1949 and they were angry with the West for its support of the new state. In Egypt, there was also resentment at the continuing Anglo-French control of the Suez Canal and the presence of British troops along the Canal. After toppling the monarchy, the new

Egyptian government under President Nasser sought to achieve complete control of its own affairs.

However, when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, the British and French decided that he had gone too far. In collusion with the Israelis, who had their own reasons to want to teach Nasser a lesson, they planned to retake control of the Canal by force. Thus, the Suez Crisis became the Suez War of 1956. It turned into a disaster for the western powers, largely a success for the Israelis and, in the eyes of most historians, a diplomatic victory for Nasser.



Examination advice

Paper 1 question 2: comparing and contrasting sources

Question 2 on the IB History Diploma examination requires you to compare and contrast two sources. This means you will discuss the similarities and differences between them. The most commonly used form of the question will ask you to compare and contrast two sources and how they view a certain historical event, document or person. Usually the similarities and differences are fairly clear and can be easily answered in a few minutes.

Question 2 requires no own knowledge, just the ability to read and understand the sources. It is possible that one of the sources will have been used in question 1. If this is the case, read the source again.

Question 2 is worth 6 marks out of the 25 total for Paper 1. This means it is worth 24 per cent of the overall mark. Answering question 2 should take 10–15 minutes of your examination time.

How to answer

Read question 2 carefully. Determine which sources you need to read and what exactly you are being asked to compare and contrast. You will not be asked to just compare and contrast the two sources, but the two sources' view on something specific. Do not discuss the origins or purpose of the sources; focus only on the demands of the question. You should make notes on scrap paper from the source regarding the question's focus. Do this for both sources. There is no need to record or use any information which does not specifically address the question.

- First paragraph: explain how the sources compare, or are similar, on whatever is being asked in the question.
- Second paragraph: explain how the sources contrast, or are different, on whatever is being asked in the question.

You should not treat each source separately, but integrate them in the same sentences as much as possible. Use quotes from the sources to strengthen your answer and help you to obtain more marks, but you should also paraphrase and summarize the sources.

Remember, the total mark available for this question is 6. A general rule to follow would be to have at least three points of comparison and three of contrast. This is not always possible, so in certain circumstances it may be possible to have four compares or contrasts and two of the other and still receive the maximum 6 marks. Again, this is a general rule and it is always better to have as many of each as possible, making sure that all points are completely relevant and focused on the question. There may be minor similarities and differences between the sources. Do not let these take the place of the more significant points.

Example

This question uses Sources K and M found in this chapter on pages 70 and 71.

Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources K and M about the results of the Suez Crisis for Egypt.

You will immediately make a note on your scrap paper by writing 'Results' and then 'Source K'. You will go to Source K in the examination booklet and start reading it, making notes on Nasser's views about the results of the crisis. You will probably write 'Nasser' and make quick, small points about his interpretations. You will repeat this for Source M and head your list with the historian's name. Use these notes to determine how the sources are similar and different. Your notes may appear something like this (see page 76):

Source K	Source M
Nasser	Rogan
• Take over all foreign property • War meant wealth of country for its citizens • Egyptians could defend their country • Egyptians could secure their independence	• Military defeat turned into political victory • Egypt (Nasser) survived = political victory • Nationalization of Canal meant no further challenges/foreign invasions • Egypt now had full sovereignty over territory and resources

There is running comparison in both paragraphs, with both sources usually mentioned together in the same sentence.

There is an appropriate use of quotations as supporting evidence.

Comparisons and contrasts have been separated into two paragraphs.

The comparisons and contrasts are the most significant ones. Minor points have not been used, keeping the paragraphs focused and strong.

There is an appropriate use of language, especially in connecting sources or points. Examples of words that help build linkage include 'both', 'whereas', 'while' and 'however'.

Both Sources K and M agree that Egypt succeeded in taking over foreign-owned property. In Source K, Nasser states that Egypt took over all such property, while Source M specifically mentions the nationalization of the Suez Canal, as well as that Egypt 'now had full sovereignty over all its territory and resources'. Both sources also suggest that as a result of the Suez Crisis, Egypt was able to control its territorial independence and be truly independent. The two sources make clear that overall the Suez Crisis was of great significance and a victory for Egypt and her people. Finally, the victory for Egypt came about as a result of a war.

There are major differences between the sources, however. Source K makes no mention of the fact that the Egyptian military forces were defeated, unlike Source M. In Source M, Rogan clearly states that a major result of the Crisis was a 'political victory' for Nasser. Nasser writes that the Egyptians were quite capable of defending Egypt whereas Rogan points out that the country suffered a military defeat. Nasser was writing about the conflict in its immediate aftermath, while Rogan wrote about the Suez Crisis more than 50 years later. In other words, his analysis benefits from a much longer perspective than Nasser's.

Answer indicates that the question was understood. There are at least three comparisons and three contrasts between the two sources. There is running comparison and contrast in each paragraph with both sources often treated in the same sentence. Appropriate quotations used from the sources to reinforce the answer. The answer addresses all criteria.



Examination practice

The following are exam-style questions for you to practise, using sources from the chapter. Sources can be found on the following pages:

- Source B: page 61
- Source C: page 63
- Source D: page 64
- Source E: page 66
- Source F: page 66
- Source G: page 67
- Source H: page 67
- Source J: page 69
- Source K: page 70
- Source L: page 70
- Source M: page 71
- Source N: page 71

SAMPLE QUESTION 1s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 44–5.

- 1 What is the message conveyed by Source C?
- 2 What is the message conveyed by Source F?
- 3 What is the message conveyed by Source J?

SAMPLE QUESTION 2s

- 1 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources B and E about the importance of oil to Europe.
- 2 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources D and E regarding the impact the nationalization of the Suez Canal would have.
- 3 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources G and H regarding the reasons Israel, France and Britain went to war.
- 4 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources K and L about the results of the war.
- 5 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources E and N about the role of the USSR before and after the Suez Crisis.

SAMPLE QUESTION 3s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question see pages 125–7.

- 1 With reference to their origins and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Sources D and E for historians studying Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.
- 2 With reference to their origins and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Sources K and L for historians studying the results of the Suez Crisis.

SAMPLE QUESTION 4

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 142–3.

Using Sources D, E, F, K and M and your own knowledge, analyse the 1956 Suez Crisis.



Activities

1 Try to locate one or two cartoons from the 1956 Suez Crisis. If possible, find cartoons from different countries. For each cartoon, do the following:

- Locate the date of the cartoon.
- Determine in which newspaper it was published.
- Name the cartoonist.
- Identify the key figures.
- Identify any symbols used that might help us to understand the cartoon.
- Explain the message of the cartoon.

You may want to share your investigations with classmates. Discuss which cartoon was the most persuasive and/or amusing.

2 Create five Paper 1 question 2-type questions using sources and paragraphs from Chapters 2 and 3 of this book:

- Create five different questions.
- Discuss the wording of each of your questions with your classmates. Make sure that your compare and contrast questions are worded with precision and are not too general.
- Select your best question and exchange it with a partner so that everyone has one to answer.
- Answer your question in 30 minutes.
- Give the question and answer back to the person who wrote the question, who should then read the answer, make suggestions for improvement, and give it a mark out of six.

Repeat this activity several times, reducing the amount of time allowed to answer the question gradually from 30 minutes down to 15.

The Six-Day War of 1967 and the October War of 1973

In 1967, increasing tension on Israel's borders led to the outbreak of the shortest and most dramatic Arab–Israeli war. This chapter examines how the participants slid into war and how the map of the Middle East was redrawn as a result. It then assesses the fourth Arab–Israeli war, in 1973, which started with surprise attacks on Israel by Egypt and Syria and ended with superpower involvement. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- ★ What were the causes of the Six-Day War of 1967?
- ★ Why did the Israelis win the Six-Day War so quickly?
- ★ Who was responsible for the outbreak of the Six-Day War?
- ★ Why did Egypt and Syria attack Israel in 1973?
- ★ What part did the superpowers play in the outcome of the October War?

1 The background to the Six-Day War

▶ **Key question:** *What were the causes of the Six-Day War of 1967?*

In its results, the Six-Day War was the most dramatic of all the Arab–Israeli wars yet it was the only one that neither side wanted. It resulted from a crisis that neither Israel nor its Arab enemies were able to resolve. One of the catalysts of the war was the action of a newly formed Palestinian organization.

The Palestine Liberation Organization

In 1964, Nasser had invited the leaders of the Arab states to a conference in Cairo. Although many of them distrusted each other, one thing united them all: opposition to the state of Israel (see Source A).

This may have been just rhetoric, or bold talk, to enable the Arab states to show a united front but it was the first time that they had declared, in an official document, that their ultimate aim was the destruction of Israel.

← **What part did Fatah play in the developing conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours?**

KEY TERM

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Set up in 1964 to lead the struggle to regain Palestine, it also provided many health and welfare services in the Palestinian refugee camps.

Fatah A Palestinian guerrilla group founded by Yasser Arafat in 1959. Its name comes from reversing the initials of its Arabic name which, in translation, is 'The Movement for the Liberation of Palestine'.



What do you think is the significance of the statement in Source A?



Why do you think children as young as those shown in Source B received basic paramilitary training?

The Arab leaders went on to set up the **Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)**, whose aim was to unite all Palestinians and, ultimately, to win back the land which they had lost in 1948–9 (see the map on page 50). It was to be an umbrella organization for various Palestinian groups. One of those groups was **Fatah**, a guerrilla group. Fatah had its bases in three of the Arab countries that bordered Israel: Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. In 1965, Fatah carried out its first raid on Israel. The group carried out many armed raids into Israel over the next few years. Israeli retaliation for Fatah raids was usually swift and harsh.

SOURCE A

An excerpt from a statement of the leaders of the Arab states, Cairo, 1964, quoted in *The Iron Wall* by Avi Shlaim, published by Penguin, London, UK, 2000, page 230. Shlaim is an Israeli–British historian.

The existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation ... Collective Arab military preparations, when they are completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel.

SOURCE B

A young girl holding an AK-47 assault rifle, with other children who received rudimental paramilitary training, in 1970 at a Palestinian refugee camp which gave strong support to Fatah.



The governments of Lebanon and Jordan tried to restrict PLO activities because they were afraid of Israeli reprisals. The Syrians, however, were keen to support the PLO. They encouraged Fatah's raids against Israel and supplied men and arms. The only neighbouring state from which Israel was

not attacked was Egypt. This was because United Nations (UN) troops had been placed on the border between Egypt and Israel after the 1956 war to prevent further clashes (see page 69).

Countdown to war 1966–7

In February 1966 a new, radical and aggressive government came to power in Syria. It demanded ‘revolutionary struggle’ against Israel and called for the ‘liberation of Palestine’. The Syrians now stepped up their support for the PLO guerrillas and accused the Egyptian government of not supporting them. The Egyptian leader, Nasser, was stung, but he did not want war: he knew that the Arab states were not ready and that Israel had stronger military forces than all the neighbouring Arab states combined. However, he wanted to remain the leader of the Arab world, the champion of Arab nationalism. So, in November 1966, he signed a defence agreement with the Syrian government whereby, if one state was attacked, the other would come to its defence. Nasser hoped the pact would restrain the hotheads in the Syrian government but all it did was encourage them.

Tension was not only high in Syria for, a week after the Egyptian–Syrian pact was signed, a mine exploded on the Israel–Jordan frontier, killing three Israeli soldiers. The Israelis retaliated with a massive attack on the Jordanian village of Samu from which they believed the attackers had come. Fifteen Jordanian soldiers and three civilians were killed and over a hundred houses destroyed. In early 1967 there were many more raids and reprisals across the borders. However, tension was particularly high on the Israeli–Syrian border: several of Israel’s military leaders were keen to provoke clashes with Syria so that they could retaliate forcefully and teach the Syrians a lesson. One particular incident illustrates this.

Clashes on the Syrian–Israeli border, April 1967

On 7 April 1967, an Israeli tractor was ploughing land in the demilitarized zone which the UN had established on the Israeli side of the border after the 1948–9 war. The Syrians opened fire and the Israelis fired back. The Syrians then started shelling other Israeli settlements in the area. Israeli tanks went into action but could not reach all the positions from which the Syrians had been firing. So Israeli planes were called up. These were then intercepted by Syrian fighter planes and, in the dogfight that ensued, six Syrian planes were shot down, two of them over the Syrian capital. The Israeli planes roared low over Damascus, further humiliating the Syrians. Some historians, such as Avi Shlaim, believe that this incident started the countdown to the Six-Day War in June 1967. Many years later, the Israeli leader, Moshe Dayan, explained how the Israelis provoked the Syrians to attack (see Source C, page 82).

Why was there increased tension on Israel’s borders in 1966–7?



Who, according to Dayan in Source C, bears the main responsibility for provoking conflict on the border?



What does the author of Source D mean by 'infiltration into Israel from Syrian-based camps'? Compare and contrast the views expressed in Source C with those in Source D.

SOURCE C

An excerpt from notes made by Moshe Dayan, the Israeli general and politician, of a private interview conducted in 1976, published by his daughter in 1997, long after he had died. Quoted in *The Iron Wall* by Avi Shlaim, published by Penguin, London, UK, 2000, page 235.

I know how at least 80 per cent of the clashes there started. It went this way: we would send a tractor to plough some place where it wasn't possible to do anything, in the demilitarised area, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn't shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance further, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the airforce also, and that's how it was.

SOURCE D

An excerpt from *The Arab–Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East* by Chaim Herzog, published by Arms and Armour Press, London, UK, 1982, page 147. Herzog was an Israeli historian who had, in turn, been an army officer, diplomat and politician.

Syrian attacks along the northern frontier continued, as did infiltration into Israel from Syrian-based camps, via Jordan and Lebanon. In April 1967, their shelling of farming operations in the demilitarised zones along the Sea of Galilee [in northern Israel] were stepped up, with increasing fire being directed against Israeli border villages. On 7 April 1967, unusually heavy fire was directed by long-range guns against Israeli villages, and Israeli aircraft were sent into action against them.

What was the impact of Soviet intervention?

→ The crisis of May 1967

By May 1967, Israel and its Arab enemies were sliding into a crisis that neither side could control. Israel issued several threats to act against Syria unless it stopped supporting Palestinian attacks on Israel. On 12 May, an Israeli general threatened to occupy the Syrian capital, Damascus, and overthrow the Syrian government. He was severely criticized by the Israeli government but his words were widely interpreted by the Arabs as a sign that Israel intended to attack Syria.

Then the USSR intervened. The Soviet government regarded Syria as a key ally in the Middle East. On 13 May, the Soviets warned the Egyptian government that Israel was moving its armed forces to the border with Syria, Egypt's ally, and was planning to attack. This was not true. Moreover, Nasser knew the Soviet report was untrue. The Soviets were either mistaken or lying. Perhaps they saw an opportunity to expand their influence in the region at a time when the USA was bogged down in the **Vietnam War**.

Nevertheless, the story spread rapidly. Arab eyes were on Nasser. What would he do? He did not want war as he knew that Israeli forces were far superior to those of the Arab states yet he had to respond because his

KEY TERM

Vietnam War War between non-Communist South Vietnam (supported by the USA) and Communist North Vietnam and Communist allies in South Vietnam (1954–73).

leadership of the Arab world was being challenged. Since the attack on Samu, the Jordanians had been accusing Nasser of cowardice and of hiding behind the protection of the UN troops. Besides, he had a defence agreement with Syria which compelled Egypt to go to Syria's aid if Syria was attacked by Israel. As historian Avi Shlaim put it: 'What he did was to embark on an exercise in **brinkmanship** that was to carry him over the brink.'

Nasser's next moves

Nasser took three steps, both to deter Israel and to impress Arab public opinion:

- First, on 15 May, he moved 100,000 Egyptian troops into the Sinai peninsula (see the map on page 89). This was Egyptian territory and Israel still had far more troops on its side of the border but it alarmed the Israelis because it brought Egyptian troops nearer to Israel.
- Secondly, he asked the UN commander to remove his troops from Egyptian soil. He wanted to prove that Egypt was completely independent. The UN forces could stay on Egyptian territory only as long as Egypt allowed them. The UN Secretary-General proposed that the UN troops be placed on the Israeli side of the border but the Israelis refused, so the UN troops were withdrawn.
- Thirdly, on 22 May, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, which led into the Gulf of Aqaba, to Israeli shipping. This denied access to the port of Eilat (see the map on page 89) to ships coming from the Indian Ocean and the Far East. The Israelis claimed that the USA, France and Britain had 'guaranteed' free passage for all shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba in 1957 and announced that Nasser's action was 'an aggressive act against which Israel is entitled to exercise self-defence'.

Meanwhile, a war fever was being whipped up in the press and radio in several Arab states. See Source E for a typical Egyptian radio broadcast.

SOURCE E

The Egyptian broadcaster Ahmed Said, speaking on 'Voice of the Arabs' radio in Cairo, quoted in *Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East* by Jeremy Bowen, published by Simon & Schuster, London, UK, 2003, page 70. This radio station was used to broadcast Nasser's speeches.

We have nothing for Israel except war – comprehensive war ... marching against its gangs, destroying and putting an end to the whole Zionist existence. Our aim is to destroy the myth which says that Israel is here to stay. Everyone of the 100 million Arabs has been living for the past 19 years on one hope – to live, to die on the day Israel is liquidated. There is no life, no peace or hope for the gangs of Zionism to remain in the occupied land.

KEY TERM

Brinkmanship Pursuing a dangerous policy to the limits of safety, in this case to the brink of war.

How did Nasser put pressure on Israel?

This may be just rhetoric but what impact might Source E have had on Israeli public opinion?



On 24 May 1967, the Syrian defence minister challenged the Israelis: 'We shall never call for, nor accept peace. We have resolved to drench this land with your blood and throw you into the sea for good.' A booklet later published in Israel accused Syria of inciting terrorism and war (see Source F).

SOURCE F

An excerpt from a booklet later published by the Israeli government in 1969.

In 1966–67 terrorism had been increased by the Arab states to a fearsome peak. Syrian radio continuously broadcast claims of the havoc and destruction caused by Arab terrorists in Israel. The Syrian Prime Minister said at the United Nations in October 1966: 'Syria will never retreat from the popular liberation war to recover Palestine.'



What is the significance of what the Syrian prime minister is quoted as saying in Source F?



What is the message of the cartoon in Source G? What does it suggest about Arab unity?

SOURCE G

A cartoon published in a Lebanese Arab newspaper in May 1967. Each cannon has the name of a different Arab state on it.



Israel's response

Among the Israeli public, many feared a repeat of 1948 as the country was surrounded by warlike Arab states. Many felt that their survival was threatened. However, Israeli military leaders knew that an Arab invasion was not imminent but were now keen to go to war and they were confident of victory. However, the Israeli government insisted on securing US support: they needed, for example, to be sure that the US government would stand by Israel in the United Nations if Israel attacked first. The Israelis remembered that the USA had intervened to forestall the joint Anglo-French-Israeli advance in 1956.

US President Johnson now told the Israeli Foreign Minister, on 26 May, that, according to US intelligence, Egypt had no plan to attack but that, if it did, then the Israelis would 'whip the hell out of them'. He then added: 'Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone'. The Israeli government decided to wait.

Increased pressure on Israel

In Egypt, on 29 May, Nasser stepped up the pressure in a speech to the Egyptian parliament (see Source H).

SOURCE H

An excerpt from Nasser's address to the Egyptian National Assembly on 29 May 1967 quoted in *The Middle East 1914–1979* by T.G. Fraser, published by Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1980, page 106.

We are now ready to confront Israel. The issue now at hand is not the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran, or the withdrawal of the UN forces, but the rights of the Palestine people. It is the aggression which took place in Palestine in 1948 with the collaboration of Britain and the United States. It is the expulsion of the Arabs from Palestine ... We are not afraid of the United States and its threats, of Britain and her threats, or of the entire Western world and its partiality to Israel.

To what extent does Source H play to an Arab audience?



SOURCE I

Moshe Dayan, Israeli Defence Minister. He had been imprisoned by the British in 1939. He was later released and fought in the British army in Syria where he lost an eye. In 1956, he organized the Israeli campaign in Sinai.



How might the career of Moshe Dayan, outlined in the caption to Source I, influence his military views?




Nasser demanded that Israel should allow the Palestinian refugees to return to Israel and that Israel should give up the land taken in the 1948–9 war. Maybe he thought that Israel would give way and he could win a victory without a war. In Jordan, King Hussein wanted to avoid war and remain neutral if fighting broke out. But half the population of Jordan was Palestinian, and newspapers and demonstrations demanded revenge for what had happened in 1948–9. On 30 May, King Hussein signed a mutual defence treaty with Egypt and a force of Egyptian commandos was flown to Jordan.

On 31 May, a second Israeli delegation went to Washington, DC. They wanted the US government to take action to open the Straits of Tiran. The Americans suggested that Israel should take action, on its own, to open the Straits. This was taken as a sign to go ahead and take military action. On 1 June, a new Israeli government was formed, with Moshe Dayan, the hero of the 1956 Sinai campaign (see page 68), as defence minister, and, three days later, the Israeli cabinet decided to go to war.

On Monday 5 June, just after dawn, the Israeli air force took off. It attacked the Arab planes on the ground: within four hours the Israelis had destroyed the air forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The war was to last six days but the Israelis had virtually won on the first day. They had complete control of the skies.

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The background to the Six-Day War



2 The Six-Day War: the fighting and its outcome

► **Key question:** Why did the Israelis win the Six-Day War so quickly?

The main facts of the fighting, which took place on three fronts, are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. The Six-Day War

Date	Israel vs Egypt	Israel vs Jordan	Israel vs Syria
Monday 5 June	Israeli planes bombed all 19 Egyptian airfields and wrecked 300 planes. Israeli troops advanced into the Gaza Strip and Sinai desert	The Israelis destroyed the Jordanian air force. Jordanian troops attacked West Jerusalem	Israeli planes crippled the Syrian air force
Tuesday 6 June	Israeli forces advanced to the Suez Canal. The Israeli air force destroyed many Egyptian tanks and other vehicles, while Israeli ground forces destroyed or captured the rest	Heavy fighting for control of Jerusalem and the West Bank of the River Jordan	
Wednesday 7 June	The Israelis took complete control of Sinai and accepted the UN call for a ceasefire with Egypt	The Israelis captured all of Jerusalem. Jordan accepted the UN demand for a ceasefire	
Thursday 8 June	Egypt accepted the ceasefire call	Israel took control of all the West Bank of the River Jordan	
Friday 9 June			Israeli troops attacked the Golan Heights
Saturday 10 June			Israelis took control of the Golan Heights. Syria accepted the UN call for a ceasefire

Reasons for Israeli victory

The Israelis won a spectacular military victory and were now the dominant power in the Middle East. The Arabs had lost 15,000 men while the Israelis had lost fewer than a thousand. The Arabs had larger armies but their air forces were destroyed. The Arabs had modern Soviet missiles and other weapons but the Israelis had French fighter planes and tanks. The Israelis also had the most advanced US electronic equipment, which enabled them to intercept Arab communications, and they were highly skilled and well trained. Above all, the Israelis believed they were fighting for their nation's survival.

What were the results of the Six-Day War?

→ The results of the Six-Day War

KEY TERM

Occupied territories

Lands controlled by the troops of a foreign power (in this case, the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and Golan Heights, all occupied by Israeli troops).

Settlements A group of houses, or communities, as built by the Israelis on the West Bank, Golan Heights and in Gaza.

Annex To incorporate a territory into another country.

The Israelis were so confident now that they were indisputably the regional superpower, that they saw no need to hurry into any peace negotiations. They had effectively redrawn the map of the Middle East and now they had to decide what to do with the lands they had conquered. These were the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights. For the time being, the Israeli government decided on military occupation. These **occupied territories** were to become the central issue in Arab–Israeli relations for the next 40 years. Control of these lands made Israel’s borders more secure. There was a buffer zone between Israeli territory and each of its three main enemies, as you can see in Source J on page 89.

- Villages in the north of Israel were safe from Syrian artillery now that the Israelis controlled the Golan Heights.
- Military fortifications were built on the banks of the Jordan River while the land on the West Bank of the river was controlled by Israel. It protected the country’s narrow waist (it is only 15 miles (24 km) from the Mediterranean to the West Bank).
- The Sinai desert formed a huge buffer between Israel and the Egyptian army.

The Israeli government later ordered the army to confiscate Arab land and to build Jewish **settlements** in order to make the areas more secure.


On one point, in particular, the Israelis were united. They had taken control of east Jerusalem, the Old City, for the first time in nearly 2000 years. They were determined to hold on to it. As the Israeli defence minister, General Dayan, said on the radio: ‘We have unified Jerusalem, the divided capital of Israel. We have returned to the holiest of our holy places, never to part from it again.’ The Israeli government **annexed** east Jerusalem. This act violated international law (as did the annexation of the Golan Heights 14 years later) and the UN General Assembly condemned the Israeli action.

The Arabs in defeat

The Arabs felt more hostile than ever. They blamed their defeat on the USA, Britain and other European powers, whom they accused of helping Israel in the war. The three main oil-producing Arab states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya agreed to pay £135 million annually to Egypt and Jordan as compensation for their losses in the war. The USSR decided to replace the weapons that its allies, Egypt and Syria, had lost. Meanwhile the Arab leaders, at a conference in August 1967, declared: ‘No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiation with it. We insist on the rights of the Palestinian people in their country.’

SOURCE J

A map showing the occupied territories after the end of the Six-Day War.

**SOURCE K**

Victorious Israeli soldiers at the Western Wall in Jerusalem, 1967. The wall is the one remaining part of the ancient Jewish temple that was destroyed by the Romans.



Look at Source J. What strategic gains had Israel made by taking control of these lands?

?

Look at Source K. What does this photograph suggest to you about the significance of the Israeli capture of the Old City, east Jerusalem?

?

What was the significance of UN Resolution 242?

→ UN Resolution 242

In November 1967, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 242 which called for permanent peace based on:

- 'The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.'
- Respect for the right of every state in the area 'to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force'.

The Resolution supported the Arabs on the issue of land and supported Israel on the issue of peace and security. Egypt and Jordan (although not Syria) accepted the Resolution, effectively recognizing Israel's right to exist. Israel held up the 'three noes' of the Arab conference in August as proof that the Arabs did not really want a peace settlement but the Israeli government eventually accepted the resolution. The UN led discussions with the warring parties but made little progress: Israel found that its occupation of Arab land gave it added security while the Arabs insisted on Israeli withdrawal as a first step to peace.

Many subsequent peace discussions were to be based on the formula of '**Land-for-Peace**', most notably those leading to a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979 (see page 180). But before that, there was to be another war between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

KEY TERM

Land-for-Peace The formula by which Israel would give up Arab land it had conquered in return for Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist and live in peace.

Israeli victory in six days:

- Israel destroyed the air forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria

Israel gained and occupied Arab lands:

- Sinai and Gaza from Egypt
- Golan Heights from Syria
- East Jerusalem and West Bank from Jordan
- Built Jewish settlements in these occupied territories

UN Resolution 242 called for:

- Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands
- Arab recognition of Israel

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The Six-Day War: the fighting and its outcome

3 Key debate

► **Key question:** Who was responsible for the outbreak of the Six-Day War?

The 1956 Suez War was a result of deliberate planning – by Britain, France and Israel. In 1967, no one had planned to go to war. The participants slid into war; a result of miscalculations. But who bears the primary responsibility?

Arab responsibility

On the surface, it appears to be the fault of the Arab powers, particularly Syria and Egypt, and their Soviet ally. Syria had been actively encouraging PLO raids into Israel from bases in Syria and calling for a war to liberate Palestine. There is also plenty of evidence of Syrian incursions into the demilitarized zone which the UN had established between Syria and Israel at the end of the 1948–9 war. Furthermore, the Syrians incited Nasser, as the champion of the Arab world, into taking a more actively anti-Israeli stance. They partially achieved their objective when, in November 1966, Nasser signed a defence agreement with Syria. Now the Syrians knew that if it came to war with Israel, then Egypt would have to join them. In many ways, it was inter-Arab rivalries that had triggered the crisis that led to the Six-Day War (see Source L).

SOURCE L

An excerpt from *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970* by Malcolm H. Kerr, published by Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1971, page 126. Kerr was a US professor who lived and taught in the Middle East and the USA.

It was not hard to imagine, early in May 1967, that the mounting tension in the Arab world would lead to some sort of violent outbreak. The conflict to which all signs seemed to point, however, was between Arab revolutionaries and conservatives.

What does the author of Source L see as the most likely source of conflict in May 1967?



Not only was the radical Syrian government taunting Nasser to prove he was the champion of the Arabs in their fight against Israel. They were also doing their best to topple the conservative regime of King Hussein in Jordan or, at the very least, to force him to take a more radical, anti-Israeli line. The Syrians encouraged Fatah guerrillas to launch attacks on Israel from camps in the Jordanian-controlled West Bank as well as from Syria. That was what led the Israelis to launch their reprisal raid on the Jordanian village of Samu in November 1966. This, in turn, led to a wave of riots by Palestinians on the West Bank accusing Hussein of weakness. Nasser criticized Hussein for his handling of the riots and the Jordanian king rounded on Nasser, accusing

him of hiding behind the protection of UN forces on the Egyptian–Israeli border.

Increasingly intense rhetoric from both the leadership and press of the Arab states increased the pressure on Nasser. By May 1967, according to historian Peter Mansfield, ‘the Arabs were in a state of emotional self-intoxication as the belief became widespread that final victory over Israel was imminent’.

However, it was the Soviet report of Israeli troop concentration on the Syrian border that undoubtedly led to Nasser’s decision, in May 1967, to order UN forces out of Egypt, to deploy more Egyptian forces on Israel’s border and to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. This was, unsurprisingly, interpreted by Israel as an act of war.

Nasser’s moves may have been designed to deter Israel from pursuing any offensive action against Syria. Certainly, Nasser knew that his forces, even combined with those of Syria and Jordan, could not defeat Israel. It is even more likely that his actions, and his talk of overturning the result of the 1948–9 war, were designed primarily to impress public opinion at home and in the wider Arab world. Whatever his motives, he had certainly underestimated the determination of the Israeli military.

Israeli responsibility

Among the Israeli military leadership, there was undoubtedly a desire to teach the Syrians a lesson. Cultivation of land in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria had been resumed by Israelis in April 1967. It was intended to provoke Syria so that Israeli forces could use force to compel the Syrians to stop any further raids, whether by PLO or Syrian forces. This policy of escalation, exemplified in the events of 7 April 1967 and afterwards, was ‘probably the single most important factor in dragging the Middle East to war in June 1967’, according to Israeli–British historian Avi Shlaim.

After Nasser blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, the Israeli government hesitated, stricken by conflicting opinions. However, the military were confident of Israeli victory in the event of war, knowing that Israel was militarily superior (see Source M).

SOURCE M

An excerpt from *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict* by Charles D. Smith, published by Bedford/St. Martin’s, Boston, USA, 2007, page 54. Smith teaches history at the University of Arizona.

The [Israeli] military leadership wanted a minister who would unleash a war they were convinced they would win and which for some would signal the hoped-for expansion of Israel’s borders to include Jerusalem and the West Bank.

After a new government of national unity was formed, in early June, the Israelis decided to carry out air strikes on Egypt, Syria and Jordan.



What, according to Source M, was the added motive for war for some of the Israeli military?

Conclusion

On balance, it seems fair to conclude that a series of provocations and miscalculations, by both sides, turned a crisis into a war. Inter-Arab rivalry contributed as did the intervention of the Soviets, whatever their motives. The USA's role was pretty ambiguous although the Israelis chose to think they had been given the green light by the USA at the end of May. Most historians agree that Nasser did not want or plan to go to war with Israel while recognizing that his actions made it much more likely.

**T
O
K**

How far back does one need to go in determining responsibility for an event in history? Is this a flexible exercise? (History, Ethics, Reason, Political Judgement.)

4 The causes of the October War 1973

▶ **Key question:** *Why did Egypt and Syria attack Israel in 1973?*

At the end of the Six-Day War in 1967, there was no peace treaty and Israel remained firmly in control of large areas of Arab land – not only the West Bank and Gaza but also Egypt's Sinai peninsula and Syria's Golan Heights. The Arab show of defiance at their conference in August 1967 (see page 88) made the Israelis even more determined to hold on to the land they had seized in the war. At their conference, the Arabs presented a united front but, in practice, it was left to each Arab state to decide for itself how to regain the territory it had lost. Meanwhile, over a million Palestinian Arabs found themselves living under Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. (The effects on the Palestinians will be examined further in Chapter 7.)

Fighting across the Suez Canal, March 1969 to August 1970

Why did Nasser launch raids across the Suez Canal?

In Egypt, Nasser sought to re-equip and reorganize his armed forces. Both Egypt and Syria received substantial military support from the USSR, both in weapons and in military advisers. (The USA became Israel's main military supplier.) Then, with the support of the Soviets, Nasser embarked on artillery bombardment of Israeli positions on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and periodic commando raids across the Canal.

Nasser's strategy was a limited but prolonged war to bring about an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. He sought to inflict heavy casualties on the Israelis, to exhaust them psychologically and economically. However, the Israelis retaliated with air attacks which destroyed Egypt's air defence missile system. Since 1968, Israel had been supplied with advanced fighter jets by the USA. They were determined to sit tight and stay in possession of Sinai. They built a line of fortifications on their side of the Canal, the Bar-Lev line (named after the Israeli chief of staff). Over the next two years there were

KEY TERM

War of attrition A war in which each side tries to wear the other out.

Why did Sadat decide to go to war?

→ President Sadat and the origins of the war

In September 1970, Nasser died and was succeeded by Vice-President Anwar Sadat. Like Nasser, Sadat had been an army officer. He realized that the fighting over the Suez Canal was draining Egypt of money and morale. The Canal could not be used and fighting could flare up at any time. Egypt had to keep nearly one million men ready to fight and this was very expensive. Peace was needed in order to clear the Canal and rebuild Egypt's cities. However, the overriding objective for Egypt was to regain Sinai, the land that it had lost in 1967. Sadat promised his people that the year 1971 'would not end without the conflict with Israel having been settled'.

SOURCE N

A photograph taken in August 1971 showing President Sadat of Egypt, on the left, with Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi, in the centre and President Assad of Syria on the right.



'No peace, no war'

Sadat was prepared to recognize the state of Israel in order to regain the lost land. In February 1971, he put forward a plan for a limited Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal and the reopening of the Canal for international shipping. However, the Israelis were unwilling to discuss it (see Source O).



How might President Sadat explain to fellow Arab leaders, Assad and Gaddafi, photographed together in Source N, that he had promised his people that he might settle the conflict with Israel?

SOURCE O

An excerpt from 'The origins of Arab-Israeli wars' by Avi Shlaim in *Explaining International Relations since 1945* edited by Ngaire Woods, published by Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1996, page 230. Shlaim is professor of History at Oxford University.

Israel kept raising her price for a political settlement just when Egypt became convinced of the need for a historic compromise ... Holding onto the territories acquired in 1967 gradually replaced the quest for settlement as Israel's top priority.

Why do you think the Israeli government made continuing control of the occupied territories, as suggested in Source O, its priority?



The US government condoned Israeli intransigence, believing that a strong Israel would deter the Arab states from going to war. Sadat knew he could not defeat Israel in war. He also knew that only the USA could force Israel to enter into peace discussions: as he said, the USA held 99 per cent of the cards in the Middle East. Sadat realized that the US government wanted peace and friendship with the Arab states in the Middle East. An increasing amount of the USA's oil was imported from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. As an Arab, Sadat hoped he could persuade the US government to use its influence with the Israelis. He sacked the members of his government who were anti-US. The USA, however, was too busy with the war in Vietnam. Besides, the six million Jews in the USA would oppose any attempt by the US government to 'bully' the Israelis. So the year 1971 ended, as it had begun, with 'no peace, no war'.

Preparations for war

Sadat continued to secure aircraft and arms from the Soviets but they would not provide Egypt with the type of equipment it needed to make a successful attack across the Canal possible. More significantly, the Soviets could not exert any leverage over the Israelis. In 1972, Sadat expelled all 15,000 Soviet advisers who had been training Egypt's armed forces. This was a popular move as Soviet interference in Egyptian affairs had been resented, especially by the army. This still made little difference to the USA's attitude, especially as there was an election approaching and US President Nixon, keen to win Jewish votes, did not want to be seen as pro-Arab.

In 1972, Sadat decided that the stalemate could only be broken by war. Only war would provoke the international crisis that would compel the superpowers to intervene, stop the fighting and put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the territory it had captured in 1967. Sadat knew that weaponry, training and planning in the army had been much improved, especially with Soviet aid, but he would need further support from abroad in order to force the Israelis out of Sinai. He now had strong financial support from the oil-rich state of Saudi Arabia. Also, the new Syrian leader, President Assad, became a close ally. Both Sadat and Assad realized that they would have to act soon if they were to recover Sinai and the Golan Heights, the lands they had lost in 1967. The Israelis were increasing their control of these

areas: they were building new Jewish settlements and kept many troops there. At the very least, Egypt would have to cross the Suez Canal and take control of the east bank while the Syrians would have to recapture part of the Golan Heights and destroy some of the Israeli forces there before peace negotiations began. Only then, so Sadat calculated, would Egypt be in a strong enough position to break the *status quo*.

Secretly, the Egyptian and Syrian leaders prepared for war. In September, Sadat made a defiant speech at a rally in Cairo (see Source P).

SOURCE P


An excerpt from Sadat's speech in Cairo, September 1972, quoted in *The Arabs* by Peter Mansfield, published by Penguin, London, UK, 1982, page 357.

The United States is still under Zionist pressure and is wearing Zionist spectacles. The United States will have to take off those spectacles before they talk to us. We have had enough talk. We know our goal and we are determined to attain it.



What does Sadat mean, in Source P, when he accuses the USA of wearing 'Zionist spectacles'? What had he already done to encourage the USA 'to take off those spectacles'?

Very few people, in Egypt or abroad, took his speech seriously. They had heard it all before. So had the Israelis, who had a low opinion of the Arab armies anyway. They were in for a shock.



SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The causes of the October War 1973

5 The course and consequences of the October War

► **Key question:** What part did the superpowers play in the outcome of the October War?

The Egyptian–Syrian offensive

On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked. It was **Yom Kippur**, a holiday and the holiest day of the Jewish year, which is why this is often referred to as the Yom Kippur War. This meant that many Israeli soldiers were on leave. The Israelis were caught completely by surprise. In the first 24 hours, 90,000 Egyptian men and 850 tanks had crossed the Suez Canal. They broke through the fortified Bar-Lev line and destroyed 300 Israeli tanks. The whole operation had been planned and practised very thoroughly.

At the same time, 500 Syrian tanks overwhelmed Israeli forces on the Golan Heights. The Israeli air force retaliated but discovered that the Arabs had shoulder-fired Soviet surface-to-air missiles which they used very effectively. It took the Israeli army three days to become fully mobilized. However, by 12 October, they had pushed the Syrians back and, on 15 October, they

What did the Arabs achieve?

KEY TERM

Yom Kippur The Day of Atonement, an important Jewish religious day of fasting and an annual Jewish holiday.

How useful is Source Q as evidence of Egyptian preparations for war?

SOURCE Q

Egyptians storm across the Suez Canal, 1973. On the first day of the war, 90,000 Egyptian troops crossed the Canal over 10 bridges, bypassing the Israeli strong points.






Look at Source R. On which war front was Israeli territory under greater threat?

SOURCE R

A map showing the October War 1973.



KEY TERM

Airlift Large-scale transport of supplies by air, especially in an emergency.

Why and how did the superpowers become involved?

→ The superpowers intervene

The Israeli military recovery, following the initial Arab attacks, was made possible by a massive **airlift**, of thousands of tons of the most advanced weaponry, from the USA. Shortly after the US airlift, the USSR sent arms to Egypt and Syria. Then, when the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal and were

just 50 miles (80 km) from Cairo, the Egyptian capital, the USA and the USSR sponsored a joint UN resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and negotiations for a peace settlement. The ceasefire was due to come into effect on 22 October but it broke down. At this point, the superpowers came close to a direct clash over the Middle East. The Egyptians requested US and Soviet troops be sent to enforce the ceasefire. The Soviets threatened to respond immediately to counter the Israeli threat to the Egyptian capital. The US government was alarmed by the threat of armed intervention by Soviet troops. For a time, US forces were put on nuclear alert. However, both superpowers were keen to avoid a direct confrontation. In the event, the Soviets backed down and agreed to the formation of a UN emergency force. The fighting ended on 24 October and, a few days later, UN troops were sent to Egypt to enforce the ceasefire.

The oil weapon

During the war, the Arabs produced an unexpected weapon – oil. Following the huge injection of US military aid to Israel and the prospect of the Israelis advancing on Cairo, the Arab oil-producing states decided to reduce oil production until the Israelis withdrew from the lands they had occupied in 1967 and ‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinians are restored’. The West received much of its oil from the Middle East. The richest oil state, Saudi Arabia, went further. It banned all oil exports to the USA and to the Netherlands, which supplied much of western Europe through the port of Rotterdam. The West was shocked, petrol prices rocketed, quadrupling by the end of the year, and it was not until March 1974 that the Saudis lifted their ban.

The results of the war

The October War was, in the end, a military victory for the Israelis. Yet again they had proved that their weapons, their training and their tactics were superior. When the war ended, Israeli forces were only 50 miles (80 km) from Cairo and 20 miles (32 km) from the Syrian capital, Damascus. But they had incurred far more losses, of both men and weaponry, than in previous wars. Perhaps most significant, the Arabs had destroyed the myth of Israeli invincibility. They had completely surprised the Israelis and the rest of the world with their attack. They had proved that Arab soldiers could fight with courage and determination under skilled leaders. They had overcome the humiliation of the Six-Day War and restored Arab pride, honour and self-confidence. Furthermore, they had acted together, both in their military planning and in the use of the oil weapon. As a result the rest of the world showed much more respect for the Arabs.

One man, in particular, emerged from the war as a world leader. Anwar Sadat had achieved exactly what he had set out to do. First, he had broken the stalemate that existed before the war. Secondly, he had forced a change in US policy. From now on, the USA was to become far more friendly

← To what extent was the war an Arab victory?

towards the Arab states, keen to establish and cement its position as the dominant superpower in the Middle East and far more willing to persuade Israel to enter peace negotiations. The developments leading to an eventual Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty and Israeli withdrawal from Sinai are examined in Chapter 9.

SOURCE S

An extract from *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars* by Ritchie Ovendale, published by Pearson, London, UK, 2004, page 225. Ovendale is a British historian specializing in the history of the Middle East.

Sadat emerged from the October War a world statesman, something Nasser had never achieved. Relations were established between Washington and Cairo. Sadat realised that only the US could effectively persuade Israel to make concessions in the occupied territories. The United Nations decided on 'negotiations between the parties concerned aimed at establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East'.



With reference to its origins and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source S for the historian studying the effects of the October War.

Course of the war

- Egypt and Syria surprise attack
- Israelis recovered and went on offensive
- Both superpowers airlifted military supplies to their allies
- Arabs used oil weapon to pressure the West
- USA and USSR enforced a ceasefire

Results of the war

- Arabs regained pride and respect
- Sadat had broken the stalemate and forced a change in US policy

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The course and consequences of the October War

Chapter summary

The Six-Day War of 1967 and the October War of 1973

Simmering tension on Israel's borders, particularly on the northern border with Syria, and periodic attacks by the newly formed Palestine Liberation Organization, developed into a crisis in Israel's relations with both Syria and Egypt in May 1967. A series of provocative acts and miscalculations, by Syria, Israel, Egypt and the USSR, led to war in June. Israel's swift victory

transformed the map of the region as the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights all came under Israeli control.

There was no peace treaty and the outcome of the war led directly to the outbreak of another war in 1973. Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, in an attempt to regain the lands they had lost in 1967 and, although their military performance surprised the Israelis, the latter emerged as victors. However, Egypt's President Sadat achieved his objective of breaking the stalemate and eliciting active US involvement in peacemaking that would lead to eventual Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.



Examination advice

Interpreting visual sources

Visual sources are often included on Paper 1 examinations and can be used in any of the questions. Visual sources include cartoons, maps, graphs, charts, tables, photographs, posters and potentially many other types of graphic art. Some visual sources are easier to understand than others.

Graphs, charts and tables


Graphs, charts and tables usually convey very specific information such as economic data, how many people from a particular political party were in parliament, or how many leaders a country had over a period of time. This type of visual source still needs interpreting, however.

Example: bar graph

Look at Source N (Chapter 1, page 22):

SOURCE N

Jewish and Arab populations in Palestine 1919–47.



This graph conveys a tremendous amount of information, although it appears quite simple. You will be able to see how the respective populations of Jews and Arabs grew over a 28-year period. A number of important conclusions can be drawn from this graph:

- In 1919, the population of Arabs greatly outnumbered that of the Jews.
- In the following years, the Jewish population grew at a faster pace than the Arab population.
- From 1929 to 1939, the Jewish rate more than doubled. From Chapter 1, you will recall that increased immigration accounted for much of this. The population growth slowed during the war years.

- Arab population growth increased at a steady pace due to the birth rate of the Arabs, without immigration.
- In 1919, Arabs represented 92 per cent of the population. In 1947, they made up 70 per cent. The population increase of Jewish immigrants led to conflict as land and jobs became contested.

Cartoons, posters, stamps and graphic art

Cartoons and posters can be very similar in terms of symbolism, message and intended effect. Either can be intended to make fun of something, criticize a person or idea, try to get the viewer to agree with their point of view, or inform. They can be complex and should be treated very carefully and thoroughly.

Symbolism

First we need to consider symbolism. The chart below gives some of the more common symbols you may encounter while studying the Arab–Israeli conflict and their potential meanings.

Symbol	Represents	Symbol	Represents
Red star, five points	USSR, communism	Hammer and sickle	USSR, communism
Bear	Russia, USSR	Scales, blind-folded woman	Justice
Sphinx	Egypt	Money bags, fat men	Wealth
Pyramids	Egypt	Crown of leaves, winged goddess	Victory
Sarcophagus	Egypt	Statue of Liberty (one arm holding torch, other holding tablet)	Democracy, USA
Pharaoh	Nasser, Sadat	Uncle Sam	USA
Desert	Middle East	Olive branch, dove	Peace
Suez Canal	Suez Canal Crisis, transit route for oil	Skull and crossed bones	Death
<i>Keffiyeh</i> (distinctive check-patterned headdress worn in the Middle East)	Symbol of Palestinian nationalist movements	Hawk	War
Palestinian flag (red, white, green, black)	Palestinian nation	Hourglass	Time
AK-47 assault rifle	Guerrilla movements	Factory, smokestack	Industry
Star of David, six points	Jews, Judaism, Zionism, Israel after 1948	Bulldog, eagle	War, possibly a nation such as Britain for bulldog or eagle for the USA
Palestine/Israel map	Nationalist aspirations of Zionists and Palestinians	Woman or baby crying	Misery, death, destruction
Turtle	Slow movement	Oil wells	Wealthy Saudi Arabians
Chains	Oppression	Overweight Arabs in robes	Petroleum-rich Arabs
Bomb	Disaster, war, major tension		

Representations of people

Additionally, significant people like Nasser, Sadat, Assad, Ben-Gurion, Dayan, Golda Meir, Begin, Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Eden, Khrushchev and Brezhnev often appear in cartoons and other visual sources. Cartoons in this and other chapters in the book will help you to understand how individuals typically appear in cartoons.

Captions

Captions are the labels that accompany visual sources. These are very important, often informing you of the date of creation, name of artist and perhaps country of origin. All of this information helps to determine the message of the source. For example, Source G on page 84 informs us that the cartoon appeared in a Lebanese newspaper in May 1967 and that each cannon represents a different Arab state. The cartoon pre-dates the June 1967 war and suggests that war was not unexpected and that Arab countries were unified in their position on Israel. Read captions carefully because they contain clues that will help you to answer at least one question in Paper 1.

Example: cartoon

Source F on page 66 (Chapter 4), was published in Britain shortly after President Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal Company. It is full of clues as to how the cartoonist felt about this. Nasser appears to be out of control. He has shredded agreements such as the Suez Canal treaty. Words appear such as 'Anti-Western', 'Embargo', 'Lies' and 'Anti-British Broadcasts'. Nasser appears in uniform, which would indicate that he is part of a military regime. Symbols are found above his head which might indicate that he is cursing. And finally, Nasser is ranting through the medium of Cairo Radio. Put together, this cartoon suggests that Nasser is dangerous and breaks international agreements.

Example: maps

There are several maps in this book and each is meant to convey certain information. For example, Source A on page 50 (Chapter 3), illustrates not only the political borders of a number of Middle Eastern countries but also key geographic features such as the Dead Sea, the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. Important cities are also located. You should be able to figure out from this map that Israel seized strategic lands that made the country less vulnerable because areas that had been virtually separated were now contiguous.

Photographs

Photographs are another visual source. Photographs can capture a specific moment. Sometimes photographs just record what the photographer saw at that particular moment, while many photographs, especially of political events, politicians and conferences, are ones in which everyone poses in a specific way for an intended effect.

Example: photograph

Source Q (page 97) is a photograph recording Egyptian armoured vehicles crossing the Suez Canal in October 1973. Notice that:

- There are Egyptian soldiers on both sides of the Canal. This would indicate that the crossing has been a success.
- A clever bridge has been installed to permit the transit of heavy vehicles and soldiers.
- There seems to be no sense of urgency. In other words, the photograph was probably not taken in the very beginning of the October War.
- There does not appear to be any immediate danger because on the opposite side of the Canal, soldiers appear to be standing and sitting.
- A photographer is in the foreground of the photograph. He is recording the crossing.
- The Egyptian army appears to be well organized and equipped.

Someone who saw this photograph would probably assume that the Egyptian army's crossing of the Suez Canal was well organized and successful. It would appear that the Egyptians at this point did not face any Israeli opposition or that they had already taken care of that threat.

How to answer

It is likely that you will be asked to analyse a visual source that appears on your Paper 1 examination in question 1. The questions are usually very straightforward, asking you to indicate what the message of the source is.

Example 1

This question uses Source N found on page 94 in this chapter.

What message is conveyed by Source N?

(2 marks)

First, take note that there are three Arab leaders portrayed: Sadat, Gaddafi and Assad. Notice what each is doing in the photograph. Pay attention to the date because that can help to provide context.

Lastly, write your answer to the question. In some visual sources, you will have to take educated guesses if the meaning is not immediately clear. Try to come up with at least two significant points because the question is worth 2 marks.

Source N is a photo taken in 1971 of President Sadat of Egypt, Colonel Gaddafi of Libya and President Assad of Syria. It appears that the three leaders are attending some sort of celebration as they are smiling and holding hands. Sadat and Assad are dressed in suits unlike Gaddafi who is wearing a uniform. This might mean that they wish to portray themselves as political not military leaders. The fact that the three of them are together could be seen as an expression of Arab unity. Because the photo was taken before the October 1973 war, it might mean that the three were discussing joint plans in regard to Israel.

The answer indicates which source is being analysed, the type of source and the date.

The caption is thoroughly analysed.

All major elements depicted in the photograph are discussed and analysed, including what the men are doing and where they might be.

Answer indicates that question was understood. There are at least two points made about the photograph. All points are clear, supported with evidence from the photograph, and accurate. Good use of analysis and deduction.

Terms and phrases such as 'might' and 'could be' are used appropriately when presenting a hypothesis based on historical events and probability but where some other interpretation may be possible.



Examination practice

- Source A: page 80
- Source D: page 82
- Source E: page 83
- Source H: page 85
- Source I: page 85
- Source J: page 89
- Source K: page 89
- Source L: page 91
- Source O: page 95
- Source P: page 96
- Source S: page 100

SAMPLE QUESTION 1s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 44–5.

- 1 According to Source D, how did Israel respond to attacks from Syria?
- 2 What, according to Source E, were the goals of the Arabs in relation to Israel?
- 3 What is the message conveyed by Source K?
- 4 What is the message conveyed by Source S?

SAMPLE QUESTION 2s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 74–5.

- 1** Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A and E regarding the Arab views on Israel.
- 2** Compare and contrast the views of Sources H and L regarding reasons for the outbreak of war in 1967.
- 3** Compare and contrast the views of Sources O and P regarding Egyptian and Israeli goals in the early 1970s.

SAMPLE QUESTION 3

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 125–7.

With reference to their origin and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Source H and Source I for historians studying the Six-day War.

SAMPLE QUESTION 4

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 142–3.

Using Sources J, L, O, P and S and your own knowledge, explain how the 1967 war was linked to the 1973 war.



Activities

- 1** The Arab–Israeli conflict has generated many posters from the Middle East and from supporters of the different sides. The artwork is often very heavy on symbolism. A large number of posters can be found at: www.palestineposterproject.org/special-collections/categories.
 - Each student in the class should select a poster to analyse, with no two students selecting the same one.
 - Each student should answer the question ‘What message is conveyed by your selected poster?’ and try and make at least three points.
 - Each student should present their analysis to another student for marking, along with the link to the poster. Students should mark each other out of three possible points.
- 2** Using the posters from activity 1, compare and contrast pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli posters.
 - What symbolism is used for each group?
 - Who is the intended audience?
 - Are symbols or words more powerful or useful in conveying a message?
- 3** One way to learn cartoon symbolism is to create a bingo-like game where symbols are represented on a grid pattern. Each grid card should have symbols arranged in a different order than any of the others. Someone calls out the meaning of a symbol, keeping track, of course, of which meanings and symbols have been called out. As meanings are matched with symbols, students may cross out or otherwise mark the appropriate symbol. Once a line of symbols is complete, that individual is the winner of that round. Grid patterns can contain any number of symbols, with perhaps five across and five down being the easiest to work with.

Zionism and Arabism: the development of Israel and of Arab nationalism

This chapter examines the impact of Jewish immigration, foreign aid and other factors on Israel's economic development. It then focuses on the influence of the religious parties and the development of Zionism within Israeli politics. In the second half, it traces the growth of Arab nationalism and how it was shaped by President Nasser and his defiance of the West. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- ★ How did the state of Israel develop into a regional superpower?
- ★ What was the impact of Arab nationalism?
- ★ To what extent was the creation of the state of Israel the main reason for the growth of Arab nationalism?

1 Jewish immigration and the economic development of Israel

▶ **Key question:** *How did the state of Israel develop into a regional superpower?*

When the state of Israel was created in 1948, it had a population of about 750,000 of which 80 per cent was Jewish. Within four years it was to double and, by 1979, it reached four million of which, again, about 80 per cent was Jewish. The non-Jewish element was Israeli Arabs; those Palestinians (and their descendants) who had not fled in 1947–9.

The immigration of Jews from the Arab world

Surrounded by hostile Arab states, the new state of Israel needed massive immigration both for its security and for its development into a strong modern state. In 1950, the Law of Return granted any Jew in the world the right to become a citizen of Israel. Many of the earliest immigrants were survivors of the Holocaust: about 120,000, largely from Poland, arrived in Israel. Most of Europe's Jews, around six million, had been killed.

← **How and why were Arab-speaking Jews settled in Israel?**

However, half the immigrants in the first few years were Arab-speaking Jews. In many of the big Arab cities in the Middle East, like Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, there were large Jewish communities: they had lived there for centuries, many had prospered and very few of them were Zionist or had any desire to be uprooted and move to Israel. However, the new state launched a campaign to lure them to Israel and, after the 1948–9 war, Arab governments and people increasingly viewed them with suspicion, as potential Zionists, and associated them with what they saw as the disaster in Palestine. Thus, under duress, about 120,000 Iraqi Jews moved to Israel in the early 1950s as well as smaller numbers from Egypt, Syria and other Arab states. Later, in the mid-1950s, an even larger number arrived from Morocco. These Middle Eastern and North African Jews were known as Sephardic or Oriental Jews. Jews from Europe were known as Ashkenazi.

Most of these Sephardic Jews had been forced to leave their property behind and thus arrived in Israel with few possessions. Many were settled on land and in houses recently abandoned by Palestinian Arabs and confiscated by the Israelis. Many of these were in border areas where the new Jewish immigrants might provide a buffer zone against attempts by Palestinian refugees to cross into Israel and retake their lands.




What impact do you think immigration shown in Source A might have on the new state?

Immigration on this scale presented a huge challenge to the new Israeli state. The new arrivals had to be housed and educated. They also had to be integrated into what was a predominantly European culture. They had not experienced the European Holocaust nor had they grown up in the Yishuv, the Jewish community in British-ruled Palestine, which was largely made up

SOURCE A

A map showing Jewish immigration to Israel from Arab states 1948–72.



of Jews from eastern Europe. The Sephardic Jews were poorer and less well educated. For many years, they took the poorest paid jobs and often suffered discrimination.

The isolation of Israeli Arabs

However, the most marginalized group was undoubtedly the Israeli Arabs who were mostly Muslim. They became Israeli citizens but their experience was that of second-class citizens. Israeli law stated that any Palestinian Arab who had left his usual place of residence on or after 29 November 1947, the date of the UN partition resolution, could be declared 'absentee'. This applied even if the individual only left temporarily in order to avoid the fighting during the war. The definition of **absentee property** thus served to justify the taking of Arab lands and houses in order to consolidate Israel's control over all of its territory. Like many of the new Jewish immigrants from Arab countries, most Palestinian Arabs lived near to the borders, often in areas which had been declared military zones. In these zones, they could, under the orders of the military, be banished and have their properties confiscated while whole villages could be cleared of their inhabitants. Israeli Arabs were also regarded with suspicion because of the continuing conflict with the Arab states on Israel's borders.

KEY TERM

Absentee property The term used to describe the property of Palestinian Arabs who had left their homes, even if only for a day. Tens of thousands of Palestinian Arabs were classified as 'absentee'.

Kibbutzim Agricultural settlements in Israel where people live and work together.

Building the state of Israel

Discouraged from speaking Arabic, Polish, Russian, English or whatever the language of their country of origin, immigrants to Israel were taught Hebrew. This ancient language was revived and adapted for modern usage, even developing its own slang. In fact, the Hebrew language played a crucial role in state-building and in the development of an Israeli-Hebraic culture.

The Israeli army

Equally, if not more important, in developing the Israeli state was the army. This is hardly surprising: since the end of the war in 1949, the Israelis had lived with the threat of invasion. They knew they were surrounded by enemies and were convinced that the Arabs would try to attack again. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) would have to be constantly on the alert. All males had to do two years of military service, and women one year, and to spend a long period in the reserves so that Israel had an increasingly large pool of men and women ready to take up arms and defend the country. The Israeli army not only defended the new nation, it also helped to shape it. The Jews of Israel had come from Europe, the USA, the Middle East and North Africa. In the army they all received a similar training, lived together and had to learn Hebrew. It was experience in the army that probably did more than anything else to make the newly arrived Jews into Israelis.

Kibbutzim

Many Israelis went to live and work on **kibbutzim**. These were large co-operative farms in which all the property and work was shared. Different

← How did Israel develop into a strong, modern state?

families ate together and shared living quarters. Several were established in the Galilee region where Arabs outnumbered Jews. Here many Palestinian villages were depopulated and their inhabitants were moved to other villages or driven across the border in order to make way for kibbutzim. Other kibbutzim were situated in the Negev desert in the south of Israel. Soon large areas were irrigated and cultivated, often with citrus fruits. Later, many kibbutzim diversified into industrial production (see Source B).



How and why, according to Source B, did kibbutzim change over time?

SOURCE B

An excerpt from *Kibbutz: The Way We Live* by Joel Magid, published by the Federation of the Kibbutz Movements, 1980, quoted in *The Middle East Since 1900* by Kenneth A. Rice, published by Longman, Harlow, UK, 1990.

Some kibbutzim wanted to maintain small, intimate communities based on farming the land. ... Reality, however, has its way of transforming ideology. A limited amount of water and arable land in our dry country, the rapid absorption of agricultural technology and growth in population of the kibbutz made us turn to factories in order to guarantee our economic vitality in the face of fickle rain gods and in order to provide members with workplaces where they could contribute to the society. So we built factories; now almost every kibbutz has a factory and some of the larger kibbutzim even have two or three different industrial enterprises.

A strong, modern economy

The state of Israel became richer, stronger and more highly developed in the 1950s and 1960s. New industries, such as cars, chemicals and defence, were built and vast sums of money were spent on the armed forces to defend the country. Israel became a manufacturer of high-technology military equipment. The high level of education and skills of Israeli citizens played a major part in Israel's economic development, as did the availability of a plentiful supply of cheap immigrant labour. With an increasingly large proportion of its population living in towns and cities, many working in service industries, and enjoying a rising standard of living, Israel became more like a West European state. It also became a regional superpower.

The importance of foreign aid

The speed of Israel's progress would not have been possible without huge gifts from abroad. In the early years, most of this aid came from Jews in the Diaspora, especially from Zionist groups in the USA. Also, from 1952 onwards, the state of West Germany started paying **reparations**: a sum of \$715 million, to be paid over many years, was agreed. This was the equivalent of many billions in today's currency. Then, after 1967, the US government pumped in an increasingly large amount of aid, more than \$2 billion a year by 1979. About 40 per cent of this was economic aid, 60 per cent in the form of military equipment. (The reasons for the USA's huge injection of aid are explored fully in Chapter 8.)

KEY TERM

Reparations Damages or compensation that Germany paid to Israel for the persecution of the Jews during the Second World War.

SOURCE C

A town centre restaurant in Nahariya, Israel in the 1970s.

What evidence is there in the photo in Source C to suggest that Israel was more like a western than a Middle Eastern country?



In a foreword to a guidebook on Israel in 1962, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion wrote of 'the dynamic quality of a new State turning deserts into gardens and welding heterogeneous immigrant groups into a sturdy nation'. It may have been propaganda but it captured much of what Israel achieved in its early years.

Zionism: politics and religion

Israel was and is a Jewish state. The concepts of Judaism, the Jewish people and of Eretz (biblical) Israel, which had been so important in the development of the Yishuv, continued to dominate the political life of the new state. From the start, the rabbis were granted full responsibility, through their courts, for marriage and divorce and for the laws regarding the observance of the **Sabbath**. Religion was also to play an increasingly significant part in the politics of the new nation because of the electoral system.

In elections for the Israeli parliament, the **Knesset**, all of Israel was treated as one large constituency and parliamentary seats were allocated to the political parties in proportion to the number of votes cast for them. Any party that secured just one per cent of the vote was assured a seat in the Knesset. Not surprisingly, this system of proportional representation supported a large number of parties, often reflecting the wide range of backgrounds from which Israel's people came.

Politics in Israel, up to 1977, was dominated by the political party called Mapai. In 1968, it merged with the Labour Party to become the largest

Why, and how, did religious parties play an increasingly significant part in Israeli politics?

KEY TERM

Sabbath The Jewish day of rest and worship, a Saturday.

Knesset The Israeli parliament.

KEY TERM

Orthodox Jews Jews who adhere to the traditional interpretation and application of Jewish law.

political party. It was led by David Ben-Gurion who was the first prime minister and towered over Israeli political life until his retirement in 1963. However, neither Mapai nor any other political party ever secured an overall majority. All Israeli governments have therefore been coalition governments. Most have been made up of several parties and the so-called religious parties have often held the balance of power. These religious parties, largely representing **Orthodox Jews**, have consistently gained about 15 per cent of the vote and have been able to extract huge concessions from the main party in government in return for their support. Thus, they have won financial support from the state for religious schools, exemption from military service for Orthodox Jews and the establishment of a Ministry of Religion. Increasingly they have demanded that the state be governed by religious law and, since 1967, they have pressed for the annexation of the occupied territories, particularly the West Bank, as part of the state of Israel.

Zionism and the Occupied Territories

The official view, as expressed by Defence Minister Dayan, of the status of the territories seized in the Six-Day War of 1967 was that they were being held in 'custody', that they would remain Arab, to be administered, not annexed or settled, by Israel. Few thought that the occupation would be permanent.

Nevertheless, an Israeli historian, Tom Segev, believes that Israel's leaders missed a 'great opportunity [to heal] the wound' of the Palestinian refugee problem.

SOURCE D

An excerpt from *1967: Israel, the War and the Year That Transformed the Middle East* by Tom Segev, published by Abacus Books, London, UK, 2008, page 653. Segev is an Israeli historian and journalist living in Jerusalem.

Lacking vision, courage and compassion, captivated by the hallucinations of victory, they [the Israeli leaders] never accepted Israel's role in the Palestinian tragedy, or perhaps they simply did not have the courage to admit it; this was probably the main inhibition. And perhaps they truly believed that one day they would succeed in getting rid of them.



For what does the author of Source D blame the Israeli leaders?

Land of Israel Movement

Meanwhile, in a challenge to the government, the religiously inspired Land of Israel Movement, founded in August 1967, campaigned for Israeli retention of all the territories occupied in the war. It believed that Jewish occupation of Judea and Samaria, as the West Bank was known to its believers, was an important step on the road to redemption, the idea that Israel had returned forever to the heart of its ancient homeland. The Labour government's concern that incorporation of the occupied territories would add over a million Arabs to the existing 400,000 Israeli Arabs, and thus jeopardize Israel's existence as a predominantly Jewish state, was brushed

aside. The historic alliance between the religious parties and the Labour government began to break down. Facing a growing tide of public opinion, Dayan changed his tune: in an interview on BBC television, he said 'I do think that Israel should stay for ever and ever and ever and ever in the West Bank because this is Judea and Samaria. This is our homeland.'

Gush Emunim

Meanwhile, **Gush Emunim** which was, according to historian Martin Gilbert, a 'fanatical extremist religious group', pressed for the widest possible settlement of the West Bank. Its members settled illegally near supposedly biblical sites and resisted government attempts to evict them. Claiming that Jewish settlement was preordained by God, they took over sites throughout the West Bank, however close they were to Arab villages or towns. They gained increasing support within Israel and among some Zionist groups abroad, particularly in the USA.

Election of Likud government, 1977

With a growing rift between the secular and the religious Israelis, and also between the Labour-dominated government and the religious parties, the Likud Party won the election in 1977 and emerged as the largest single party. It had secured the vote of many of Israel's Sephardic Jews and, with the support of the religious parties, formed a government. For the first time in 30 years, Labour no longer dominated the government. The new prime minister, Menachem Begin, insisted on using the ancient biblical terms, Judea and Samaria, for the West Bank and settlement building expanded. As far as Begin was concerned, the Palestinians had their own homeland on the east bank of the Jordan, under the rule of King Hussein.

KEY TERM

Gush Emunim A religious group, its name is often translated as 'Bloc of the Faithful'.

Immigration led to a doubling of Israeli population from 1948 to 1951

Hebrew language, the army and kibbutzim were all important in the development of Israeli state and society

Foreign aid (from the Diaspora, Germany and the USA) contributed to rapid economic development

Religious parties participated in coalition governments and, after 1967, spearheaded the drive for settlement building in the occupied territories

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

Jewish immigration and the economic development of Israel

Nasser and the growth of Arab nationalism



KEY TERM

Arab nationalism

A movement striving for Arab political unity and an end to western domination.

▶ **Key question:** *What was the impact of Arab nationalism?*

In the early twentieth century, the Arabs sought independence from European colonial rule. Countries like Syria, Lebanon and Palestine were ruled by the Turks while Egypt was dominated by the British. Many Arabs embraced the idea of **Arab nationalism**.

Why did Arab nationalism emerge as a political movement?

→ The emergence of Arab nationalism

This concept of Arab nationalism was rooted in the feeling of sharing the same language, Arabic, and the same religion, Islam (although a tiny minority of Arabs are non-Muslim). But it was more than that because it had a political dimension: the desire for Arab political unity, even to establish a single Arab state. In the First World War, Arab nationalism was boosted by the Arab Revolt of 1916 in which an Arab army fought against the Turks in the Middle East (see page 15). It was further strengthened, after the war, in opposition to continued European domination: in 1919, British and French mandates were imposed on the Arab countries of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine (see page 16).

Above all, however, Arab nationalism emerged as a growing political movement in the 1930s and the main reason was the increasing Jewish immigration to Palestine. Opposition to Zionism was the one issue on which all the Arabs of the Middle East could agree. The events in Palestine, especially the Arab Rebellion from 1936 (see page 24), contributed to the growth of national feeling among Arab people.

Although most Arabs still felt that their first loyalty was to their tribe, clan or region, there was growing support for a single Arab state, especially among the urban, educated classes in countries like Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, as well as Palestine. Nevertheless, it was separate Arab countries that emerged in the twentieth century and most of their governments did not wish to merge and form a single Arab state. They did, however, show their solidarity when their leaders met in a conference in Cairo in 1945 and formed the Arab League with six founding members. Then, a few years later, the emergence of the state of Israel and the humiliating defeat of the invading Arab armies united the Arabs in their hatred of the new Jewish state. The Arabs also resented the western powers, especially Britain and the USA, whom they blamed for the creation of the state of Israel in the first place.

Nasser and the West

In Egypt, as we have seen (page 60), it was the war against Israel in 1948–9 that acted as the catalyst which led the army to overthrow the monarchy. Nasser and his fellow army officers had been so appalled by the incompetence of the Egyptian government in the 1948–9 war that they started plotting to take over the government soon afterwards. They overthrew the King's government in 1952. Next, in order to establish complete independence for Egypt, they secured Britain's agreement, in 1954, to withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal area. However, it was also agreed that British officials would continue to operate the Canal and this therefore remained as a symbol of western domination.

In the 1950s, the Britain and the USA tried to persuade Nasser's government to join an anti-Soviet alliance. This was the era of the Cold War and the western powers wished to contain the spread of Soviet power and influence. When the USA explained to Nasser what a threat the USSR was, he pointed out that it was 'five thousand miles [8000 km] away'. For him, it was the western powers and Israel that posed the greater threat to Egypt's stability and independence. Nasser wished to stay independent of any pro-western alliance. This neutral stand made the western powers suspicious because they saw things through Cold War eyes: if Egypt was not *for* them, they suspected it must be *against* them.

The Baghdad Pact 1955

In 1955, at the height of the Cold War, the British formed an anti-Soviet alliance with Turkey and Iran. They tried to persuade the government of Iraq, which was an Arab state, to join. Nasser was furious. He did not want any Arab state to join. It seemed that the British were interfering in Arab affairs again, as they had been doing for much of the twentieth century. Nasser saw the **Baghdad Pact**, as the alliance became known, as an instrument of western intervention and he feared that Jordan, Lebanon and Syria might also be seduced into joining. That would leave Egypt very isolated. He launched a massive propaganda campaign to prevent Iraq from joining.

'Voice of the Arabs'

To do this, Nasser made use of the Arab world's biggest radio station, the 'Voice of the Arabs', which was broadcast from Cairo and reached millions in the Arab world. Radios were set up in cafés and in village squares. Dozens of people listened to each radio. In this way, Nasser could appeal to the Arab peoples, sometimes against the wishes of their governments. As the radio station declared: 'The Voice of the Arabs speaks for the Arabs, struggles for them and expresses their unity.'

Nasser's main aim was to preserve the power of Egypt but he recognized the wide appeal of Arab nationalism. Through the power of the radio (at a time before television was common) he could strengthen both the power of Egypt

Why did Nasser view the West as a threat?

KEY TERM

Baghdad Pact An alliance formed by Britain, Turkey, Iran and, later, Pakistan and Iraq. Its headquarters were in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.

and his own leadership of the Arab world. Egypt was the leading Arab state and the strongest military power in the Arab world. Now it had the radio with which to dominate other Arab powers and defy the West. As historian Eugene Rogan wrote, 'Nasser conquered the Arab world by radio.'

Cairo Radio already had a huge audience throughout the Arab world because Egyptian music was so popular. Now the voice of Nasser was also heard by millions and they thrilled to his mesmerizing speeches. The Arab masses, particularly in the cities where they had more access to radio, responded with huge enthusiasm. The 'Voice of the Arabs' appealed to Arabs of all classes and across national borders. It went to the heart of Arab politics. In this way, Arab nationalism became an increasingly strong, unifying movement and Nasser was its champion.

Nasser's opposition to what he saw as western imperialism won so much Arab support that only Iraq, out of all the Arab states, was able to join the Baghdad Pact. Public opinion in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria was swept along by Nasser's oratory and made it impossible for their governments to join the pact. It was Egypt's opposition to any western alliance that was thus the main contributor to the rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s.

SOURCE E

An excerpt from *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* by Adeed Dawisha, published by Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA, 2002, page 172. Professor Dawisha is an Iraqi-born historian who teaches at Miami University, Ohio, USA.

The struggle over the Baghdad Pact ushered in a period in the history of the region in which Arab nationalism became the uncontested ideological force among citizens of the countries and areas that call themselves Arab. During the few years that followed the Baghdad Pact, an Iraqi lawyer, a Jordanian student, a Syrian doctor and a Moroccan businessman would not have known one another by name or profession, but by adhering to the Arab nationalist creed, they were indeed but one fraternity, sharing in convictions and aspirations.



What does the author of Source E see as the most significant effect of 'the struggle over the Baghdad Pact'?

Why did Nasser earn respect beyond the Middle East?

KEY TERM

Non-aligned Not wishing to step into line with either the West (the USA and its allies) or the USSR and its allies.

→ Nasser and the non-aligned world

As we have seen, Nasser was determined that Egypt should not be drawn into any alliance with the West (or, for that matter, with the USSR). He wanted the Arabs to be neutral and to defend themselves. This neutralist stand won Nasser many admirers beyond the Arab world. The leaders of major countries like India and China admired his independent stance and treated him as an equal. These countries were, like Egypt, determined not to be drawn in to any alliance either with the West or with the USSR. They wanted to keep out of the Cold War and remain **non-aligned**. In 1955, Nasser attended the first conference, in Bandung, Indonesia, of these non-aligned states. His international prestige grew and he came to be seen as the leader of the whole Arab world.

Three further events were to accelerate the onward march of Arab nationalism. The first was the so-called Czech arms deal. The second was the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the third was the merging of the states of Egypt and Syria in 1958.

The Czech arms deal, September 1955

In September 1955, Nasser announced that he had agreed to buy arms from the Czech government. In return for sales of cotton and rice, Egypt was to be supplied with weapons, including Soviet aircraft and tanks. This was Nasser showing his 'independent' stance which so worried the West. A few months earlier, Israeli armed forces had attacked Egyptian military headquarters in Gaza and killed 35 Egyptian troops. Now, at last, Nasser had secured the weapons Egypt needed to defend itself. The announcement of the Czech arms deal had an electrifying effect, not just in Egypt but in many other Arab countries. On the streets of the Arab cities of Damascus, Amman and Baghdad there was rejoicing. Nasser was seen as a saviour, throwing off the domination of the West and securing the defence of the Arab world. Now at last, the Arabs had achieved their victory over 'imperialism' and its 'illegitimate offspring', Israel.

SOURCE F

An excerpt from *Uneasy Lies the Head* by His Majesty King Hussein, published by Bernard Geis Associates, New York, USA, 1962, page 106, quoted in *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* by Adeed Dawisha, published by Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA, 2003, page 168. Hussein was the King of Jordan from 1952 to 1999.

The bombshell fell on the Arab world when Nasser announced his now historic arms deal with the Soviet bloc. In an instant, everything changed. Hundreds of thousands of Jordanians, listening avidly to the propaganda on Cairo Radio, saw in Nasser a mystical sort of saviour and ... their best bet for their future against Israel. [All] they saw was ... that Nasser was the first Arab statesman really to throw off the shackles of the West. I must admit I sympathized with the point of view to a great extent.

How did the Czech arms deal contribute to the growth of Arab nationalism?

Why, according to King Hussein in Source F, was the Czech arms deal 'historic'? Why is it so significant that the author refers to Nasser as 'a mystical sort of saviour'?

?

The Suez Crisis 1956

There was similar euphoria in the Arab world a year later, in 1956, when Britain and France were forced to withdraw from Egypt after attempting to regain control of the Suez Canal. This episode is explained fully on pages 65–9. For a short time, it looked to the Egyptian government as if Cairo might be attacked by Anglo-French forces and Nasser considered taking poison rather than suffer the humiliation of being captured, but then came news that Britain and France had been forced to call off their military action.

Why did the Suez Crisis lead to euphoria in the Arab world?

Nasser himself recognized that he had been saved by US intervention (see page 69) but, on the radio and throughout the Arab world, it was Egyptian resistance that was portrayed as having won the day. Arab cities erupted in anti-western demonstrations and riots, Nasser's name was chanted and Arab governments came under huge pressure to bring their policies into line with Egypt. Syria and Saudi Arabia broke off relations with Britain and France while Jordan signed a military pact with Syria and Egypt. In January 1957, a 'Treaty of Arab Solidarity' was signed by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Nasser's charisma, his perceived victory over Suez and the predominance of Cairo Radio contributed to an ever-rising tide of Arab nationalism. This reached its height, in 1958, when Syria demanded a complete merger with Egypt so as to form one state.

SOURCE G

President Nasser waves to the cheering crowd in 1956 after announcing that he had nationalized the Suez Canal Company.



What does the photograph in Source G suggest about the impact of Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal?

KEY TERM

International communism A term used by the US government to describe the threat posed by the communist USSR and its allies during the Cold War.

Why was the UAR formed in 1958?

→ The United Arab Republic (UAR) 1958–61

Some Arab governments, like those of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, remained lukewarm in their attitude towards Nasser's Egypt. Both were ruled by conservative monarchies and were wary of Nasser's radical, even revolutionary politics (see the section on Nasser's achievements, page 120). When the US government offered aid to countries requesting US help against the threat of **international communism**, both Jordan and Saudi Arabia responded and received US aid.

By contrast, Syria accepted economic and military aid from the USSR. The USA was so afraid that Syria might go communist that they persuaded Turkey to move troops to its border with Syria. Nasser unleashed a barrage of propaganda against the USA and its 'reactionary' allies in the Arab world. He also sent a contingent of Egyptian troops to Syria. As a military force, these troops were insignificant but, as a symbol, they had a huge impact on Arab public opinion. Even those leaders who had adopted a pro-US position had to retreat and appear to swim with the Arab nationalist tide. The Syrian parliament went further and voted for immediate union with Egypt!

Syria demands union with Egypt

Nasser was not enthusiastic: Syria had no common border with Egypt and it had completely different political and economic systems. However, Syria's army leaders flew to Cairo and virtually handed their country over to Nasser. The Syrians felt vulnerable: theirs was a small population of just four million. They would feel far more secure if joined to Egypt's 26 million. On the streets of the Syrian capital, Damascus, there was a frenzy demanding the political unity of the 'Arab nation'. Nasser, as the 'hero' of Arab nationalism, was cornered. He insisted that the political and economic systems of Syria would have to be merged with those of Egypt. That would mean Syria closing down its political parties to come into line with one-party Egypt. Yet still the Syrian leaders demanded complete union and, in February 1958, the **United Arab Republic (UAR)** was born.

When Nasser arrived in the Syrian capital at dawn a few weeks later, people poured out of their homes, many still in nightclothes, to welcome him. Nasser made speech after speech to huge crowds. There was dancing, singing of Arab songs and chanting of political slogans. Nasser was treated like a pop or film star. He was, by far, the biggest celebrity in the Arab world.

SOURCE H

An excerpt from *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* by Anwar Sadat, published by Harper & Row, New York, USA, 1977, page 152. Sadat, later to succeed Nasser as president of Egypt, accompanied Nasser on his visit to Syria.

I really feel incapable of describing that week. It was like a constant delirium – a stream of speeches that flowed day and night. ... The crowds could not get enough and seemed to grow increasingly frenzied. All that was said was hailed, applauded, celebrated. People chanted and screamed and called for more. For a whole week the crowds besieged the Guesthouse [where Nasser was staying].

KEY TERM

United Arab Republic (UAR) The union of Egypt and Syria formed in 1958.

Republic A state governed by elected representatives.

Using Source H, explain in your own words how Sadat viewed the attitude of the Syrian people towards President Nasser.



Overthrow of Iraqi monarchy, July 1958

Even in Iraq, Nasser's main Arab rival, big crowds celebrated the news of the new Arab state. Five months later, the Iraqi army overthrew and killed their king and his leading ministers and declared Iraq a **republic**. The country left the Baghdad Pact, which then collapsed. It was widely assumed that Iraq

would now join Egypt and Syria and that the three countries, at the heart of the Arab world, would form the bedrock of the Arab nation-state.

The end of the UAR 1961

In 1958, Arab nationalism reached the height of its power. But from now onwards, it entered a period of gradual decline. First, the new Iraqi government put its own interests first and decided not to join the UAR. Secondly, the euphoria that had greeted the formation of the UAR soon turned to disillusionment in Syria. There were many reasons, mostly to do with Syrians being made to feel inferior. Nasser had imposed the Egyptian political system on Syria. This meant the abolition of all political parties except Nasser's National Union. Furthermore, the army and the government of the new Arab state was dominated by Egyptians. Although this was not unexpected, it was still resented. Landowners and businessmen became resentful too. They disliked Nasser's 'Arab socialism' (see page 121). The Egyptians insisted that Syria carry out land reform, breaking up the big estates and redistributing land to the peasants, as had been done in Egypt. Then the major industries and the banks in Syria were taken over by the government. What may have worked in Egypt did not go down well in Syria. The urban masses may have remained loyal to the UAR but the élites became disaffected.

KEY TERM

Coup Sudden or violent change of government.

In September 1961, Syrian army officers carried out a **coup** against those 'who have humiliated Syria and degraded her army'. Egyptian forces did not intervene and the new Syrian prime minister, Mamoun al-Kuzbari, said he wanted to maintain a close alliance with Egypt: there was still huge support among Syrians for the idea of Arab unity. But Nasser's prestige and his status as the unifying symbol of Arab nationalism were dented.

What did Nasser achieve domestically?

→ Nasser's achievement

The political system in Nasser's Egypt

Nasser and his fellow Free Officers formed a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) after they took power in 1952. Then, as president from 1954, Nasser dominated the government and most of the senior positions were held by army officers or people with a military background. The old politicians were dismissed and, in January 1953, all political parties were banned. Throughout Nasser's presidency, the military dominated Egyptian politics. 'My parliament is the army', Nasser told a British army general with whom he was negotiating the evacuation of British troops, and the army remained the base of his power. Parliament was not abolished but its power was severely limited. All major decisions on foreign and domestic policy were taken by Nasser. The great majority of Egyptians consented to this highly personal and authoritarian rule, even after the disaster of the 1967 war.

Nasser's 'Arab socialism'

After coming to power, Nasser had set out to transform the Egyptian economy and share the country's wealth more fairly. He started with land reform. In the early 1950s, a small number of landowners owned a third of the cultivated land in Egypt while 72 per cent of the rural population owned an acre (0.4 ha) or less. Nasser's government passed a law which limited land owning to 200 acres (80 ha) per person, later reduced to 100 acres (40 ha). The land confiscated from those who owned more than this amount was then redistributed amongst the poorer farmers.

Later, in 1961, the government nationalized the export of cotton, Egypt's main product, and took over the banks and many large industrial companies. It also confiscated the property of over a thousand of the wealthiest landowners. This huge programme, accompanied by an expansion in schools and hospitals, was intended to reduce poverty and increase opportunities for the masses. By the mid-1960s most Egyptians were considerably better off than they had been when Nasser came to power (see Source I).

SOURCE I

An excerpt from *The Arabs* by Peter Mansfield, published by Penguin, London, UK, 1982, page 450. Mansfield was a British journalist and historian who spent many years living in, and writing about, the Middle East.

The average Egyptian, especially in the towns, was noticeably healthier and better fed in 1964 than in 1954. Educational opportunities were also greatly increased. In the 1950s the regime could claim that it was opening two new schools every three days. Inevitably the quality of teaching was often low ... Illiteracy did not fall nearly as fast as was hoped. Nevertheless, by the 1970s, Egypt was turning out tens of thousands of teachers, doctors, pharmacists and administrators.

In what ways, according to Source I, were Egyptians better off by 1964?



The economy slowed down after 1964, partly because of less foreign investment, from both the West and the USSR, and, after the 1967 war, economic development was further curtailed by the need to replace Egypt's military losses and the continuing situation of 'no peace, no war' (see page 94).

The death of Nasser 1970

Nasser died, aged 52, from a heart attack in 1970. (He had been trying to negotiate an end to bitter fighting in Jordan.) Millions turned out for his funeral and he was mourned by many more throughout the Arab world. He had been a towering Arab leader, inspiring and exciting those who heard his speeches, whether at rallies or on the radio. He was the undisputed voice of Arab nationalism, the movement that united so much of the Arab world in its defiance of the West and Israel.

KEY TERM

Political Islam The belief that Muslims should establish states based on laws derived from the Qur'an, the Muslim holy book.

Yet Arab nationalism was already on the wane when Nasser died. The main reason was the crushing defeat that the Arab nations of Egypt, Syria and Jordan suffered in their war against Israel in 1967 (see pages 87–8). In that war, the Israelis proved that they were stronger than the three Arab states put together and they seized land from all of them. Arab nationalism was seen to have failed and it lost its appeal as a unifying force in the wake of the Arabs' humiliation at the hands of Israel and her western backers, especially the USA. In the years ahead, the vacuum left by Arab nationalism was to be filled by radical or **political Islam**.

Arab nationalism grew in response to western domination which was shown in:

- mandates in inter-war years
- creation of the state of Israel on Arab land
- continued presence of British troops on Egyptian territory
- pressure to join anti-Soviet alliance such as Baghdad Pact

President Nasser became champion of Arabs in defying the West:

- in his use of Cairo Radio
- in Czech arms deal 1955
- in Suez Crisis 1956

Formation of UAR, 1958:

- in response to Syrian demand for union with Egypt

Syria left the UAR, 1961:

- as Syrians resented their inferior position and disliked 'Arab socialism'

Nasser died in 1970:

- but Arab nationalism was already in decline, especially after Arab defeat in Six-Day War

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

Nasser and the growth of Arab nationalism

3 Key debate

► **Key question:** To what extent was the creation of the state of Israel the main reason for the growth of Arab nationalism?

The concept of Arab nationalism is inextricably linked with the name and career of Nasser. It rose with him and it declined as his apparent invincibility waned. It can be argued that Arab nationalism was fuelled, above all, by hatred of, and opposition to, Zionism and the state of Israel. Equally, however, it can be argued that it was determination to be rid of western interference that was the main contributory factor.

Opposition to Zionism was the main impetus for Arab nationalism

The creation of the state of Israel was opposed throughout the Arab world. In the eyes of the Arabs, it constituted the imposition of a foreign, European state on Arab land. Hatred of Zionism and of Israel led to the invasion of the new state in 1948 by armies from neighbouring Arab states. Defeat at the hands of the Israelis did nothing to lessen the intensity of opposition throughout the Arab world.

SOURCE J

An excerpt from *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars* by Ritchie Ovendale, published by Pearson Education, London, UK, 2004, page 149. Ovendale is a British historian who was professor of International Relations at the University of Wales, UK.

The First Arab–Israeli War led to upheavals in individual Arab countries, often fomented by a new, young and disillusioned generation which had been nurtured on what was considered the injustice of Zionist dispossession of Arab land. ... This emerging Arab nationalism found a common focal point in the hatred of Israel.

What does Ovendale, in Source J, see as the main reason for the emergence of Arab nationalism?



For all their many differences, both at the end of the 1948–9 war and in the years ahead, the Arab states were united in their refusal to recognize the new state. The formation of the PLO, in order to liberate Palestine and destroy Israel, helped to sustain Arab nationalism while the wars of 1967 and 1973 intensified anti-Israeli and, thus, Arab nationalist feeling.

Opposition to western intervention was the driving force of Arab nationalism

Defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1949 may have been the catalyst for the Egyptian revolution and the rise of Nasser but it was the desire, on the part of Nasser's government in Egypt, to be completely independent and free of

domination by the western powers that fuelled the rise of Arab nationalism. In particular, it was Nasser's campaign against the Baghdad Pact and his perceived victory over the British and the French in the Suez Crisis that brought both Nasser and Arab nationalism to the height of their power.

The main means by which Arab nationalist opinion was roused and intensified was Egyptian radio. The 'Voice of the Arabs' radio exploited the huge range of its audience (see Source K).

SOURCE K

An excerpt from *The Arabs* by Peter Mansfield, published by Penguin, London, UK, 1982, page 293. Mansfield was a British writer, broadcaster and lecturer on the Middle East.

Cairo radio developed a style of brilliant invective which roused a response in every Arab country. ... [Its] methods were often highly unscrupulous in detail, but they struck a responsive chord in the deep-seated resentment against the old colonial powers among the Arab masses.



What does the author of Source K identify as a significant effect of Egyptian radio?

When building nationalist sentiment, is it necessary, or at least more effective, to have an enemy in the narrative? Why or why not? Can you think of other examples of this phenomenon? (Social Sciences, Ethics, Reason, Emotion, Language.)

T
O
K

With the help of radio, Nasser made Arab nationalism into a revolutionary movement that won Arab support right across the political spectrum. Above all, his 'anti-imperialist' stand and his defiance of the West constituted the driving force of Arab nationalism.

Conclusion

Much Arab nationalism was essentially anti-western but much of that feeling was fuelled by opposition to what was seen as the West's creation of, and continuing support for, the state of Israel. Nowhere is this shown more clearly than in the Suez Crisis of 1956: throughout the Arab world, the co-ordinated attack by the forces of Britain, France and Israel was portrayed as aggression by western 'imperialists' and their 'illegitimate offspring', Israel.

Chapter summary

Zionism and Arabism: the development of Israel and of Arab nationalism

Immigration and foreign aid had a major impact on the rapid economic development of Israel, while religious parties were influential in Israeli politics and

spearheaded the Zionist drive for Jewish settlement of the West Bank after 1967.

Arab nationalism grew in response to western domination of the Middle East and Nasser became the champion of the Arab world. His 'victory' over Suez in 1956 and the creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 marked the pinnacle of Arab nationalism but defeat in the Six-Day War dented its appeal.



Examination advice

Paper 1 question 3: origin, purpose, value and limitations (OPVL)

Question 3 on the IB History Diploma examination requires you to discuss the origin and purpose of two sources and then to use that information to determine each source's potential value and limitations. The question always asks you to refer to the origin and purpose of two named sources to assess their value and limitations for historians studying a particular topic. Unlike questions 1 and 2, some knowledge of the topic, value of types of sources, or authors can be useful, although this is not required.

Question 3 is worth 6 marks out of the 25 total for Paper 1. This means it is worth 24 per cent of your overall mark. Answering question 3 should take approximately 15 minutes of your examination time.

How to answer

Read question 3 carefully. You will notice that it is asking you to discuss the origins and purpose of two different sources and then to determine the value and limitations for these two sources for historians. This question is not like question 2; you must treat each source separately. The first source mentioned in the question should be the one you start with and it should be in its own paragraph, with the second source treated in the second paragraph. At no point should you compare or contrast the sources or discuss them in the same paragraph.

Structure will help you in answering the question. Incorporate the words origin, purpose, value and limitation into your answer. 'The origin of Source B is ...', 'the purpose of Source B is ...', 'the value of this source is ...' and 'a limitation of this source may be ...'. This keeps you focused on the task, making sure you cover all the required elements, but also helps the examiner to understand your answers by providing a framework that can be followed.

It is important to remember that you are to use the origins and purpose to determine the value and limitations. The actual text of the source is not to be used as it is just an excerpt from a much larger work.

Origin

The origin of a source is the author, the type of publication, the year it was published and sometimes the country it originates from. If there is biographical information included as part of the source's introduction, this may be used in addressing the source's origin also.

Purpose

The purpose of a source is usually indicated by the source's title, the type of source, the writer or speaker, if it is a speech or the location of the source,

such as in a newspaper, an academic book or a journal. Purposes can range from speeches that try to convince certain groups or nations that what the speaker is saying is the truth or should be heeded, to explaining the history of a certain time period.

If a book's title is *The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-determination, 1969–1994* the purpose of this particular source is likely to discuss how the Palestinians lost their lands. If the author of this source is Palestinian, it may be that the purpose is to examine the political background of how Palestinians were dispossessed of their territory. If the author of this source is a US academic, it may be that the purpose is to look at the history of the Palestinians and why they have struggled to form a state of their own.

Since this is a hypothesis on your part, be sure to include the words 'perhaps' or 'possibly'. In order to determine the purpose or purposes of a source, be sure to read the title, the date of publication, the name of the author and any biographical information given. Be aware that there are certainly many historians whose nationality does not stop them from being highly critical of their own government's past actions.

Value

The value of a source flows naturally from the origins and purpose. Perhaps a book exists that is titled *The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-determination, 1969–1994* and was written by a US-based Palestinian academic in the 1990s. The value will be that this author may well have been involved in the fight to establish an independent state. Because the historian works at a major US university, he would have access to excellent research facilities. The fact that he is Palestinian may also add to the value of this source because he would presumably have contacts in the Palestinian community. Your answer will have to be determined by the origin and purpose of the source you are asked to discuss. Do not state that secondary sources have more value than primary sources or vice versa; this is not necessarily true.

Limitation

The limitation of a source is determined in much the same way you determined the source's value. If the writer of *The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-determination, 1969–1994* is a Palestinian, he might not have access to Israeli sources that could provide him with information that runs counter to his argument. Other than the author's nationality, there may be other ways to determine possible limitations:

- The title of the source may be of a limited nature or too broad for the topic.
- The date of publication may be limiting if it is too close to or far from the historical events.
- A source that is political in nature may be trying to advocate a certain view or policy instead of being objective.

Visual images

Visual sources will have information explaining to you their origin.

Remember that photographs can capture a single moment in time so that they can show exactly what happened, but they can also be staged to send a particular message. A photograph of someone waving a gun in the air could mean many things. Cartoons, posters and even photographs often have a political message. The purpose of any of these could potentially be to convince the viewer of a certain point of view. Another purpose could be to make fun of a particular idea or person for some other reason. Be sure to read the captions closely because these will usually have clues on the context of the image.

Example

This question uses Sources E and F found in this chapter on pages 116 and 117.

With reference to their origins and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Sources E and F for historians studying the appeal of Arab nationalism.

You will immediately turn to Source E and read that it is an excerpt from a book written by Professor Adeed Dawisha. There is no need to brainstorm or outline for this question, so go to your examination paper and start writing.

The origin of Source E is an excerpt from Professor Adeed Dawisha's book Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, published in 2002 by Princeton University Press.

The purpose of the book is to explain to the general public the history of Arab nationalism in the previous century.

A value of this source is that it was published in 2002 and reflects the recent scholarship on this topic. As the author was born in Iraq, he perhaps can read Arabic and thus have access to sources in this language. Because Dawisha's book was published by Princeton University Press, it may be considered reliable and/or significant.

A limitation of Source E could be that the author may well be examining the growth of Arab nationalism through very biased lenses. His analysis is only partially based on concrete evidence since the reader does not know for sure whether or not such solidarity among all Arabs existed as is suggested by Dawisha.

The origin of Source F is an excerpt from King Hussein's memoir, Uneasy Lies the Head, published in 1962 in New York.

The terms origin, purpose, value and limitation are used throughout both paragraphs.

Each source is discussed in its own paragraph and nowhere is there comparison or contrasting of the two sources.

The title of each source and its author are clearly stated, as is the year of publication and where it was published.

More than one value or limitation was found for each of the sources based on the origin and purpose.

Use of the words 'may be' and 'perhaps' are appropriately used since the value and limitations are based on hypotheses.

The purpose of Hussein's book is to explain how difficult it is to be a reigning monarch in the Middle East. His audience appears to be the English-reading public.

A value of Source F is that Hussein was an active observer of the events he described in his memoirs. He knew the reaction Nasser's speech had on his own people. He also appears heartfelt in his

admission that even he, too, sympathized with Nasser's goals.

A limitation of Source F may be that the King was hoping to suggest that he was also an Arab nationalist like Nasser, even if he was a monarch. This seems a bit unlikely since Arab nationalism hoped to depose monarchies in the Arab world. King Hussein was very

close to England and the USA so it might not be fully honest of him to suggest that he wanted to also 'throw off the shackles of the West'.

A further limitation could be that he wrote this memoir in 1962, only seven years after Nasser's arms deal.

Answer indicates that the demands of the question were understood. Both sources assessed. There is clear discussion of the origins, purpose, value and limitations of both sources, often with multiple examples.



Examination practice

The following are exam-style questions for you to practise, using sources from this chapter. Sources can be found on the following pages:

- Source A: page 108
- Source B: page 110
- Source C: page 111
- Source D: page 112
- Source E: page 116
- Source F: page 117
- Source G: page 118
- Source H: page 119
- Source I: page 121
- Source J: page 123
- Source K: page 124

SAMPLE QUESTION 1s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 44–5.

- 1 What, according to Source B, were the difficulties faced by the kibbutzim?
- 2 What, according to Source D, were the failures of the Israeli leaders?
- 3 What impact, according to Source E, did the Baghdad Pact have on Arab nationalism?
- 4 According to Source H, how was President Nasser received in Syria?
- 5 According to Source J, how did the Arab–Israeli war help to unite Arabs?

- 6 What was the importance of Cairo Radio, according to Source K?
- 7 What message is conveyed by Source A?
- 8 What message is conveyed by Source C?
- 9 What message is conveyed by Source G?

SAMPLE QUESTION 2s

For guidance on how to answer this question, see pages 74–5.

- 1 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A and B about the challenges facing the new Israeli state.
- 2 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources F and H about why Nasser was a popular leader.

SAMPLE QUESTION 3s

- 1 With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources B and C for historians studying Jewish life in Israel.
- 2 With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources D and J for historians studying the roots of Palestinian–Israeli animosity.
- 3 With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources G and I for historians studying the popularity of President Nasser.

SAMPLE QUESTION 4

For guidance on how to answer this question, see pages 142–3.

Using Sources E, F, G, H and I and your own knowledge, assess the popularity of President Nasser.



Activities

- 1 It helps to know some of the more familiar historians who have written extensively on the period 1945–79. Create a flashcard game with the name of a historian on one side and biographical information about the historian on the other side. You will find these historians throughout this book. Some of those historians might be Rashid Khalidi, Avi Shlaim and Peter Mansfield, as well as many others. Once you are familiar with their names and areas of expertise, you may wish to create another set of cards regarding their values and limitations based on their works, dates of publication, and other factors to help you review further.
- 2 Create one Paper 1 question 3-type question per chapter in this book:
 - Each chapter's questions should be on a separate sheet of paper.
 - Exchange a single chapter's question 3 with your classmates.
 - Complete as homework.
 - Exchange answers with classmates and correct each other's work.
- 3 With the help of your teacher or school librarian, research the works of the authors you made flashcards for in activity 1. Create a list of some of the works of the authors you have chosen and then look online and on information databases your school may have for either the works themselves, or reviews of them. Use this information to make a presentation to your classmates to add more information about the origins and purpose of the authors presented in this book. Be sure to consider the possible biases of each historian.

The Palestinian diaspora and the emergence of the PLO

This chapter focuses on the Palestinian diaspora and the plight of the refugees after 1948. It then examines the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), especially after the Six-Day War in 1967, and the impact of terrorism, both on foreign opinion and on the Palestinians themselves. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- ★ What was the plight of the Palestinian refugees?
- ★ What was the impact of the PLO?

1 The Palestinian diaspora


▶ **Key question:** *What was the plight of the Palestinian refugees?*

During the fighting between Israel and the Arabs in 1948–9, over 700,000 Arabs fled from their homes in Palestine. As you can see on the map in Source A, most of them went to the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Large numbers also went to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Today the United Nations (UN) reckons there are about five million Palestinian refugees.

What were conditions like in the refugee camps?

→ The Palestinian refugees

After the war ended in 1949, the UN formed the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). This body set up camps for the refugees and provided food, clothing, shelter and education. At first, the refugees lived in tents, later in huts made of mud, corrugated iron or concrete. The camps became the shanty towns of the Middle East. The conditions are described in Sources C, D and E (page 132), first by a British observer, then by a refugee and, finally, by a UN official.

SOURCE A**A map showing the locations of Palestinian refugees 1948–9.****SOURCE B****A refugee camp in Jordan 1949.**

Which two areas, according to the map in Source A, received the largest number of refugees? Which of those two areas would become most densely populated with refugees?

?

Which of the conditions described in Sources C and D (page 132) can you see evidence of in the photograph in Source B?

?



What, according to Source C, were the main threats to the refugees' lives?



Compare and contrast the descriptions given of conditions in the camps in Sources C and D.



According to Source E, what benefits does the UNRWA bring to the refugees in the camps? What factors mentioned in this source might turn some of the refugees into fighters for the Palestinian cause?

SOURCE C

An excerpt from *The Palestinians* by Jonathan Dimbleby, published by Quartet Books, London, UK, 1979. Jonathan Dimbleby is a British journalist.

The conditions in the camps were atrocious. Families huddled bleakly in overcrowded tents. They were without adequate food or sanitation. When it rained, the narrow paths along each row were churned into mud which oozed into the tents. They lived in sodden clothes and slept in wet blankets. Influenza reached epidemic proportions. The young and old perished. Malnourished children were too weak to resist, and the old, left with no purpose, lacked the will.

SOURCE D

An excerpt from an account by Ghazi Daniel, published by the PLO in 1972, quoted in *Arab-Israeli Conflict, Schools Council History 13-16 Project*, published by Holmes McDougall, Edinburgh, UK, 1977, page 65. Ghazi Daniel was a Palestinian refugee.

A few months after our arrival, we were penniless and had to move into a refugee camp with 2000 other homeless Palestinians. It is beyond human endurance for a family of eleven to live in a small tent through all the seasons of the year on UNRWA rations. Fathers buried their children who died of hunger. Some buried their fathers who died of disease. On winter days we all crawled together to gain the warmth of humans.

SOURCE E

An excerpt from *Between Arab and Israeli* by E.L.M. Burns, published by George Harrap & Co., London, UK, 1962. General Burns, a UN commander, describes the conditions in the camps in Gaza in the 1950s.

They live in little huts of mud and concrete blocks, corrugated iron roofs, row after row. Fairly adequate medical service is provided, probably better than was enjoyed before they were expelled from their native villages. Children swarm everywhere. There are primary schools for nearly all of them. There are secondary schools for many of the adolescents. And what will these youths and girls do when they have finished their secondary school training? There is no employment for them in the [Gaza] Strip, and very few can leave it to work elsewhere. The Gaza Strip resembles a vast concentration camp. They can look to the east and see wide fields, once Arab land, cultivated extensively by a few Israelis.

KEY TERM

Repatriate To send people back to their own country.

Hopes of repatriation

The UN wished to **repatriate** the refugees but the Israelis refused to allow them to return to their lands in Israel. Instead, the Israelis continued to take over Arab villages and to confiscate the property of Palestinians who had fled from Israel. Much of this 'absentee property' was given to new Jewish immigrants. The Israeli 'Law of Return' allows any Jew anywhere in the world

to go and live in Israel but forbids Palestinians to do so. Moshe Dayan, the Israeli politician, later explained in an interview on US television in 1967, 'We want to have a Jewish state. We can absorb the Arabs, but then it won't be the same country. We want a Jewish state like the French have a French state.'

By 1953, Israel had absorbed 300,000 Jews from Arab countries and insisted that those same Arab countries should find homes for the Palestinian refugees. Jordan allowed the Palestinian refugees to settle and become citizens of Jordan but other Arab states kept them in refugee camps near the borders with Israel. Most of the refugees themselves dreamt of 'the Return': they were Palestinians and they wanted to return to their homes in Palestine.

Some Palestinians migrated to other parts of the Middle East or the West. They became engineers, teachers, doctors or businessmen. A small number became very wealthy. But the vast majority of the refugees remained poor and unemployed. In their camps, they formed a ring of human misery round the borders of Israel. Crowded together, they became frustrated and bitter. It was from the camps that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) recruited most of its members.

700,000 Palestinians in refugee camps in 1949:

- mostly on the West Bank and in Gaza but also in neighbouring Arab states
- overcrowding, unemployment and poverty

Most dreamt of 'the Return' but Israel refused to repatriate them

PLO recruited most of its members from the camps

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The Palestinian diaspora

2

The emergence of the PLO

► **Key question:** What was the impact of the PLO?

Since the end of the first Arab–Israeli war in 1949, Palestinians had been crossing the border into Israel, often just to try and retrieve their property. Later, some of them carried out armed raids, sometimes killing the new Jewish 'owners' of their property. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) retaliated

forcefully. In 1959, a new group of Palestinian fighters emerged. Its name was Fatah, which comes from the Arabic initials of its name 'The Movement for the Liberation of Palestine'. When spelt backwards, the initials spell *fatah*, which is the Arabic word for 'victory'. Fatah's leader was Yasser Arafat and its goal was to create a Palestinian state.

Five years later, in 1964, the PLO was set up by Arab leaders meeting in Cairo (see page 80). The aim of the PLO was to unite all Palestinians in the struggle to win back their land. The largest group within the PLO was Fatah. From 1965 to 1967, Fatah carried out an increasing number of guerrilla attacks on Israel and was supported by the Arab states that bordered Israel, especially Syria. However, after the Six-Day War of 1967, things were to be very different for Fatah and the PLO as a whole.

Why was the Six-Day War a turning point for the Palestinians?

→ The impact of the Six-Day War 1967

Syria, Jordan and Egypt, which had provided important support for the PLO, were weakened by their heavy losses in the war. At the same time, Egypt and Syria became far more concerned about the lands they had lost to Israel than about the Palestinian refugees. Many Palestinians were now convinced that they would have to fight for their homeland on their own. This was even more urgent now that all the original land of Palestine, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was under Israeli rule.

Life in the occupied territories

The Israeli government annexed east Jerusalem and many of its Palestinian inhabitants were either evicted or offered money to leave and sign documents relinquishing their right to return. Large areas were converted into Jewish neighbourhoods and the city was encircled with Jewish settlements. Jerusalem was effectively robbed of its Arab identity. The Israelis never actually annexed Gaza and the rest of the West Bank. Instead, the Palestinian Arabs were placed under Israeli military rule. Resistance was dealt with harshly and was interpreted in many ways: holding a rally or demonstration, organizing a strike or just waving the Palestinian flag. Israeli troops rounded up PLO suspects and others whom they saw as a threat to their security. Thousands were jailed without trial, some tortured and hundreds were deported (usually to Jordan). Sometimes their houses were blown up, leaving their families homeless.

The Israeli army also confiscated land and declared it to be Jewish property. At first, this was largely for security reasons, to keep an eye on the Palestinians. Increasingly, however, Arab land was seized for the building of Jewish settlements and thousands of Jewish civilians were given financial incentives to move to these settlements. The Israeli military authorities also built roads, to link the towns and settlements, and established military camps and checkpoints. The movement of Palestinians was closely monitored and they were regularly stopped at roadblocks.

Fatah and the battle of Karameh 1968

Although many of the Palestinians living in the West Bank stayed there after 1967, over 300,000 fled when it was captured by the Israelis. Most of the refugees went to Jordan. In fact, from 1967, half the population of Jordan was Palestinian. Fatah and other groups within the PLO now concentrated their forces in Jordan and started to recruit far more volunteers from the refugee camps. For many, 1967 was a turning point (see Source F).

SOURCE F

An excerpt from an account by Ghazi Daniel, published by the PLO in 1972, quoted in *Arab–Israeli Conflict, Schools Council History 13–16 Project*, published by Holmes McDougall, Edinburgh, UK, 1977, page 65. Ghazi Daniel was a Palestinian refugee.

The aggressive war of 1967 was a landmark in my life. The new expansion of Israel and the new waves of refugees multiplied the tragedy many times. ... I am left with no alternative but to fight our oppressor. This is why I have joined the Palestine National Liberation Movement. We shall fight for the Palestinians' return and for a new society in Palestine.

What impact did the Six-Day War have on Ghazi Daniel, in Source F?




What might be the effect of the movement of refugees shown in Source G on the development of Israeli–Palestinian relations?



SOURCE G

The Israeli conquest of the West Bank in 1967 drove more than 300,000 Palestinians across the Jordan River. Many of the bridges had been destroyed and many of the refugees could only take the possessions they could carry.



Fatah increased its raids into Israel. Its guerrilla forces planted bombs and mines, and attacked military installations. In retaliation, in 1968, the Israelis crossed the border into Jordan and launched a full-scale attack on a major Fatah base in Karamah. The Israelis had 15,000 troops as well as tanks and planes. The Palestinians had 300 fighters. Although the Israelis destroyed the Palestinian base, the Palestinian forces, with the aid of Jordanian troops, knocked out several Israeli tanks and planes and killed 28 Israeli troops. They proved that the Israelis were not invincible. This inspired thousands of Arabs, not just Palestinians, to join the Palestinian guerrillas: in fact, 5000 joined up in the following two days. Between 1967 and 1970, Fatah forces killed over 500 Israelis. This was almost as many as the Israelis had lost in the whole Six-Day War.

Arafat becomes leader of the PLO

In 1968, the Palestinian fighters, led by Fatah, gained control of the PLO and, in 1969, Yasser Arafat, now internationally known as a result of the battle of Karamah, became chairman. The new charter of the PLO is described in Source H.

SOURCE H

An excerpt from the *Palestinian National Charter*, July 1968 quoted in *The Middle East, 1914–1979* by T.G. Fraser, published by Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1980, page 120.

- *Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an indivisible part of the Arab nation.*
- *Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine.*
- *The liberation of Palestine is a national duty and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine.*
- *The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time.*
- *Judaism is a religion, not an independent nationality.*
- *The Arab Palestinian people reject all solutions except the total liberation of Palestine.*



How and why does the charter, in Source H, aim to enlist the support of the whole Arab world? Why do you think it states that 'Judaism is a religion, not an independent nationality'?

KEY TERM

Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

An organization set up by Dr George Habash, a Palestinian Christian. It carried out many terrorist acts.

Arafat tried to co-ordinate the guerrilla activities of the various groups within the PLO. Like most of the PLO leaders, he wanted to limit the raids and the bombings to Israeli territory and Israeli targets because he believed the Palestinians' military aim was strictly war on Israel. However, some more radical Palestinian groups, like the **Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)**, started to carry out attacks in other parts of the world. They pointed out that raids into Israel had achieved very little. They were impatient. They were not prepared to wait 10 or 20 years to regain their country.

SOURCE I

Yasser Arafat (1929–2004) photographed in a press conference in Amman, Jordan, 1970. Arafat was one of the founders of the Fatah organization and became chairman of the PLO in 1969. He slept in a different bed every night.



For what reasons do you think Arafat, photographed in Source I, 'slept in a different bed every night'?



Terrorists or freedom fighters?

The views of some of those who decided to become fighters are shown in Sources J–M (pages 137–8) while an Israeli view is illustrated in Source N.

SOURCE J

An excerpt from an interview with George Habash in the German newspaper *Der Stern* on 16 September 1970, quoted in *The Gun and the Olive Branch* by David Hirst, published by Futura, London, UK, 1978, page 304. George Habash was leader of the PFLP.

When we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we killed 100 Israelis in battle. For decades world public opinion has been neither for nor against the Palestinians. It simply ignored us. At least the world is talking about us now.

How useful is Source J for a historian studying why some Palestinians have used military force in order to achieve their objectives?





Why, according to Source K, was violence 'our last resort'?

SOURCE K

Sami el-Karami explains why violence is used, quoted in *Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians* by David Gilmour, published by Sphere, London, UK, 1980, page 160. Sami el-Karami was a Palestinian living in Canada.

The non-violent methods are very beautiful and very easy, and we wish we could win with these methods. Our people do not carry machine guns and bombs because they enjoy killing. It is for us the last resort. For 22 years we have waited for the United Nations and the United States, for liberty, for freedom and democracy. There was no result. So this is our last resort.



Why does the author of Source L decide to become one of 'the freedom fighters'?

SOURCE L

An excerpt from a letter from a Palestinian student to his parents, 1968, quoted in a pamphlet published by the Palestinian Liberation Movement in Britain in 1969.

For 20 years our people have been waiting for a just solution to the Palestinian problem. All that we got was charity and humiliation while others continue to live in our homes. I refuse to remain a refugee. I have decided to join the freedom fighters and I ask for your blessing.



What evidence is there in Source M of the 'charity and humiliation' referred to in Source L?

SOURCE M

An excerpt from an interview with a Palestinian woman quoted in *The Middle East* by Walter Oppenheim, published by Blackwell Education, London, UK, 1989, page 37.

I am proud that my son did not die in this refugee camp. The foreign press come here and take pictures of us standing in queues to obtain food rations. This is no life. I am proud that my son died in action, fighting on our occupied soil. I am already preparing my eight-year-old for the day he can fight for freedom too.



What according, to Source N, motivated 'Palestinian terrorist groups'?

SOURCE N

An excerpt from a speech by Shimon Peres at a conference on international terrorism in 1976, quoted in *The Arab-Israeli Wars* by Chaim Herzog, published by Arms and Armour Press, London, UK, 1982, page 328. Shimon Peres was the Israeli Minister of Defence from 1974 to 1977.

Palestinian terrorist groups should be described in their true colours – groups which are impatient with democracy, which are undisciplined, corrupt in their attitude to life and unable to free themselves from the domination of murder and hatred.

Palestinian terrorism

In December 1968, two Palestinians, members of the PFLP, hijacked an Israeli passenger plane at Athens airport, killing one man. The Israelis retaliated by destroying 13 aircraft in an attack on Beirut Airport in Lebanon, which is where the hijackers had come from. In the following years there were many hijackings, kidnappings and bombings in Europe and elsewhere. At first the targets were Israeli planes, embassies and offices but, in February 1970, a Swiss plane was blown up on its way to Israel. The Israelis usually responded to these attacks by bombing Palestinian bases in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Often these bases were near refugee camps and, as a consequence, hundreds of innocent Palestinians died. These Israeli reprisals received far less publicity in the western press than the Palestinian attacks.

← What did the PLO achieve by terrorism?

The PLO are expelled from Jordan 1970

Sometimes, terrorist violence led Arab to fight Arab. In Jordan, King Hussein feared the Israeli reprisals which followed Palestinian attacks that were launched from his country. In 1968 his troops had helped the Palestinians to inflict heavy casualties on the Israelis at Karameh. However, in September 1970, he decided he did not want any more raids launched on Israel from inside Jordan. Besides, the PLO were acting as if they ruled much of Jordan, not just the refugee camps: they were roaming round fully armed and setting up road blocks, even in Amman, the Jordanian capital. So he ordered the Palestinians to obey him and his army.

Then, in the same month, four aircraft were hijacked by the PFLP and three of the planes (belonging to BOAC, Swissair and TWA) were flown to a remote and unused airfield in Jordan. The hijackers demanded the release of Palestinian fighters held in British, German and Swiss, as well as Israeli, jails. The passengers were set free and then the planes were blown up (see Source O, page 140). This incident was the last straw for King Hussein. It was a direct challenge to his authority and he feared foreign intervention. He was forced to act. He ordered his army to take control of the PLO bases. The Palestinians resisted and, in the next 10 days, more than 3000 of them were killed. Egyptian President Nasser played a key role in arranging a ceasefire but, over the next nine months, the last Palestinian military bases in Jordan were eliminated and the remaining fighters went to Syria and Lebanon. PLO offices in Jordan were shut down and their newspapers banned.

SOURCE O

A British plane, which was hijacked by the PFLP, is blown up in Jordan in 1970.



What light does Source O throw on the nature of the Palestinian campaign of terrorism?

KEY TERM

Black September

A Palestinian group which killed 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics.

Terror at the Olympics 1972

Palestinian extremists later got their revenge by murdering Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tel while he was in Egypt. The killers were members of a group called **Black September**, named after the month in which the Palestinian bases in Jordan were wiped out. Soon they began sending letter bombs to Israeli embassies in Europe.

Then, on 5 September 1972, Black September stunned the whole world. It attacked the Israeli athletes who were competing in the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. The group killed two athletes and then demanded the release of 200 Palestinians in prison in Israel. When German police attempted a rescue, the Palestinians killed nine more athletes. The Palestinians got the massive publicity they wanted for their cause but not the release of their comrades. A few days later the Israelis took their revenge and carried out reprisal raids on Syria and Lebanon, in which over 200 refugees were killed.

The effects on world opinion

Acts of terrorism made the Palestinians unpopular in the rest of the world. People were shocked by such brutal deeds. They branded the PLO, as a whole, as terrorists. However, terrorist acts made many people in Europe and other parts of the world begin to think more about the Palestinian problem. They read about the crowded, unhealthy camps in which hundreds of thousands of refugees had lived for over 20 years. They came to understand that the Palestinian people were the helpless victims of war.

With growing understanding in the West of the plight of the Palestinians, the French foreign minister held a meeting with Yasser Arafat in October 1974. This was, in effect, the first time a major western power had recognized the PLO. Afterwards, he reported that Arafat was a 'moderate' who 'represents and embodies the aspirations of the Palestinians'. A month later, Arafat was invited to address a full meeting of the UN (see Chapter 8, page 167).

PLO formed to liberate Palestine by 'armed struggle'



PLO carried out armed attacks on Israel which led to:

- Israeli reprisals
- Palestinian success at Karameh 1968
- Arafat becoming leader of the PLO
- world-wide publicity for hijacks and hostage-taking
- expulsion from Jordan 1970
- Israeli athletes being killed at Olympics 1972

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The emergence of the PLO

Chapter summary

The Palestinian diaspora and the emergence of the PLO

Over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were housed in refugee camps from 1949 and most lived in poor,

overcrowded conditions. The PLO recruited most of its members from the camps. The PLO was committed to 'armed struggle' in order to 'liberate Palestine'. Under Arafat's leadership, many attacks were carried out against Israel. Militant elements within the PLO embarked on acts of terrorism beyond Israel, especially plane hijackings and hostage-taking, and attracted world-wide attention in the early 1970s.



Examination advice

Paper 1 question 4: how to integrate sources and write a good essay

Question 4 is always an essay question. It requires you to write what you know while integrating the sources provided. The sources are there to support your own knowledge. Therefore, it is important that you prepare yourselves for this type of question by knowing and understanding the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–79 that we have presented in this book.

Question 4 is always worth 8 marks. This means it is worth about a third of the overall mark possible. We suggest that you spend 20–5 minutes answering this question, using the first five to eight minutes of this time to summarize the sources and outline your response. Many students do not score full marks on this question because they have not paced themselves and find they only have a couple of minutes left for their answer. With practice, you should be able to complete Paper 1 fully in the allotted 60 minutes.

How to answer

Summarize the sources and outline your essay

It is best to first list and summarize your sources to focus your thoughts. This should be done in about five to eight minutes and should be in the form of short bullet points. Remember to also put down what you know about the topic but what is not in the sources. Your essay will be marked based on these two components. Only include points that are related to the question in order to save time. Once you have summarized the sources and your own knowledge, briefly outline your essay's structure. This outline should include some sort of introduction to your essay and a concluding answer to the question. Write your outline down on scrap paper.

Writing the essay

When you write your essay make sure you follow your outline and use *all* the sources. This should take the remainder of your time, which should be at least 20 minutes.

You need to start with a good introduction to focus your essay and to define anything that might be open to interpretation. Be sure to pay attention to the command word (evaluate, analyse, discuss, etc.) because your answer should be focused on meeting the demands of this word. Your introduction should conclude with a brief but clear answer to the question. This should further serve to focus your essay. Usually you can introduce one or more of your sources into the introduction to support what you are going to cover.

All sources must be used at least once, but use them multiple times if they will help your essay. Remember the sources should support your essay.

Finally, under no circumstances are you to list just the five sources with a couple of bullet points after each in a sort of preamble to a real essay. Sources should be integrated and quoted to support your essay.

Your concluding paragraph should clearly answer the essay question, summarizing your main arguments. For example, if the question asks you 'to what extent', answer the question:

- 'to a great extent'
- 'to some extent', or
- 'to no extent'.

Your conclusion will then include a summary of your main points.

Example

This question uses the following sources found in this chapter:

Using these sources and your own knowledge, assess the living conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps.

Source B: see page 131

Source C: see page 132

Source D: see page 132

Source E: see page 132

Source M: see page 138

First, very briefly summarize the living conditions in the refugee camps as described in each source.

***Source C:** (secondary source) overcrowded tents, inadequate food/sanitation, mud in tents, people slept in wet blankets when it rained, influenza: old and young died.*

***Source D:** (personal account) overcrowded, 11 in one small tent, children died of hunger, old died of disease, families huddled together for warmth, without money.*

***Source B:** (photo) crowded, many tents, muck. Jordan.*

***Source E:** (memoir) huts of mud + concrete, adequate medical service, primary and secondary schools, many children, mass unemployment: people stuck in what was similar to concentration camps. Gaza.*

***Source M:** (interview) stand in line for rations, no life, proud her son did not die in camp.*

Second, jot down your own knowledge about camp conditions. This might include:

- *Hundreds of thousands of refugees in camps in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria.*
- *No future because Israel would not allow refugees to return to their homes and Arab governments could not integrate such large numbers into their own work forces.*
- *UNRWA became responsible for refugees.*
- *Conditions were so dire that many young men joined resistance.*

Third, briefly outline in bullet points the main parts of your essay.

Intro:

Conditions were terrible – key factors:

- *overcrowding*
- *disease*
- *no future/hope.*

Paragraph 2:

Overcrowding. Hundreds of thousands, then millions.

This led to diseases. Detail.

Paragraph 3: No hope, no future:

- *unemployment*
- *appeal of resistance movements*
- *differences in camps.*

Paragraph 4: UNRWA and foreign powers:

- *UN assistance in camps*
- *Israel unwilling to let refugees back in*
- *Arab govts. Unwilling to integrate refugees.*

Conclusion: Terrible conditions

- *festering sore*
- *no hope without settlement.*

The introduction clearly defines the general living conditions in the Palestinian camps and then presents three examples of these.

- *The living conditions faced by Palestinian refugees were generally horrible. The camps where most of them lived were overcrowded and disease-ridden. Adding to the generally desperate conditions was the reality that no bright future existed for the inhabitants; they were stuck there. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)*

was put in charge of the camps and tried to provide some very basic services.

After the 1948–9 and 1967 wars, more than a million Palestinians fled their homes and gathered in camps to seek shelter and food. The camps were located in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The conditions in the camps were usually dire.

Source C describes the overcrowded tents, and inadequate food. Poor sanitation most likely contributed to the spread of disease and when it rained, the refugees often 'slept in wet blankets'. Influenza took the lives of many of the old and young. These details of the living conditions in the camps are supported in Sources B, D and E. Source D provides further details of the overcrowding. Ghazi Daniel explains how his family of 11 were all crammed into one small tent and 'On winter days we all crawled together to gain the warmth of humans.' He also mentions the inadequate food rations provided by UNRWA. Source B illustrates the rows and rows of tents, as well as the muddy grounds refugees had to walk over to get to their tents.

In the camps, the refugees were stuck. Source D states that people had no money. Source E supports this notion. Few had work so there were no means to break out of the cycle of poverty. Source E further describes the sense that the refugee camps were like concentration camps. There was no way to escape. It was from this mass of the discontented and unemployed that the Palestinian resistance movements recruited. One Palestinian refugee in Source M explains that conditions drove her son to fight to free his people from their misery.

What is unclear from the sources is whether or not conditions in the camps were similar whether they were located in the Gaza Strip or Jordan. Source E states that both primary and secondary schools were established in the camps in Gaza, as well as health care facilities. Conditions in the camps were certainly very poor in the immediate aftermath of the Nakbah (1948–9). Hundreds of thousands fled to non-Israeli occupied lands. The local authorities in Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon were overwhelmed by the numbers and because these countries were poor, they could not adequately provide for the refugees. UNRWA was created in 1949 in order to provide adequate living conditions for the Palestinians. However, the UN agency was severely stretched because of lack of funds and trained

All five sources are used in the essay and explicitly mentioned. Some sources are quoted which demonstrates the importance of particular sources in making a historical argument.

The essay makes three strong arguments in three tightly focused paragraphs. Each paragraph focuses on a different topic relating to the living conditions in the refugee camps.

personnel. The 1967 war created more refugees as Israel conquered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and put further pressures on living conditions. The numbers of refugees grew from hundreds of thousands to more than three million. The governments of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon did not wish to improve living conditions too much because that might have meant that the refugees would become permanent residents in the countries where they had found refuge instead of returning to their former homes in Palestinian territories (only Jordan offered citizenship to its refugees). Furthermore, in order to preserve the Jewish nature of Israel, the Israelis had no intention of allowing refugees to return. In other words, conditions would continue to be poor. The Israeli military forces would often attack refugee camps in order to seek out Palestinian fighters. This added to the uncertain and dangerous conditions in the camps.

The conclusion clearly indicates that conditions in the camps were poor and summarizes the argument.

In conclusion, the living conditions in the camps were poor and remained so for decades. Generations of Palestinian refugees grew up in camps where little hope for a better life existed. Without a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel and her Arab neighbours had little interest in substantially improving conditions in the camps.

This essay uses all the sources in an explicit and appropriate manner. The essay also goes beyond the sources to indicate that the student also used their own knowledge and that this knowledge was correct. The response to the question is complex, but assesses the camp conditions from a variety of angles.



Activities

- 1 Many Palestinians continue to live in refugee camps. Find out the number of camps in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. How many people are currently in each camp? You may want to look at www.unrwa.org to gain a greater sense of life in the camps.
- 2 The Palestine Liberation Organization is an umbrella group. Since its creation in the 1960s, there have been several groups in the PLO. Make a chart with each group's name, founder(s), the number of members in the group, where it was based, its symbol and its political ideology.



Examination practice

The following are exam-style questions for you to practise, using sources from this chapter. Sources can be found on the following pages:

- Source B: page 131
- Source C: page 132
- Source E: page 132
- Source F: page 135
- Source J: page 137
- Source K: page 138
- Source L: page 138
- Source M: page 138
- Source O: page 140

SAMPLE QUESTION 1s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 44–5.

- 1 What, according to Source E, were the conditions in Gaza refugee camps?
- 2 In what ways, according to Source F, did the author's life change in 1967?
- 3 Why, according to Source M, was the mother proud of her son?
- 4 What is the message conveyed by Source B?
- 5 What is the message conveyed by Source O?

SAMPLE QUESTION 2s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 74–5.

- 1 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources C and E about conditions in refugee camps.
- 2 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources F and K about the guerrilla movement.

SAMPLE QUESTION 3s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 125–7.

- 1 With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources C and L for historians studying the Palestinian resistance movements.
- 2 With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources J and K about the use of violence.

SAMPLE QUESTION 4

Using these sources and your own knowledge, explain why and how Palestinians resorted to violence.

The USA, the USSR, the UN and the Arab–Israeli conflict

This chapter analyses why and how the USA and the USSR became involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict and the extent to which they have achieved their objectives. It also throws light on the impact their policies have had on the continuing conflict in the region. Finally, it examines the role of the United Nations (UN), particularly in the wars of 1956 and 1967. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- ★ Why, and how, did the USA support Israel?
- ★ Why, and with what effects, was the USSR involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict?
- ★ How significant was the UN's role in the Arab–Israeli conflict?
- ★ To what extent did the intervention of the superpowers shape the Arab–Israeli conflict?

1

The role of the USA in the Middle East

► **Key question:** *Why, and how, did the USA support Israel?*

Before 1945, the USA had few interests in the Middle East. There was a limited amount of trade, particularly in oil, and a number of US educational and missionary institutions, but the USA had no major political or military commitments, certainly no military bases, colonies or mandates. Britain was the major western power in the Middle East and, in the inter-war years (1918–39), it was British companies who owned most of the oilfields in countries like Iraq and Iran. The US government largely left it to Britain to safeguard western interests in the region.

Why did the USA become more involved in the Middle East after 1945?

→ US interests in the Middle East after 1945

However, the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War were to change the situation. As news of the deaths of millions of Jews in the Holocaust emerged, support for Zionism and then for the state of Israel became a distinct feature of US policy. Not only did millions of US Jews support the Zionist project, so did millions of non-Jews in the USA. There was huge sympathy for the victims of the Holocaust and considerable support for the idea of an independent Jewish state. Many US Christians believed that a Jewish state would fulfil biblical prophecy.

This support for a Jewish state had a significant influence on the government of President Truman, especially in states like New York, which had a large Jewish population, and at election time. Truman put pressure on the British to admit a large number of Jewish refugees into Palestine and, later, when the state of Israel was proclaimed by its leaders in 1948, the USA was the first country to recognize the new state. In fact, the USA recognized the state of Israel 11 minutes after its existence was proclaimed!

SOURCE A

President Truman, on the left, receives gifts from David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, seated on the right, on 8 May 1951. Truman showed strong support for Zionism despite the advice of many experts who predicted that it would encourage anti-US feeling in the Arab world.



What were the advantages and disadvantages for President Truman of being portrayed, as in Source A, so closely to the Israeli leader?



In the USA, where there was little knowledge or understanding of the Arab world, many saw the Israelis as more educated, more enterprising and more 'like us' than the Arabs. Israel was a democracy, like the USA, and Israel was viewed as a potentially reliable friend and ally in an otherwise volatile, backward part of the world.

Conflicting priorities in US policy in the Middle East

Support for the state of Israel became a major priority of US policy in the Middle East. However, there was a competing priority: the need to contain the spread of Soviet **communism**. With the emergence of the Cold War after 1945, the USA wished to prevent any parts of the Middle East coming under Soviet influence. That, in turn, meant that the USA needed the support of

KEY TERM

Communism A system in which government controls the economy and in which all political power is held by the Communist Party.

Arab states in the region. However, many Arab countries were wary of allying with the country which had done so much to bring the state of Israel into being and then continued to support Israel even when it seized and kept yet more Palestinian Arab land in the 1948–9 war.

And there was another reason why the USA was keen to be friendly with the Arab world: oil. Although the USA was still largely self-sufficient in oil, its allies in Europe and Japan were almost wholly dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, especially from Saudi Arabia. The Arabian–American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and the presence of a large US military base, established in Saudi Arabia during the Second World War, gave the USA a big stake in the Saudi kingdom. However, continuing Saudi support could not be taken for granted, especially as all Arabs sympathized with their fellow Arabs in what was left of Palestine and no Arab country was willing to recognize the new Jewish state.

What made the USA's predicament even more complex was that successive US governments were determined to keep the Soviets away from the oil of the Middle East. In 1953, in his first year as president, Eisenhower approved a US government document quoted in Source B.

SOURCE B

An excerpt from the US National Security Council document No. 5401, 1953, quoted in *Crossing Mandelbaum Gate* by Kai Bird, published by Simon & Schuster, London, UK, 2010, page 49.

United States policy is to keep the sources of oil in the Middle East in American hands and defend them at all costs, and deny them to the Soviet Union, even if this led to a confrontation or to the destruction of these resources by the Americans themselves.



What does Source B reveal about the nature of US policy in the Middle East?

What impact did the Suez Crisis have on US policy in the Middle East?

→ The USA and the Suez Crisis 1956

The US government was particularly keen to maintain good relations with Egypt. It was the most populous state in the Arab world and, in Nasser, it had a leader who was seen as the champion of Arab nationalism (see page 117). If the USA could keep Nasser on side, it would make it easier to maintain peace and stability in the region. Most important of all, in US eyes, support for Nasser's government might curb the appeal of communism. However, the USA was not willing to sell arms to Egypt, whether out of unwillingness to upset the Israelis or because of distrust of Nasser. This apparent distrust led to even more strained relations when Nasser purchased Soviet arms through Czechoslovakia in 1955 and recognized the government of Communist China (which the USA refused to do).

Despite this setback, the US government was determined to maintain the support of Nasser's Egypt. When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in 1956, the USA advised the British against the use of force. So when the British *did* resort to the use of force, without letting the US

government know of their secret deal with Israel and France, let alone of their plan to bomb Egyptian cities along the Suez Canal, President Eisenhower was furious.

SOURCE C

An excerpt from President Eisenhower's speech to the nation on 31 October 1956.

Matters came to a crisis when the Egyptian government seized the Suez Canal ... some among our allies urged a reaction by force. We urged otherwise. ... But the direct relations of Egypt with both Israel and France kept worsening to a point at which they determined that there could be no protection of their vital interests without resort to force. ... The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. We do not accept the use of force for the settlement of international disputes.

What does Source C reveal about Eisenhower's policy over the Suez Crisis?



Nothing, in the eyes of the US government, was more likely to drive the Egyptians into the welcoming arms of the Soviets. The British were seen as having deceived the USA and were punished. The US government blocked financial aid to Britain and then gave its full support to the UN demand that the British withdraw their troops before they had retaken control of the Suez Canal, let alone toppled Nasser.

The failure of the Anglo-French mission, the subsequent withdrawal of their troops and the loss of prestige all left western influence in the Middle East very vulnerable. The Suez Crisis signalled a definitive end to British dominance in the region. In US eyes, this left a vacuum which had to be filled before the Soviets stepped in and extended their influence.

The Eisenhower Doctrine 1957

In January 1957, Eisenhower announced what came to be known as the **Eisenhower Doctrine**. In a speech to Congress, he spoke of 'Russia's desire to dominate the Middle East' and asked for support for a new security policy in the Middle East. In particular, he asked for both economic and military aid, including the authority to use US armed forces (see Source D).

SOURCE D

An excerpt from President Eisenhower's speech to Congress on 5 January 1957.

The action which I propose would ... authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

What do you think was meant, in Source D, by 'any nation controlled by International Communism'?



The USA was now taking on prime responsibility for safeguarding western interests in the Middle East. But if the Arab states were to remain at all sympathetic to the West and were to resist the appeal of communism, Israeli

KEY TERM

Eisenhower Doctrine

The policy, announced by US President Eisenhower, of opposing the spread of communist (that is, Soviet) influence in the Middle East.

aggression would have to be seen to be punished. After all, it was Israeli aggression, not Soviet communism, that the Arabs saw as the main threat to their interests. So the USA decided that the Israelis had to be forced to withdraw from the Egyptian territory of Sinai which they had captured in the Suez War. The Israelis were reluctant to do this, especially without a guarantee of safe navigation through the Straits of Tiran so that their ships could reach the Israeli port of Eilat (see the map on page 68). The Israelis also wanted to keep control of the Gaza Strip. The USA believed that Israeli withdrawal should be 'prompt and unconditional' and that Israeli security could be achieved through the presence of the United Nations (UN) force at Sharm el-Sheikh, to ensure free use of the Straits of Tiran, and at Gaza. Within governing circles, the USA argued that if they failed to bring the Israelis to heel, then its policy would be seen as pro-Israeli and Arab states would turn to the USSR.

SOURCE E



Why, according to Source E, would Israel have to be curbed in order to contain the spread of Soviet communism?

An excerpt from *The USA and the Middle East since World War 2* by T.G. Fraser, published by Macmillan, London, UK, 1989, page 74. Fraser, who taught History at the University of Ulster, UK, summarizes the view of the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

The states of the Middle East would conclude that their [US] policy was controlled by Jewish influence in the United States and would see no alternative but to turn to the Soviet Union, destroying the Eisenhower Doctrine at birth.

It was imperative that the Israelis leave Egyptian soil, as the British and French had done. The US government used the threat of sanctions to force the Israelis to comply with its wishes. The last Israeli forces left Sinai and Gaza in March 1957. It was one of the few times that a US government imposed its will on the Israeli government and it probably contributed to the *relative* quiet of the late 1950s in the Middle East.

The Eisenhower Doctrine in action

Nevertheless, the example and appeal of Nasser's Arab nationalism led to increasing tension between radicals and conservatives in the Arab states. In 1957–8, the USA saw what it thought was rising communist influence in Syria as that country's government denounced the Eisenhower Doctrine, accepted more Soviet weapons and appeared to be stirring revolt in Jordan against the government of King Hussein. Then, when the pro-western government of Lebanon claimed to be threatened by communists and invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine in July 1957, the USA sent 5000 troops to the country. The US Marines stayed for three months and were withdrawn after a compromise peace between warring factions was arranged. However, the USA was not able to prevent the overthrow of the pro-western Iraqi monarchy by young army officers in 1958. These were local conflicts but the US government tended to see them, in the words of historian Avi Shlaim, 'through the distorting prism of the Cold War'. In other words, the USA saw

these conflicts as the product of Soviet interference and thus began to behave like an imperial power in the Middle East despite the fact that it had been so critical of British and French imperialism in the region.

US policy after the Six-Day War

In the 1950s, US policy, especially where Israel was concerned, could be seen to have been fairly even-handed. It had certainly helped to bring about a peace settlement after the Suez Crisis, although there was never any peace treaty between the main parties. To some in the US government, this policy of even-handedness was the best way of bringing stability to the Middle East and safeguarding US interests. However, from the mid-1960s onwards, and particularly after the Six-Day War in 1967, an 'Israel-first' approach (to borrow the phrase of historian Avi Shlaim) was to become far more evident in US policy in the Middle East. This approach, in the eyes of its critics, had the effect of undermining US interests in the Middle East and driving more radical Arab regimes towards the USSR while Israel's occupation of Arab lands after 1967 and its refusal to recognize the Palestinians made Arabs even more wary of America's pro-Israeli stance.

← **Why was the Six-Day War a turning point in US policy in the Middle East?**

Reasons for the USA's pro-Israeli policy

The scale of the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 surprised the USA as well as the Arabs. The USA, and the West as a whole, was very favourably impressed: it was felt that Israel had fought justifiably, and fought well, to achieve its survival. Israeli views were well represented in the media and government in the West and there was widespread support and respect for Israel's nation-building achievements and its democracy. There was little understanding of the Arab perspective although considerable coverage had been given to the virulently anti-Israeli rhetoric emanating from the Arab world in the days leading up to the war.

Another reason for the increasingly pro-Israeli leaning of US policy in the Middle East was domestic in origin: the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the so-called 'Jewish lobby', was growing in power and influence. AIPAC had over four million members in the USA, was well financed and it was organized on a national basis. It was committed to strengthening the bond between Israel and the USA. The key to its power was its lobbying of Congressmen: it campaigned to support pro-Israeli candidates for election and was loudly and visibly critical of those who disapproved of Israeli policy. It raised huge financial support for Israel during both the 1967 and 1973 wars.

After the end of the Six-Day War, the US government hoped that the scale of the Israeli victory would induce the Arab states to accept an overall peace settlement. However, the USA was not willing to enforce an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as it had done after the Suez War of 1956. The Israelis, for their part, were not willing to make any concessions, preferring to hold on to the territories they had captured. This state of affairs suited the USA.

It believed that Israeli superiority was the key to stability in the Middle East and that the war had been a big defeat for the USSR as its Arab allies had performed so weakly. Furthermore, the USA felt that continuing Israeli occupation of Arab lands undermined Soviet credibility among Arab leaders as it demonstrated that, even with Soviet weaponry and military advisers, they could not dislodge the Israelis from Sinai and the Golan Heights. Even when Egypt's President Sadat expelled all Soviet military advisers from Egypt, in July 1972, he was not able to prevail on the US government to pressure the Israelis into entering the peace negotiations which Sadat had offered. Besides, with elections approaching, US President Nixon was keen to win over Jews from their traditional allegiance to the Democratic Party.

The USA's role in the October War of 1973

The Arab states of Egypt and Syria surprised the whole world with their attack on Israel in 1973 (see page 97). Not only that, their early successes shook up the US–Israeli belief in Israel's military superiority. Early in the war, Sadat assured the USA that he had limited war aims and that chief among them was to prod the US government into playing a key role in making a peace settlement and compelling Israel to hand back the Arab territory it had held since 1967. Henry Kissinger, the US **Secretary of State**, understood. He changed his view of Sadat too, recognizing him as 'a statesman of the first order'.

KEY TERM

Secretary of State The USA's foreign minister.

Nevertheless, in the war, the USA remained staunch in its support for Israel, airlifting a huge amount of weaponry to its allies. Not only did the USA feel it had to match the Soviet arms supply to the Arab armies, it also had to please domestic public opinion which was very sympathetic to Israel. It is possible that the US government also feared that Israel might use its nuclear arsenal to stave off defeat. (Israel has never admitted to possession of such weapons but there is clear evidence that it has the capability.) One of Kissinger's advisers later wrote: 'We knew that a desperate Israel might activate its nuclear option.'

In the event, however, the USA prevailed on the Israelis not to attack Cairo or strangle the Egyptian Third Army in Sinai. It knew that a humiliating defeat of Egypt would probably bring about Sadat's downfall and the establishment of a more radical and, worse still, pro-Soviet regime in Egypt. Undoubtedly the USA wanted to ensure the superiority of its arms over Soviet arms in the war but it did not want Soviet intervention in the fighting or increased Soviet influence in Cairo. In these aims it was largely successful.

A favourable outcome for the USA

Overall, the outcome of the October War, as discussed in Chapter 5 (see page 100), was a success for US policy. The USA had managed the crisis well. From now onwards, Sadat moved Egypt into the US camp, not the Soviet one, knowing that only the USA could prevail on the Israelis to withdraw from Sinai. The USA had to abandon its pre-war policy of assuming that a

strong Israel would deter the Arabs from going to war. Now, it became committed to a more even-handed, less ‘Israel-first’, policy.

Henry Kissinger set about establishing a US-led peace settlement. This would eventually lead, in 1979, to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This is fully discussed in Chapter 9.

Objectives of US policy in Middle East were:

- Support for Israel
- Containment of communism
- Need for oil security

Eisenhower Doctrine offered aid to states in Middle East to resist ‘International Communism’

USA curbed Israel to maintain Arab support over Suez but adopted increasingly ‘Israel-first’ policy in 1960s

USA saw Israeli victory in 1967 as defeat for USSR and its Arab allies

US policy during and after October War of 1973 gained the support of Egyptian government

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The US role in the Middle East

2 The Soviet role in the Middle East

► **Key question:** *Why, and with what effects, was the USSR involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict?*

The USSR had two overriding objectives in the Middle East after the Second World War. The first was to defend and protect its southern border. Secondly, it wished to further the advance of communism in the Cold War between communism and capitalism, between the Soviet-led East and the US-led West.

The USSR's first objective suffered a setback in the early 1950s when both Turkey and Iran became firmly entrenched in the pro-western camp. After that, the Soviets modified their aims and focused on trying to win friends and extend their influence to the south of Turkey and Iran, into Arab lands. If they could establish a Soviet presence in the Arab Middle East and challenge western predominance, they would enhance their security and, it was hoped, advance the cause of communism. Thus both strategic and ideological goals would be achieved.

How did the USSR challenge western predominance in the Middle East?

→ Soviet–Egyptian relations

The Soviets were supportive of the state of Israel when it was created in 1948, seeing the Jewish struggle to be free of British control in Palestine as an anti-western, anti-imperialist struggle. However, as the Arab–Israeli conflict intensified and the USA became Israel's main protector, so the Soviets looked to Israel's Arab neighbours, particularly Egypt, as potential allies in the region. Egypt, the largest Arab state, was striving to free itself of British control and to build up its defences against its Israeli neighbour. When the West refused to supply Nasser's Egypt with the arms it sought, the USSR was more than happy to oblige. The Czech arms deal of 1955 (see page 117) provided the perfect opportunity for the Soviets to extend their influence and support Egypt in its campaign to free itself of the last vestiges of western, colonial interference.

SOURCE F

An excerpt from *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* by Adeed Dawisha, published by Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA, 2003, page 168. Professor Dawisha is an Iraqi-born historian who teaches at Miami University, Ohio, USA.

The arms deal allowed for the first real penetration by the Soviet Union into Arab and Middle East politics, which was to diametrically change the balance of forces in the area. From then on the West lost its monopoly over security (and eventually political) affairs of the region.

Then, a year later, when the USA and Britain decided not to lend money to the Egyptians for building the Aswan Dam (see page 64), the Soviets were presented with the opportunity to step in with financial aid and consolidate their presence in the Middle East. These two developments constituted a major breakthrough for Soviet policy in the Middle East.

SOURCE G

An excerpt from *Sphinx and Commissar – The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East* by Mohamed Heikal, published by Collins, London, UK, 1978, page 65. Heikal was the editor of the leading Egyptian daily newspaper and also an adviser to Nasser.

There was no need for the Soviets to force the pace because they had been sucked into the Middle East by events. It was not they who had started the great



To what extent, and why, does the author of Source F see the Czech arms deal as a turning point in the development of the Cold War in the Middle East?



For what reasons, according to Source G, did the Egyptians look to the USSR? What was the attitude of the Soviets towards their developing relationship with Egypt and the Arab world?

offensive but Egypt who had forced it upon them. Egypt needed their arms; Egyptians admired what they had done in the way of planning, of developing backward areas and of mobilising the people behind a national effort. They, on their side, were fascinated by the way in which Nasser, by turning to the Soviets for aid, had become the idol of the Arab masses everywhere and a legend in his own lifetime.

Soviet influence and prestige in the region was to be further enhanced as a result of the Suez War. There was world-wide condemnation of the so-called ‘tripartite’ action by Britain, France and Israel, and even the USA was keen to distance itself from what appeared to be an example of high-handed western imperialism. The Soviets, for their part, threatened the European powers with military action and proposed that a joint US–Soviet force be sent to the Canal Zone. When the British and French were forced to withdraw, the USSR claimed that its intervention was crucial. It was not, and Nasser’s government knew that it was US opposition to the Anglo-French action that was decisive, but the West undeniably suffered a defeat. The Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, told the Egyptian ambassador in Moscow: ‘You have cut off the British lion’s tail and we have drawn [pulled out] his teeth! Now he can neither roar nor bite!’ The era of European domination of the Middle East was conclusively ended.

Soviet influence at its height

The Soviets propagated the view that they had saved the day, ended the fighting and emerged as the champions of Arab independence. Nasser’s government may not have been communist (in fact, Egyptian communists were frequently suppressed by the regime), but the USSR was quick to step in and to extend its financial aid, together with the promise of Soviet engineering expertise, for completing the construction of the Aswan Dam. Egypt, and later Syria, were promised further supplies of armaments. This was the high point of Soviet influence and prestige in the Middle East.

Although the Suez Crisis increased Soviet prestige in the Middle East, it also led to the Eisenhower Doctrine; in other words, to a stronger US commitment to the region. The Soviets were aware of their own military inferiority *vis-à-vis* the USA and they urged a peaceful solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict. This was to be a constant feature of Soviet policy in the Middle East: the Soviets acknowledged Israeli military superiority over the Arabs, especially when backed up by US support, and they certainly did not seek a military confrontation with the USA. Nevertheless, Egypt and Syria became clients of the Soviets, dependent on them for arms.

When the first stage of the building of the Aswan Dam was completed in 1964, Khrushchev was the guest of honour and the occasion was, in the words of the Egyptian commentator Mohamed Heikal, ‘converted into a festival of Arab–Soviet cooperation. The High Dam was the greatest engineering feat ever to be seen in Africa’.



What was the significance, for the leaders of Egypt and the USSR photographed in Source H, of the Aswan Dam?

SOURCE H

Nasser (on the right) and Khrushchev at the opening of the Aswan Dam on 14 May 1964.



How and why did the Soviets contribute to the crisis that led to war in 1967?

→ The USSR and the Six-Day War 1967

In the 1960s, the USSR strengthened its presence in the Middle East. More Soviet ships were deployed in the Mediterranean and Egypt granted Soviet forces the rights to use Egyptian naval and air bases. Egypt was undoubtedly the cornerstone of Soviet policy in the Middle East. The USSR also committed itself to support the new, more radical, left-wing government that came to power in Syria in 1966. In the year leading up to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967, Soviet propaganda reflected Syria's claims of Israeli aggression. But it was more than propaganda when, on 11 May 1967, the Soviet president told an Egyptian delegation in Moscow that Israel was concentrating troops on Syria's border and planned to attack between 18 and 22 May. There *had* been Israeli troop concentrations on Syria's border earlier in the spring but not at *this* time. Nasser sent a senior military figure to Syria and he confirmed that there were no Israeli troop concentrations. Nasser may have seen the Soviet report as encouraging the Egyptians to move against Israel. Three days later, Nasser moved troops into the Sinai; then he ordered the UN force to leave Egyptian territory and, on 22 May, he announced the blockade of Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. Cairo Radio reported the Soviet defence minister as saying that Soviet armed forces 'will stand by you'.

The Soviets later said that what they meant was that they would act only if US forces intervened. They were surprised by Nasser's actions and the Soviet foreign minister warned the Egyptians to 'cool things down'. The Soviets were completely surprised by the Israeli attacks of 5 June.

Reasons for Soviet action

So why did the USSR act so provocatively and report that Israel was massing its forces on the border with Syria? The most likely explanation is that the Soviets were trying to bolster the pro-Soviet Syrian government. The latter was facing opposition at home and, by diverting attention to the external Israeli threat, the Soviets may have calculated that this would prompt Egypt into offering more support to Syria. A strengthening of Egyptian support for Syria might in turn deter Israel from carrying out reprisals against Syria which it had been doing in response to Palestinian raids or Syrian shelling of Israeli positions on the border. In a recent confrontation, in April 1967, the Israelis had shot down six of Syria's Soviet-made planes. Maybe the Soviets calculated that their warning to Egypt would prompt the kind of assertive action by Egypt which would, in turn, deter the Israelis from carrying out further, more serious actions against Syria for fear that it would involve them in a two-front war. It is highly likely that the Soviets assumed that Israel would not go to war against Egypt and Syria now that both were well armed with Soviet weapons, and that the US government, bogged down in war in Vietnam, would restrain Israel anyway.

The extent of Soviet failure

The Soviets miscalculated their ability to control their clients, particularly Egypt: they had no idea that Nasser would expel the UN forces in Sinai and were alarmed when he closed the Straits of Tiran. They certainly misjudged the Israelis, who were not deterred from attacking the Arab air forces in June 1967 by the USSR's close relations with Egypt and Syria and the prospect of fighting a two-front war.

Once the Arab air forces were destroyed, the Soviets were keen to minimize further Arab losses: they sought US co-operation to arrange a ceasefire. The Soviets issued warnings to the Israelis, threatening to cut off diplomatic relations, yet they refused Egyptian requests for further military aid. Above all, the USSR was unwilling to do anything that risked confrontation with the USA.

Soviet policy between the Six-Day and October Wars 1967–73

The USSR suffered a major blow to its prestige and credibility as a result of the Six-Day War. Soviet arms and training of Arab forces had not prevented a shattering Arab defeat, while Egypt and Syria felt let down by the very limited amount of aid, even of emergency supplies, which they received during the war. The Soviets were still determined to maintain their military

← How did the USSR rebuild its reputation in the Middle East?

presence and their superpower status in the region and started an immediate and massive supply of arms and military advisers (4000 advisers within a few months) to Egypt and Syria. Keen to exercise more control over their allies, they advised them against going to war to regain the territories (Sinai and Golan Heights), which they had lost. As always, the Soviets recognized Israeli military superiority over the Arabs and the risk of any war escalating into a confrontation between the superpowers.

The USSR faced a dilemma: how to arm and prepare the Arabs for war and yet limit them to purely political action. Egypt and Syria desperately wanted arms, to be in a position to defend themselves and, when ready, to fight to regain their lost lands. The Soviets, for their part, wished to accede to the Arabs' requests for arms but to persuade their client states to use those arms for purely political purposes, such as attaining a stronger bargaining position when it came to negotiating a peace treaty.

Increased Soviet military aid to Egypt

Although the Soviet policy was to prevent the Arabs from launching all-out war, it did not oppose Egyptian commando raids across the Suez Canal which, by the spring of 1969, had developed into the War of Attrition (see page 94). The USSR still tried to restrain Nasser and limit the area of conflict to the northern Canal zone, but Israeli rockets penetrated deep inside Egypt. Then suddenly, in January 1970, the Soviets decided to give far more military support to Egypt. Following a secret visit by Nasser to Moscow, the Soviet government agreed to take responsibility for Egypt's air defence system which it had previously refused to do. The Soviets despatched their advanced surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems to Egypt together with 15,000 military advisers. They even sent Soviet pilots to man Soviet aircraft in the Egyptian air force. The most likely explanation is that they were concerned about the survival of Nasser's government, which Israeli bombing was designed to weaken. Soviet credibility in the Arab world was now at stake. According to the Egyptian commentator Mohamed Heikal, this was 'the real turning point, which conclusively raised the Middle East conflict from a local to a superpower level'.

This policy carried a serious risk of escalation: already five Soviet planes and their pilots had been shot down by Israel. So, at the same time, the Soviets offered the USA and Israel an incentive to co-operate in peacemaking by no longer insisting that Israel withdraw its forces in Sinai *prior* to any peace settlement. These policies – simultaneously bolstering the Egyptian government in the face of military failure in its War of Attrition while trying to break the deadlock in negotiations – could be seen either as contradictory or as constituting a balancing act. The Soviets were still emphasizing the political over the military solution, refusing to supply the weaponry necessary for launching an offensive across the Suez Canal, and they claimed the credit when a ceasefire was agreed in August 1970.

Friendship, co-operation and expulsion 1971–2

In September 1970, Nasser died and, eight months later, in May 1971, the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Egypt. This suggests a much closer relationship but was probably an attempt by the Soviets to save their relationship with Egypt because the new president, Anwar Sadat, was showing signs of wanting to be much more independent: he had had his pro-Soviet vice president arrested (on the grounds that he had been planning a coup) and was sounding out the USA about ending the War of Attrition.

Sadat had already announced that 1971 would be the ‘year of decision’ to end the stalemate on the Canal (see page 94). He sought new offensive weapons, missiles and aircraft from the USSR. He appeared to be confronting the Soviets with a choice between acceding to his demands, which made war more likely, or losing Egypt to a closer relationship with the USA. When he failed to secure the weapons he sought, he decided, in July 1972, to expel the 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt. Sadat saw the Soviets as being more interested in *détente* with the USA than in helping their Arab ally. He later said that the Soviets ‘had only peace on their mind’ and he was determined to break the ‘no war, no peace’ situation.

SOURCE I

An excerpt from *Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev* by Galia Golan, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990, page 82. Professor Golan teaches at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and is an expert on the USSR in the Middle East.

The expulsion of the Soviet military advisers was not only a sign of Sadat’s exasperation and anger over Soviet recalcitrance, but as he himself later proclaimed, an act to free Egypt from Soviet restraints so as to move towards the long-awaited battle. ...

KEY TERM

Détente A policy of relaxing tensions between the superpowers.

What does Source I suggest about Sadat’s reasons for expelling Soviet military advisers?



The USSR and the October War 1973

The Soviets were shocked by the expulsion of their advisers from Egypt but they complied, removing all their personnel and much of their equipment. To have refused to leave would risk driving Sadat into US arms. There was now what Sadat described as a period of ‘freeze’ in Soviet–Egyptian relations but Egypt’s planning for war went ahead and, in 1973, the USSR resumed *some* arms supplies to Egypt, including equipment needed for bridging the Suez Canal. The main reason was probably to prevent Sadat turning to the USA as well as to keep Sadat on side given that he was set on going to war anyway.

Once the war started, the USSR had two main aims: the first was to assist the Arabs and restore Soviet prestige in the Arab world; a second, and somewhat conflicting aim, was to avoid any escalation of the war that might lead to direct confrontation with the USA. Both the Soviets and the USA

← **How far did the Soviets achieve their objectives in the October War?**

SOURCE J

President Sadat viewing Israeli positions across the Suez Canal in June 1973, four months before ordering his troops to launch their attack.



?

How might the evidence in Source J suggest reasons for the Soviet resumption of arms supplies to Egypt in 1973?

?

To what extent do you agree with the view in Source K that 'both the Russians and the Americans were pursuing similar objectives'?

airlifted military supplies to their allies and, at one point, when the Israelis had crossed the Suez Canal and were in a position to march on Cairo, the Soviets threatened to intervene. Yet both they and the USA were committed to arranging a ceasefire (see Source K).

SOURCE K

An excerpt from *Sphinx and Commissar – The Rise and Fall of Soviet influence in the Middle East* by Mohamed Heikal, published by Collins, London, UK, 1978, page 258.

... both the Russians and the Americans were pursuing similar objectives. The Russians wanted an Arab victory, but not one so absolute that it would compel American intervention on behalf of Israel and so bring about direct superpower involvement in the area. The Americans wanted to assist Israel, but not so effectively that she would be able to counterattack and inflict another 1967 humiliation on the Arabs. Neither side wanted to let down its protégé, but neither wanted the other to have an excuse to get more deeply committed in the Middle East. Americans and Russians therefore had a joint interest in working for a stalemate war and a compromise peace.

It was unlikely that the Soviets intended to intervene on the battlefield in support of the Egyptians. This ran the risk of fighting with Israeli forces as

well as confrontation with the USA. It is more likely that the threat was made to persuade, and help, the USA to put pressure on Israel. Whatever part the Soviets played in ending the war, it was to be the USA who called the shots in making the peace (see Chapter 9). Sadat certainly saw that Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, would be the key figure in negotiating an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. As Sadat said of Kissinger: ‘This man is the only person alive who can say to this woman [Golda Meir, the Israeli prime minister] get out, and she will have to get out.’ From this time onwards, the USA was undoubtedly the dominant superpower in the Middle East (see Source L).

SOURCE L

An excerpt from *Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev* by Galia Golan, 1990, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990, page 94. Professor Golan teaches at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and is an expert on the USSR in the Middle East.

... the end of the war saw a new period of sharp deterioration in Soviet–Egyptian relations, which culminated in Egyptian abrogation [ending] of the Friendship Treaty in 1976, and a period of broadened, successful American involvement in the Middle East.

What does Source L tell you about Soviet influence in the Arab–Israeli conflict in the aftermath of the October War?



Soviet objectives were:

- Maintain security of its southern border
- Advance the cause of Soviet communism

The USSR provided military and financial aid to Egypt and, later, Syria

Suez Crisis enhanced Soviet influence and prestige in Middle East

Soviet miscalculation contributed to war and Arab defeat in Six-Day War 1967

The Soviets rearmed their Arab allies but relations with Egypt deteriorated in 1970s

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The Soviet role in the Middle East

3

The UN and the Arab–Israeli conflict

► **Key question:** *How significant was the UN's role in the Arab–Israeli conflict?*

The Arab–Israeli conflict has occupied much of the time of the UN. In fact, the conflict monopolized the attention of the organization in its early days. Just two years after it was established, the UN was the midwife at the birth of Israel. It took over responsibility for Palestine from the British, as you read in Chapter 2, and it recommended the partition of Palestine and creation of the state of Israel (see page 35). Although fighting followed the proclamation of the state of Israel, it was the UN which instigated the truces and sent unarmed observers, the first in its history, to implement them. Most important of all, it was the UN which conducted the face-to-face negotiations between Israelis and Arabs which led to the armistices of 1949 (see page 52).

How has the UN supported Palestinian refugees since 1949?

→ The UN and the Palestine refugees

After the war of 1948–9, the UN took responsibility for nearly 750,000 Palestinian refugees. The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is the full name of the organization that was established to provide relief. It is more usually known as UNRWA. Its definition of a *Palestine refugee* is a person 'whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 and 1967 conflicts'. Most of UNRWA's funding comes from European countries and the USA. At first, food, clothing and shelter were the priorities. Today UNRWA provides schools and health centres as well as emergency aid. When Israel captured the West Bank in 1967, another 300,000 fled from their homes and became refugees. Today, there are five million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA, most of them descendants of those who fled from Palestine in 1947–9 and 1967, and there are 59 camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Why was the UN so successful in ending the 1956 war?

→ The UN and the Suez Crisis 1956

Arguably the UN's greatest success in peacekeeping in the Middle East was achieved in the Suez Crisis of 1956 (see Chapter 4). Helped by the fact that both the superpowers condemned the Anglo-French military action, the UN acted quickly and decisively to end the fighting. It persuaded the British and the French to agree to withdraw their forces from the Canal Zone and it put together its first-ever peacekeeping military force in the space of a week. It received so many offers of troops and transport from member countries that

Ralph Bunche, the UN official responsible for raising the force, said ‘This is the most popular army in history – an army which everyone fights to get into.’ The 6000-strong UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was made up of troops from 10 states under a Canadian commander. The first of them, wearing their distinctive blue helmets, arrived in Egypt just over two weeks after the outbreak of fighting. In the end, they were not stationed on the Canal, which was recognized internationally as indisputably Egyptian property after the war, but they supervised the gradual withdrawal of Israeli troops and then were posted to monitor the Israeli–Egyptian border.

The UN received world-wide praise for its role in settling the Suez Crisis and in maintaining peace for the next 10 years but was to be widely criticized for its role in the crisis leading to the Six-Day War.

SOURCE M

UN peacekeepers wearing their distinctive blue helmets on the Egyptian–Israeli border in 1956.



What do you think is the importance of having helmets of a specific and highly visible colour as shown in Source M?

?

The UN and the Six-Day War

From 1956 to 1967, UNEF was stationed on the border of Sinai with Israel and at Sharm el-Sheikh. The latter was the town overlooking the Straits of Tiran that led to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Eilat (see the map on page 68). UN troops were stationed on Egyptian soil with the Egyptian government’s consent. However, on 16 May 1967, the Egyptian government

← To what extent can the UN be blamed for the outbreak of war in 1967?

asked the UN commander to withdraw a limited number of his forces so that Egypt could occupy certain positions on the Sinai–Israeli border ‘ready for action against Israel the moment it might carry out any aggressive actions against any Arab country’. The request was relayed to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, who said that a partial withdrawal was not possible. Two days later, Nasser asked for the withdrawal of all UN forces and U Thant acceded. Within 24 hours, all the UN troops had left, thus removing the buffer zone between Israel and Egypt. On 21 May, Egyptian troops occupied Sharm el-Sheikh and the next day the Gulf of Aqaba was closed to Israeli shipping. Two weeks later, Egypt and Israel were at war.

Criticism of U Thant

U Thant came in for much criticism. US President Johnson criticized the ‘hurried withdrawal’ and the British prime minister deplored the UNEF’s ‘disappearance ... almost overnight’. Many blamed U Thant for failing to stand up to Nasser. When war broke out, *The Spectator* in London even produced the headline ‘U Thant’s War’. Some said that U Thant should have taken Egypt’s request to an emergency meeting of the UN so that it could be debated before ordering withdrawal. Others suggested that he should have broken with the terms of the original UN resolution and only agreed to a *partial* withdrawal or that he should have delayed the UN pull-out.

However, U Thant was in a very difficult position. For a start, some countries, like Canada, withdrew their troops from UNEF on the very first day that Egypt requested withdrawal. Secondly, when U Thant suggested a compromise, specifically that UN forces be stationed on the Israeli side of the border, Israel refused. On the day when Nasser announced the blockade, he said in a speech to Egyptian armed forces that if the UN force had refused to withdraw, ‘we would have regarded it as a hostile force and forcibly disarmed it’. It may have been bravado on Nasser’s part but it is certainly true that the few thousand UN troops were only lightly armed and that a far larger number of Egyptian forces were bristling with Soviet weapons.

UN Resolution 242

The UN was not able to prevent the slide to war or the actual fighting in June 1967. It passed several resolutions calling for ceasefires which, by the sixth and final day of the war, had been accepted by all the participants. Then, after weeks of negotiation, the UN adopted its now-famous Resolution 242 calling for ‘a just and lasting peace in the Middle East’. Very little progress was made towards permanent peace, however, and the superpowers soon replenished the weapons of Israel, Egypt and Syria, but Resolution 242 became the basis for the talks that led to the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1979 (see page 180).

The UN and the October War 1973

In the fourth major Arab–Israeli war, the October War of 1973, the UN was able to declare a ceasefire that was accepted by both Israelis and Arabs. It

was based on a deal struck by the superpowers, the USA and USSR (see page 97) and, for the second time, a UNEF was created to patrol the ceasefire lines in Sinai and, this time, on the Golan Heights as well. However, the influence of the UN in the Arab–Israeli conflict was waning (see Source N).

SOURCE N

An excerpt from *United Nations: A History* by Stanley Meisler, published by Grove Press, New York, USA, 1995, page 184. Meisler is a journalist and the author of several books on twentieth-century history.

The Arab–Israeli conflict would no longer occupy the UN as obsessively as it once did ... The Secretary-General who succeeded U Thant was hardly a major player. The 1973 war made it clear that the Arab–Israeli conflict had now become an issue for great powers who did not need the UN very much in their wheeling and dealing.

Why might the author of Source N believe that ‘the Arab–Israeli conflict had now become an issue for the great powers who did not need the UN very much’?



Arafat at the UN 1974

Although the UN was to play a far less significant role in the Arab–Israeli conflict after 1973, it did play host to one particularly dramatic event in 1974. Before dawn on 13 November 1974, Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, was flown by US helicopter to the UN building in New York amidst the tightest security in the organization’s history.

This event took place at the height of the era of hijacking and hostage-taking by PLO extremists (see page 139) yet Arafat and other moderate PLO leaders had hinted that they were ready to consider a ‘mini-state’ for the Palestinians – consisting of the West Bank and Gaza where the majority of the inhabitants were Palestinian. In other words, they were no longer determined to destroy the state of Israel. The decisive shift in Arafat’s transition from guerrilla leader to statesman came after the October War of 1973 (see Source O).

What did Arafat achieve by speaking at the UN?

SOURCE O

An excerpt from *The Arabs: A History* by Eugene L. Rogan, published by Allen Lane, London, UK, 2009, page 374. Rogan teaches Middle Eastern history at Oxford University, UK.

In the aftermath of the October War, the guerrilla chief had made a strategic decision to turn away from the armed struggle, and the terror tactics this involved, to negotiate a two-state solution to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. ... Arafat recognised that the Jewish state, then twenty-five years old, was the military superpower of the region, enjoying the full support of the United States and the recognition of nearly all of the international community. Israel was here to stay.

What does the author of Source O see as the main reason for Arafat’s change of policy?



The PLO representative in London wrote several articles for *The Times* newspaper which showed that the PLO was willing to consider a negotiated settlement with the Israelis. Although some western states were still very sceptical, the UN representatives of the USSR and its allies, together with those of many Asian and African countries, combined to secure an invitation for Arafat to speak at the UN. He gave his speech with a holster attached to his hip, although he had left his gun outside (see Source P).

SOURCE P

An excerpt from Yasser Arafat's speech to the UN, 13 November 1974, quoted in *The Middle East 1914–1979* by T.G. Fraser, published by Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1980, page 136. Fraser taught History at the University of Ulster, UK.

The roots of the Palestinian question are not the result of a conflict between two religions or two nationalisms. Neither is it a border conflict between two neighbouring states. It is the cause of a people deprived of its homeland, dispersed and uprooted, and living mostly in exile and in refugee camps. ... Today I have come bearing an olive branch [a symbol of peace] and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.


Many of his listeners at the UN were sympathetic to his message: that the Palestinian problem was about a people who had been forced to flee from their homes and who were still, after 25 years, living in refugee camps. Some world leaders were beginning to admit that the Palestinians deserved a homeland. They also realized that if the Palestinians were granted their wish, then permanent peace in the Middle East was possible.

Although he received a sympathetic hearing at the UN, there was no breakthrough to peace. The Israelis were furious with the UN for inviting Arafat to speak. They said the PLO was a 'murder organization'. They refused to discuss the idea of a separate Palestinian state, however small it might be. They feared that the Palestinians aimed to take back all of Israel and would not be content with a small state next door to Israel. Furthermore, the PLO was itself divided. Some hardliners still insisted that Israel should be completely destroyed and taken over by Palestinians. They rejected the idea of a Palestinian 'mini-state' and did not want any Arab state to recognize Israel.

Five years later, in 1979, the first Arab state *did* recognize Israel. In that year, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, as you will read in the next chapter. However, the Palestinians were effectively ignored in that treaty and it would not be until the 1990s that Palestinians and Israelis held direct, face-to-face talks.



What, according to Arafat in Source P, are 'the roots of the Palestine question'? What do you think Arafat meant by the words 'Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand'?

**SUMMARY DIAGRAM**

The UN and the Arab–Israeli conflict

4 Key debate

► **Key question:** *To what extent did the intervention of the superpowers shape the Arab–Israeli conflict?*

Historian Avi Shlaim has written that the Middle East became ‘a jousting ground for the superpowers’ and it can certainly be argued that the bitter Cold War rivalry did much to shape the development of the Arab–Israeli conflict. This argument can, however, be countered: it was the Middle Eastern states that initiated the events that led to war and drew in the superpowers to support them.

US–Soviet rivalry shaped the Arab–Israeli conflict

Both superpowers supported the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 but, in the 1950s, as Cold War rivalry extended beyond Europe, both the USA and the USSR intervened decisively in the Arab–Israeli conflict. In the Suez Crisis of 1956, both superpowers condemned Britain and France for their military intervention but, in the aftermath, competition between the superpowers began to shape the conflict. Keen to extend their influence in the Middle East, the Soviets armed Egypt and, later, Syria. The Soviets may not have wished to see Israel destroyed but their arming of Israel’s Arab enemies enhanced the military strength of the latter and encouraged their clients to seek to reverse the outcome of the 1948–9 war. Meanwhile, the USA’s

determination to counter Soviet influence in the region led to the Eisenhower Doctrine and, in the case of Lebanon in 1958, to military intervention. The USA began to behave like an imperial power in the Middle East (see Source Q).

SOURCE Q

An excerpt from *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* by John Lewis Gaddis, published by Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1998, page 176. Gaddis is a professor at Yale University, New Haven, USA.

... because the Secretary of State [Dulles] believed in filling all power vacuums – even those left, in the Middle East, by the despised British and French – he allowed the United States to inherit the enmities [hatreds] imperial powers normally attract when they seek too heavy-handedly to project their influence. Determined to force a Cold War frame of reference on a region more concerned with resisting imperialism than containing communism, Dulles deadened his own sensitivities to nationalism, thereby opening opportunities for the Soviet Union, which would retain a significant presence in Egypt for the next decade and a half. ... Dulles transformed his own country into the new imperial power in the Middle East in what he knew to be a post-imperial age.

The USSR, for its part, instigated the train of events in May 1967 that led to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. The Soviets' false report of Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian border provoked Nasser into taking the steps that led to war. His demand that UN forces be withdrawn and his subsequent blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba gave Israel the pretext for going to war. The outcome was to transform the map and the politics of the Middle East. Whether the Soviets wished to exploit the USA's preoccupation with the Vietnam War or to tilt the balance of power in the Middle East in favour of their Arab allies at the expense of the USA's Israeli ally, Soviet intervention had a dramatic impact on the development of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

In the following years, both superpowers poured arms into the Middle East in order to support their regional allies and thus increased the likelihood of another war. When the next war did break out in 1973, the belligerents were armed with the most advanced US and Soviet weaponry and were confident that their superpower patrons would not let them suffer defeat. It was the superpowers that largely determined how and when the war ended and, for the rest of the 1970s, it was the US government's desire to expel Soviet influence from the Middle East, certainly from Egypt, that largely motivated the USA's peacemaking initiatives.

Middle Eastern states drew the superpowers into the conflict

In 1948, and for the next 30 years, the state of Israel encountered the enmity of all the surrounding Arab states. Until the mid-1950s, the superpowers had very limited involvement in the Middle East. Even in 1956, it was



What are the main criticisms that the author of Source Q makes of US foreign policy in the late 1950s?

intervention by the British and French, not the USA and USSR, which largely caused the Suez Crisis and, when the USA did intervene decisively, it was in order to pressure the British and French into withdrawing and the Israelis into pulling back their forces in Sinai. It was regional powers that were stoking the conflict: Israel was motivated to attack Egypt by the desire to teach the Egyptians a lesson for what the Israelis saw as Egyptian encouragement of *fedayeen* raids across their border. And it was Egypt's determination to be able to defend itself against Israel that led Nasser's government to acquire Soviet arms and draw the USSR into the Arab–Israeli conflict on Egypt's side.

In 1967, the USA largely distanced itself from the events that led to war. The USSR's intervention in May 1967, with its report of Israeli troops massing, may have raised the temperature but, by the end of May, it was Arab leaders and Arab public opinion that were generating a war fever.

SOURCE R

An excerpt from *A History of the Middle East* by Peter Mansfield, published by Penguin, London, UK, 2003, page 273. Mansfield was a British writer, broadcaster and lecturer on the Middle East.

The Arab countries were now in a state of emotional self-intoxication as the belief became widespread that final victory over Israel was imminent. Even Nasser abandoned his usual doubts about Arab military capabilities, although he had exaggerated faith in his own military commander.

What, according to the author of Source R, was the main reason for the Arabs' war fever?



This climate, in turn, created feelings of intense fear in Israel which the country's military and political leaders were able to exploit in order to justify going to war.

After 1967 and during the October War of 1973, the rearming of Israel, Egypt and Syria was very much a response to demands from the superpowers' respective client states while the actual outbreak of hostilities had so little to do with superpower involvement that both the USA and the USSR were taken completely by surprise. Before the 1973 war, the Soviet leaders had tried to restrain the Egyptians from launching an attack while, during the war, the USA had to pressure the Israelis not to inflict a humiliating defeat on the Arab states. Both superpowers strove to bring about a ceasefire.

Conclusion

At the time of the Suez Crisis, as we have seen, Egypt largely drew the USSR into the Arab–Israeli conflict while US intervention, to defuse the crisis, earned the USA considerable support and respect among Arab states. However, the USA then made the mistake, in the Eisenhower Doctrine, of identifying radical Arab regimes with international communism thus helping to drive them into the arms of the USSR. From then onwards, the USSR committed itself to opposing US 'imperialism' in the region. In the words of

Is there any evidence here that a historian's nationality affects his or her interpretation of past events? (Language, Logic, Emotion, Ethics, Social Sciences.)

**T
O
K**

historian Avi Shlaim, 'the region's home-grown conflicts, bitter enough on their own, became virtually insoluble with the involvement of fiercely competitive outside powers'.

Only when it had conclusively established its predominance over the USSR in the region, after the 1973 war, was the USA willing to make peacemaking a priority.

Chapter summary

The USA, the USSR, the UN and the Arab-Israeli conflict

The US government's main objectives in the Middle East were to maintain a close ally in Israel and contain the influence of Soviet communism. By the mid-1970s, it was able to combine a decidedly pro-Israeli stand with an alliance with Egypt that largely secured the USA's predominance in the region. The USSR's policy was to extend its influence, and thus enhance the security of its southern border, by winning friends in

the Arab world. In this, it was largely successful in the late 1950s and early 1960s although the defeat of its allies in the Six-Day War was a major setback and, after the October War of 1973, its influence waned.

The UN recommended the creation of the state of Israel. It intervened decisively to end the fighting and make peace in the Suez War of 1956 but it was not able to halt the slide to war or influence the outcome of the fighting in 1967. It passed Resolution 242 calling for 'a just and lasting peace in the Middle East' in 1967 but has had a declining influence since the 1970s. It invited Yasser Arafat to speak at the UN, effectively recognizing the PLO as representing the Palestinian people.



Examination practice

The following are exam-style questions for you to practise, using sources from this chapter. Sources can be found on the following pages:

- Source A: page 149
- Source B: page 150
- Source C: page 151
- Source D: page 151
- Source E: page 152
- Source F: page 156
- Source G: page 156
- Source H: page 158
- Source I: page 161
- Source J: page 162
- Source K: page 162
- Source L: page 163
- Source O: page 167
- Source P: page 168
- Source Q: page 170
- Source R: page 171

SAMPLE QUESTION 1s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 44–5.

- 1 What, according to Source C, were the reasons for the outbreak of war after the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company?
- 2 What, according to Source K, were the objectives of the USA during the October 1973 war?
- 3 On what, according to Source R, was US policy based under Secretary of State Dulles?

- 4 What is the message conveyed by Source A?
- 5 What is the message conveyed by Source H?
- 6 What is the message conveyed by Source J?

SAMPLE QUESTION 2s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 74–5.

- 1 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources B and Q about US objectives in the Middle East.
- 2 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources O and P about the PLO decision to change strategies.

SAMPLE QUESTION 3s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 125–7.

- 1 With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources K and L for historians studying the 1973 October War.
- 2 With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources J and K for historians studying the role of the USSR in Egypt.
- 3 With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources O and Q for historians studying the role of the United Nations in promoting peace in the Middle East.

SAMPLE QUESTION 4s

For guidance on how to answer this type of question, see pages 142–3.

- 1 Using Sources A–E and your own knowledge, analyse the role of the USA in the Middle East.
- 2 Using Sources F, G, H, J and R and your own knowledge, assess Soviet involvement in the Middle East.



Activities

As you are now well acquainted with the demands of each type of question, it's your turn to create a complete Paper 1. In groups of three or four students, try to find five sources that pertain to a specific topic from Chapters 2–8. You might choose to focus on the Suez Crisis or the 1948 war, for example. Of the five sources, one should be a visual, two should be extracts from two different history books, and two should be primary sources such as extracts from speeches or official documents or first-hand accounts. The next step is to create five questions using the wording that is similar to those found in examples in this book. You and your group will also need to create what the IB calls a markscheme. This is essentially suggested answers. Now try to have your classmates or another group in class do your Paper 1 in one hour. Don't forget to add the five minutes of reading time! If your class is shorter than an hour, you might do this as a homework assignment. After collecting the completed works of your fellow students, mark them using your markscheme. Remember, question 1 is divided into two parts and is worth 5 marks in total, questions 2 and 3 are both 6 marks each and question 4 has a value of 8 marks.

Be sure to keep the Paper 1s you and your classmates have created because they will help you to review for the real exams.

Camp David and the Egyptian–Israeli peace agreement 1978–9

This chapter examines the role of US diplomacy in persuading the armies of Israel, Egypt and Syria to ‘disengage’ and then explains how President Sadat’s dramatic visit to Israel set in train the negotiations that led to Egypt becoming the first Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. In conclusion, it assesses the impact of the treaty on Egypt, Israel and the Palestinians. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- ★ How did war in 1973 lead to peace in 1978?
- ★ What were the results of the Treaty of Washington?
- ★ How significant an achievement were the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty?

1 Peacemaking at Camp David 1978

▶ *Key question:* How did war in 1973 lead to peace in 1978?

What steps towards peace were taken from 1973 to 1975?

→ Henry Kissinger and the treaties of ‘disengagement’

KEY TERM

Disengagement The separation of the opposing armies.

For two years following the October War of 1973, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger engaged in ‘shuttle diplomacy’: he shuttled back and forth between the Israeli, Egyptian and Syrian capitals in order to arrange treaties of **disengagement**. His plane became known as the ‘Yo-Yo Express’ because it was up and down so often. In 1974, he secured the first treaties of disengagement: these were agreements by which Israeli forces would withdraw from the Suez Canal area and from part of the Golan Heights. In each area, United Nations (UN) buffer zones, patrolled by UN peacekeeping forces, were inserted between the troops of the two sides. The agreement on Suez enabled Egypt to clear the Canal, which was reopened in 1975, and to start rebuilding the cities along the Canal that had been devastated by Israeli shelling from 1968 to 1970. It also led to Saudi Arabia starting to sell oil to the West again. Kissinger impressed many observers with his tireless efforts and diplomatic skill in negotiating these agreements. The US magazine *Time* called him ‘the miracle worker’.

The second Sinai treaty of disengagement, in 1975, known as ‘Sinai II’, committed Israel to withdrawing further from Sinai, including relinquishing its control of Sinai oil fields. In return, the USA promised Israel economic and military aid. According to a US official who had served in the previous government, under Kennedy and Johnson, this agreement ‘amounted to a vast real estate deal in which the United States bought a slice of the Sinai Desert from Israel for a huge financial and political consideration’.

US President Carter’s plans for peace

In 1976, Jimmy Carter was elected US president. He criticized Kissinger’s step-by-step approach to peace and promised a fresh approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict. He said that his administration would strive to bring about a comprehensive settlement, including a solution to the Palestinian problem. He advocated a ‘homeland’ for the Palestinians. Then, in June 1977, a new government came to power in Israel. It was led by Menachem Begin, who had been leader of Irgun (see page 31) and was now leader of the Likud Party in Israel. Begin now led a government that was committed to continued Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza. He was prepared to do a deal over Sinai in order to secure peace with Egypt, the most powerful Arab state, but not over the West Bank, which he referred to, using its biblical names, as ‘Judea and Samaria’ (see Source A).

SOURCE A

An excerpt from Menachem Begin’s election manifesto, March 1977, quoted in *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict* by Charles D. Smith, published by Bedford/St. Martin’s, New York, USA, 2007, page 395.

The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal and indisputable and is linked with the right to security and peace; therefore, Judea and Samaria will not be handed to any foreign administration; between the sea and Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty ... the PLO is no national liberation organization but an organization of assassins. Its aim is to liquidate the State of Israel.

What do you think Begin meant, in Source A, by ‘any foreign administration’?



Begin refused to consider the idea of a Palestinian homeland or to talk to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). He even referred to them as ‘Nazis’. His government approved the continued building of Israeli settlements on the West Bank and around Jerusalem. Nevertheless, Carter was undaunted and planned a conference in Geneva to include all the main participants and the USSR. However, a dramatic announcement, in November 1977, led to a change of plan.

Sadat flies to Israel 1977

Following indirect, secret talks between Israeli and Egyptian officials, Sadat surprised the whole world by announcing, in a speech to the Egyptian parliament in November 1977, that he was willing to go to Israel and negotiate a peace treaty. He wanted permanent peace because four wars

against Israel had cost many lives and devastated the Egyptian economy. Egypt needed a lasting peace in order to recover. Nevertheless, this was a bold move because, for 30 years, no Arab leader had even agreed to recognize Israel's existence. When he informed President Assad of Syria of his intentions, the Syrian leader said: 'You cannot go to Jerusalem. This is treason. The Arab nation will never forgive you.' The Israeli government, however, responded favourably and, 10 days later, Sadat flew to Israel. The moment he emerged from his plane is described in Source B.

SOURCE B

An excerpt from an article by Mohamed Heikal, November 1977, in his book *Secret Channels*, page 262, quoted in *The Arabs: A History* by Eugene L. Rogan, published by Allen Lane, London, UK, 2009, page 390. Heikal was a highly respected Egyptian journalist.

As television cameras followed him down the steps the guilt felt by millions of Egyptians was replaced by a sense of participation. Right or wrong, Sadat's political and physical courage was beyond dispute. His arrival on forbidden territory enthralled many Egyptians and appalled the rest of the Arab world.

When Sadat spoke to the Israeli parliament, he promised permanent peace based on agreements that would lead to the return of occupied Arab territories, including Arab east Jerusalem, recognition of Palestinian statehood and secure boundaries.

SOURCE C

An excerpt from Sadat's speech to the Israeli parliament on 20 November, 1977, quoted in *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record* edited by Yehuda Lukacs, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1992, page 136.

I did not come to you with a view to concluding a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. ... Moreover, no separate peace between Egypt and Israel could secure a lasting and just peace in the region as a whole. Even if a peace agreement was achieved, without a just solution to the Palestinian problem it would never ensure the establishment of the durable, lasting peace the entire world is now trying to achieve. ... We used to reject you, and we had our reasons and grievances. ... But I say to you today and I say to the whole world that we accept that we should live with you in lasting and just peace.



Why did Sadat's visit to Israel arouse such conflicting responses as referred to in Source B?



Why is Sadat, in Source C, so opposed to the signing of a 'separate peace' between Israel and Egypt?

SOURCE D

The *Los Angeles Times* of 21 November 1977 reports on Sadat's speech to the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. The *Los Angeles Times* is a daily newspaper published in Los Angeles, California, USA, since 1881.

RACING RESULTS-ENTRIES **Los Angeles Times** **MORNING FINAL**

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BEGIN OPENS BORDERS TO EGYPT

Sadat Recognizes Israel

PROS, CONS
Equal Rights Amendment: Is It Needed?
BY PHILIP HAGER
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—True or false: Under the Equal Rights Amendment, women would be subject to the draft, separate public schools for boys and girls would be abolished and men would have the same right to alimony as women.
The answer: True, according to most legal authorities.
True or false: Under the amendment, prohibitions on homosexual marriage would be overturned, unisex public restrooms would be mandated and separate college dormitories for men and women would be prohibited.
The answer to all these questions is False, according to the same authorities.
But confident as authorities are on these questions, based largely on the stated intent of Congress in approving the amendment, confusion and uncertainty still surround the ERA, and authorities concede that nobody can know for sure all the ramifications.

TALK OF PEACE—Egyptian President Anwar Sadat delivers historic address to Knesset in Jerusalem at left. At right, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin gestures while giving his reply as Sadat listens at his side. Sadat said he made trip at "great risk."

But Leaders Are Firm on Differences
BY DIAL TORGERSOHN
Times Staff Writer

JERUSALEM—Only slight cracks appeared Sunday in the stone-wall deadlock between Egypt and Israel as Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin debated war and peace before the Israeli Knesset and the world.
In his historic speech to the country's lawmakers, the Egyptian president offered Israel firm recognition as a Middle East state, something he has never done in such a public forum.
In his reply, the Israeli prime minister said he was opening his borders to Egypt and called for meetings between Israel and the Arab confrontation states prior to a Geneva peace conference—a position similar to that of Egypt and one that could expedite the move toward Geneva.
But hopes that a dramatic breakthrough would be announced were dashed when Sadat and Begin spoke. Basically, the positions spelled out by the two leaders followed the line each side has held as Geneva peace talks seemed to be pending.

Text of Sadat and Begin speeches, Part 1, Pages 20 and 21. Related stories on Pages 18, 22 and 24.

In his reply, the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin did not refer to particular issues or mention the Palestinians (see Source E).

SOURCE E

An excerpt from Begin's reply to Sadat's speech in the Israeli parliament on 20 November 1977, quoted in *The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record* edited by Yehuda Lukacs, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1992, page 147.

The time of the flight from Cairo to Jerusalem is short but the distance until last night was almost infinite. President Sadat crossed this distance courageously. ... We want full, real peace, with complete reconciliation between the Jewish and the Arab peoples ... President Sadat knows and he knew from us before he came to Jerusalem that we have a different position from his with regard to the permanent borders between us and our neighbours. However, I say to the President of Egypt and to all our neighbours ... everything can be negotiated.

What, according to the newspaper in Source D, is most significant about Sadat's initiative?

Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources C and E.

What was agreed at the Camp David meeting?

 KEY TERM

Self-determination The right of a people to decide how they should be governed.

→ Agreements at Camp David, September 1978

The following month the Israeli prime minister went to Egypt and peace talks were started. However, early in 1978, they reached stalemate. Sadat demanded Israeli recognition of the Palestinians' right to **self-determination** while Begin demanded a guarantee of continued Israeli control of the West Bank. At this point, President Carter intervened in order to prevent the talks from stalling completely. He was determined to salvage something from the 'peace process' that Sadat had started. He flew to both Cairo and Jerusalem for discussions. Then, in July, he invited the Egyptian and Israeli leaders to Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, USA. For 13 days, in September 1978, the three men and their advisers discussed a peace settlement.

Carter found Begin very stubborn, especially on the issue of the West Bank. He found Sadat more willing to negotiate. Sadat appeared less concerned about the specific details of any planned autonomy for the West Bank. Palestinians and Carter realized that his own hopes for a broader peace were not going to be fulfilled. The only option seemed to be a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel, which was precisely what the Israelis were hoping for and which they believed Sadat would accept.

Even in discussions on Sinai, Begin proved a hard bargainer: initially, he insisted on retaining the settlements and airfields that the Israelis had built in the area. He did finally accept a compromise on these issues but was unbending on the issue of the West Bank. From Begin's perspective, 'the Sinai had been sacrificed, but *Eretz* [biblical] Israel had been won'. In this, he was referring to what was agreed regarding the West Bank and Jerusalem. Towards the end of the negotiations Begin insisted he would sign nothing that would mean 'signing away Jerusalem'. So Carter, eager to conclude the talks and prevent any unravelling of progress made up until that point, came up with a suggestion which was agreed to: Begin and Sadat would exchange letters. Begin's letter declared that Jerusalem was 'indivisible' and 'the capital of Israel' while Sadat's letter declared that Arab east Jerusalem was an 'indivisible' part of the West Bank and that it should be returned to 'Arab sovereignty'. In other words, there was effectively no agreement on Jerusalem.

At the end of the Camp David negotiations, the three leaders signed two agreements:

- 'A Framework for Peace in the Middle East', which dealt with the Palestinian problem.
- 'A Framework for Peace between Egypt and Israel'.

A framework for peace with the Palestinians

This agreement:

- provided for the election of a self-governing Palestinian authority and ‘full autonomy’ (although not defined) for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to replace the Israeli military government
- recognized ‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’ but it denied them any right to national self-determination, that is to decide exactly how they wished to be governed
- allowed for a five-year transition period during which negotiations about the final status of the occupied territories would be conducted.

The separation of the two agreements made the Arabs suspect that the Israeli leader had been consistently aiming for a separate treaty with Egypt while maintaining full control of the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians felt betrayed. They rejected the proposed ‘autonomy’, seeing it as a cover for Israeli annexation of the occupied territories with the tacit agreement of Egypt and the USA.

A framework for peace between Israel and Egypt

This was also agreed at Camp David. It was based on the ‘land-for-peace’ principle, enunciated in UN Resolution 242 of 1967. The main points were:

- Israeli forces to be withdrawn from the remaining parts of Sinai
- Egypt to regain all of Sinai within three years
- Israeli shipping to have free passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran (see the map on page 89).

- US ‘shuttle diplomacy’ led to withdrawals by Israeli forces from Sinai and Golan Heights, 1974–5

- Sadat flew to Israel, thus recognizing Israel, 1977
- Begin flew to Egypt

Camp David, 1978. US-brokered peace deal:

- Israelis to withdraw from Sinai
- Egypt to allow Israeli ships through Suez and Straits of Tiran
- Palestinians to be granted ‘autonomy’ in West Bank and Gaza

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

Peacemaking at Camp David
1978

2

The Treaty of Washington 1979

► **Key question:** *What were the results of the Treaty of Washington?*

US President Carter was determined to ensure that Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty. Failure to do so might lead the Egyptians to fall under Soviet influence again. When Egyptian–Israeli talks became bogged down in early 1979, Carter again intervened decisively; he visited Cairo and Jerusalem in order to ensure compromise was reached on all the issues. Then, in March 1979, six months after Camp David, the Egyptian and Israeli leaders were again brought to the USA. They signed the Treaty of Washington, which largely confirmed what the two sides had agreed at Camp David. They finally agreed to recognize ‘each other’s right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries’.

SOURCE F

Sadat (on left), Carter (centre) and Begin (right) shake hands on the lawn of the White House in Washington, DC after signing the peace treaty on 26 March 1979. Sadat and Begin had been jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1978.



To what extent do you think Sadat and Begin, photographed in Source F, deserved to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize?



The US reaction to the treaty

The US public acclaimed Carter’s diplomatic triumph, a breakthrough in the Arab–Israeli conflict, but the heart of the conflict in the Middle East was still the Palestinian problem and, on that front, little was achieved. As far as the

Israeli leader, Begin, was concerned, the peace process was complete. His government had no intention of relinquishing its grip on any of the West Bank. The US government's failure to actually secure the legitimate rights of the Palestinians undermined its credibility as an honest broker between Arabs and Israelis.

Israeli gains

The Israelis felt more secure now that they had traded land for peace and neutralized the biggest Arab military power. Furthermore, the USA guaranteed that it would meet or subsidize Israel's oil needs for the next 15 years and replace the airfields which the Israelis had to relinquish in Sinai by building two new ones in the Negev desert in the south of Israel.

Egyptian reaction

Egypt's foreign minister resigned, believing Sadat had surrendered over key issues regarding the West Bank and Gaza and had isolated Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. Most Egyptians, however, were pleased that Sadat was putting Egypt's interests first: they felt that Egypt had made huge sacrifices in blood and money on behalf of the Arabs. However, even among the Egyptians, there was a small minority, mainly **Islamists**, who turned against Sadat for making peace with the Zionist enemy and for his hostility to the new Islamic government which had taken power in Iran. In 1981, during a military parade in Cairo, Sadat was assassinated by a group of Islamic extremists within the army.

Reaction in the Arab world

Most of the world applauded this breakthrough in Arab–Israeli relations. But that was not how the rest of the Arab states viewed things: they saw Sadat as breaking Arab ranks. Instead of standing up to Israel and the West, as Nasser had done, he had sold out. At the very least, the other Arab states argued, the Arabs could have secured a better deal for all, particularly the Palestinians, through *collective* action. The Arab states cut off all relations with Egypt and moved the headquarters of the Arab League from Cairo to Tunisia. They closed their embassies in Cairo and broke off trade with Egypt. The Arab oil states cut off aid and investment which was crucial to Egypt. It would take over 20 years for Egypt to be fully accepted in the Arab world again.

The problem of Palestine

It was to be 15 years before another Arab state made peace with Israel. Meanwhile, at the heart of the conflict in the Middle East, there still remained the Palestinian problem.

The issue of Israeli settlements on the West Bank continued to cause divisions between Israel and the USA. It was also, for the Palestinians, the single most resented aspect of Israeli occupation. At Camp David, it had been agreed that there would be a suspension of settlement building. Carter

KEY TERM

Islamists Those who believed the state should be based on Islamic law.

← **Why were Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza so controversial?**

claimed that the freeze on building was to last for the five years of the transitional arrangements, the time during which the autonomy talks, on the final status of the occupied territories, would take place. Begin insisted that the freeze was only for the three months that were thought to be necessary to complete an Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty. Since no signed document on this issue emerged from Camp David, it has remained inconclusive. Nevertheless, the official US position remained: Israeli settlements in the occupied territories were illegal and east Jerusalem was considered to be occupied territory, despite having been incorporated into the state of Israel.

In March 1980, the UN Security Council unanimously asked Israel to dismantle its settlements. President Carter, however, did not pursue this issue. He had become preoccupied with events in Iran: early in 1979, an Islamic government had come to power and then, in November 1979, the US embassy in the capital, Tehran, was taken over and 69 US citizens were taken hostage. Carter had little time for Palestinian autonomy. Besides which, 1980 was election year and Carter calculated that putting more pressure on Israel would lose him Jewish votes.

Treaty of Washington 1979 confirmed what was agreed in 'A Framework for Peace between Egypt and Israel' at Camp David

- A diplomatic triumph for Carter
 - Israel and Egypt now more secure
- However:
- Other Arab states and some Egyptians were opposed
 - The Palestinian problem was still an unresolved source of tension

SUMMARY DIAGRAM

The Treaty of Washington 1979

3

Key debate

▶ **Key question:** How significant an achievement were the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty?

Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But how significant an achievement were the peace deals which were struck in 1978–9?

The significance of the achievement

Both at the time and since, US President Carter has been praised for his mediation and eventual success in persuading Israel and its strongest Arab

enemy to make peace. Historians like Martin Gilbert have singled out his ‘patient, persistent and personal efforts’ and William Quandt has concluded that ‘American leadership was certainly a necessary condition for the success of the negotiations’ while recognizing that ‘Carter’s initiatives would have come to nought had the leaders of Egypt and Israel been unwilling to accept American mediation and to make peace between their two countries’. The peace treaty made another Israeli–Arab war far less likely now that the largest Arab nation was at peace with Israel. Furthermore, from the USA’s point of view, Egypt was now firmly in the US, as opposed to the Soviet, camp so the peace treaty was a huge strategic, as well as diplomatic, success for the USA.

Israel could feel confident that there was no longer a united front of Arab states refusing to recognize the state of Israel. Other Arab states would be very reluctant to go to war with Israel without Egypt. Soon the Israeli flag would be flying over the Israeli embassy in Cairo. Israel’s security was further enhanced by a US commitment to safeguard its oil supplies and build new airfields.

Egypt had also made huge gains. For a start, it was to regain all of Sinai within three years. (Israel’s staged pullback was completed by April 1982.) This had been its main objective in going to war in 1973. All Israeli settlements and airfields in the territory would be dismantled. Now the Egyptians could rebuild their economy, aided by the promise of \$1.5 billion of US aid over the next three years. Most Egyptians felt a great sense of relief.

According to one British historian, the Palestinians also gained from the Camp David agreements (see Source G).

SOURCE G

An excerpt from *Israel: A History* by Martin Gilbert, 1998, published by Transworld, London, UK, page 492. Gilbert is a British historian.

This was the first time that Israel had conceded what were essentially the national aspirations of the Palestinians, a people hitherto regarded as either former Jordanians, or as Arabs who happened to live in and around the cities of Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah [on the West Bank] ... The acceptance of a Palestinian identity, and of the ‘legitimate rights’ of the ‘Palestinian people’, was a major step forward for Israel.

The author of Source G sees the Camp David agreement as ‘a major step forward for Israel’. Do you think many Palestinians would agree?



The limits of the achievement

Although Egyptians might justifiably feel that their territorial integrity had been restored, they were now isolated in the Arab world. Furthermore, they were accused of abandoning the Palestinians and it is certainly hard to counter the view that the Palestinians gained little. In fact, the Palestinians probably felt more vulnerable, more exposed to an expansionist Israel. The Israelis may have made concessions over Sinai in order to gain recognition

from Egypt, but that made them even less likely to relinquish any of their control over the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, settlement building continued despite official US disapproval. In September, Israel passed a law allowing its citizens to buy Arab land on the West Bank and, in 1980, Israel declared Jerusalem to be the capital of Israel. Although Israel had recognized 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people', there was still no willingness to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people while the USA had little appetite for pursuing the issue (see Source H).

SOURCE H

An excerpt from *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967* by William Quandt, published by The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, USA, 2005, page 240. Quandt is a professional historian of the Middle East but he had also been one of US President Carter's advisers at Camp David.

As he [Carter] struggled to cope with this most debilitating of foreign policy crises [US hostages in Iran], Carter had little time for Palestinian autonomy. ... Without the direct participation of the Palestinians in the negotiations, Egypt would be reluctant to go much further in dealings with Israel. Thus, for much of the next ten years, until finally the Palestinians joined the peace talks as full participants in 1991, the part of Camp David that dealt with the future of the West Bank and Gaza remained essentially a dead letter.

Conclusion

Carter did not secure the general, regional peace he had hoped for but a significant breakthrough had been achieved and Egypt and Israel have remained at peace for over 30 years. On balance, the Israelis probably secured the most: they won recognition from the leading Arab power and US guarantees over their oil supplies, and had not had to surrender any of their control over the West Bank and Gaza. It would be another 12 years before Israel and the PLO held direct, face-to-face talks and, two years later, signed a peace agreement.

Chapter summary

Camp David and the Egyptian–Israeli peace agreement 1978–9

After the 1973 war, Kissinger's 'shuttle diplomacy' led to the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Sinai and the Golan Heights. In 1977, Egyptian President

Sadat became the first Arab leader to recognize the state of Israel and, at Camp David in 1978, the USA brokered a peace deal between Egypt and Israel. This was then confirmed in the Treaty of Washington in 1979. Israel and Egypt achieved a greater degree of security but the Palestinians were largely sidelined and most Arab states condemned what they saw as Sadat's betrayal.



How and why does the view of Camp David expressed in Source H contrast with that in Source G?



Examination practice

The following is a complete sample Paper 1 for you to practise, using sources from this chapter. Sources can be found on the following pages:

- Source C: page 176
- Source E: page 177
- Source F: page 180
- Source G: page 183
- Source H: page 184

Read all the sources (Sources C, E, F, G and H) carefully and answer all the questions that follow. These sources and questions relate to the peace process in the Middle East.

- 1 a) Why, according to Source C, does Sadat not want to have a separate peace treaty with Israel? (3 marks)
b) What is the message conveyed by Source F? (2 marks)
- 2 Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources C and E about what was needed to achieve peace. (6 marks)
- 3 With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources G and H for historians studying the Camp David Accords. (6 marks)
- 4 Using the sources and your own knowledge, analyse the difficulties in achieving peace in the Middle East. (8 marks)



Activities

- 1 This chapter includes several important diplomatic events, including President Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem in 1977. To get a greater sense of the issues and both Sadat and his Israeli counterpart, Begin, read the texts of both men's speeches. Sadat's speech can be located at: www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/sadat_speech.html. Begin's speech is at: www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/begintoknessetsadat.html
 - What are the major points each leader raises?
 - What points are similar?
 - Which ones are different?
 - What might explain these similarities and differences?
 - Which speech do you find the more convincing? Why?
 - While you may not understand Arabic or Hebrew, you can find film clips of both men's speeches on the internet. What can you learn from the tone of each leader's speech?
- 2 As a class, try to create a documentary reader of sources you can find for each of the chapters. Working as a team, you could easily produce such a text with 40 or more excellent sources. These sources could be of great assistance as you prepare for your official IB History exams. As you read through or examine the sources, think of possible IB-type questions that could be created using what you have found.

Timeline

1915		McMahon–Hussein correspondence
1916		Sykes–Picot Agreement
1917		Balfour Declaration
1919		Britain granted a mandate to rule Palestine
1936–9		Arab Rebellion in Palestine
1937		Peel Commission recommended partition of Palestine
1939		British government White Paper
1945		Formation of Arab League
1946		Attack on King David Hotel
1947	November	UN voted for Partition of Palestine
	November	Start of Civil War in Palestine
1948	May	British withdrawal from Palestine
	May	Declaration of new state of Israel
	May	Invasion of Israel by Arab armies
1949	January	Final ceasefire arranged
	December	UNRWA created to help 'Palestine refugees'
1952		Egyptian Revolution
1954		Nasser became President of Egypt
1955	February	Israeli attack on Gaza
	September	Nasser announced Czech arms deal

1956	July	Nationalization of Suez Canal
	October 29	Israeli forces invaded Egypt
	October 31	British and French bombed Egyptian airfields
	November 6	UN ceasefire leading to withdrawal of Anglo-French forces
1957		Eisenhower Doctrine
1958		Formation of United Arab Republic (UAR)
1964		Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formed
1967	June	Six-Day War
	November	UN Resolution 242
1969		Arafat became Chairman of PLO
1970	September	PLO expelled from Jordan
	September	Death of Nasser
1972		Israeli athletes killed at Munich Olympics
1973		October War
1974	May	Treaty of disengagement of Israeli and Arab forces
	November	Yasser Arafat addressed UN
1977	June	Election of Likud government in Israel
	November	Sadat's visit to Israel
1978		Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt
1979		Treaty of Washington between Israel and Egypt

Glossary

Absentee property The term used to describe the property of Palestinian Arabs who had left their homes, even if only for a day. Tens of thousands of Palestinian Arabs were classified as 'absentee'.

Airlift Large-scale transport of supplies by air, especially in an emergency.

Annex To incorporate a territory into another country.

Anti-Semitism Feelings or actions showing prejudice or hatred towards Jews.

Appease To make concessions in order to avoid conflict.

Arab Higher Committee A committee of Palestinian Arab leaders, formed in 1936, that attempted to direct the Arab Rebellion. It was composed of different, often rival, factions.

Arab League A regional organization created in 1945 to represent the interests of Arab states and to promote political, economic and cultural co-ordination among them.

Arab Legion The British-trained army of Transjordan.

Arab nationalism A movement striving for Arab political unity and an end to western domination.

Armistice An agreement to stop fighting.

Baghdad Pact An alliance formed by Britain, Turkey, Iran and, later, Pakistan and Iraq. Its headquarters were in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.

Black September A Palestinian group which killed 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics.

Blockade The blocking of a place or region by troops or ships to prevent goods or people reaching it.

Brinkmanship Pursuing a dangerous policy to the limits of safety, in this case to the brink of war.

Coalition A union of two or more groups for a specific purpose.

Cold War The term used to describe the political hostilities in the era 1945–91 between capitalist and communist countries, in particular between the USA and the USSR. The conflict was primarily diplomatic, but serious military confrontation did break out on numerous occasions.

Communism A system in which government controls the economy and in which all political power is held by the Communist Party.

Coup Sudden or violent change of government.

Détente A policy of relaxing tensions between the superpowers.

Diaspora The dispersal of people into many different parts of the world.

Disengagement The separation of the opposing armies.

Eisenhower Doctrine The policy, announced by US President Eisenhower, of opposing the spread of communist (that is, Soviet) influence in the Middle East.

Eretz Israel The Land of Israel, as in the Bible. In effect, this meant the whole of Palestine, not just the area allocated to the Jewish state by the UN.

Fatah A Palestinian guerrilla group founded by Yasser Arafat in 1959. Its name comes from reversing the initials of its Arabic name which, in translation, is 'The Movement for the Liberation of Palestine'.

Fedayeen Men trained to carry out raids (literally, 'those who sacrifice themselves').

Guerrillas Soldiers who avoid fighting in open battle when possible; they prefer to use tactics like ambushes and hit-and-run raids.

Gush Emunim A religious group, its name is often translated as 'Bloc of the Faithful'.

Haganah The Jewish Defence Force, which was set up in the 1920s and was later to form the basis of the Israeli army.

High Commissioner The most senior British diplomat in another country, like an ambassador, representing the British government.

Holocaust The extermination of nearly six million Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War.

Imperialism The practice of extending a country's power and influence over other territories.

International communism A term used by the US government to describe the threat posed by the communist USSR and its allies during the Cold War.

Irgun A small secret Zionist organization which had been formed in 1937 to protect Jewish settlements from attack during the Arab Rebellion of 1936–9 and, from 1945, fought for a Jewish state in *all* of Palestine.

Islamists Those who believed the state should be based on Islamic law.

Israeli Defence Force (IDF) The Israeli armed forces, most of whose members had been in the Haganah.

Israelites The name by which Jews were known in ancient times, hence the 'Land of Israel' was their Promised Land.

Jewish Agency The governing body of the Zionist movement in Palestine during the British mandate.

Jewish National Fund A body created by the World Zionist Organization to buy land for Jewish settlement in Palestine.

Kibbutzim Agricultural settlements in Israel where people live and work together.

Knesset The Israeli parliament.

Land-for-Peace The formula by which Israel would give up Arab land it had conquered in return for Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist and live in peace.

League of Nations An international organization set up in 1919 to preserve peace and settle disputes; it was dominated by Britain and France.

Lobby To campaign for the support of, and put pressure on, members of a law-making body so as to shape its policy.

Mandate An order or command, in this case from the League of Nations, giving Britain and France control of Arab lands previously ruled by Turkey. Britain and France were to prepare the Arab lands for eventual self-government.

Nakba An Arabic word for 'catastrophe' or 'disaster', used to refer to the 1948–9 war, the loss of Palestine and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem.

Nationalize To transfer from private to government ownership.

Non-aligned Not wishing to step into line with either the West (the USA and its allies) or the USSR and its allies.

Occupied territories Lands controlled by the troops of a foreign power (in this case, the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and Golan Heights, all occupied by Israeli troops).

Orthodox Jews Jews who adhere to the traditional interpretation and application of Jewish law.

Ottoman The name of the Turkish dynasty, named after its founder, Osman. In the sixteenth century, the Turkish Empire conquered much of south-east Europe and the Middle East.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Set up in 1964 to lead the struggle to regain Palestine, it also provided many health and welfare services in the Palestinian refugee camps.

Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) An organization set up by Dr George Habash, a Palestinian Christian. It carried out many terrorist acts.

Partition Division into two or more parts.

Pogrom An officially encouraged, or at least, officially condoned campaign against the Jews.

Political Islam The belief that Muslims should establish states based on laws derived from the Qur'an, the Muslim holy book.

Promised Land The land of Palestine which Jews believed God had promised to them.

Prophet Muhammad Born in the Arabian city of Mecca c.570. For Muslims, he is the messenger and prophet of God.

Reparations Damages or compensation that Germany paid to Israel for the persecution of the Jews during the Second World War.

Repatriate To send people back to their own country.

Reprisal An act of retaliation against an enemy to stop him from doing something again.

Republic A state governed by elected representatives.

Revisionist A revised interpretation is one based on a critical re-examination of historical facts.

Sabbath The Jewish day of rest and worship, a Saturday.

Secretary of State The USA's foreign minister.

Self-determination The right of a people to decide how they should be governed.

Settlements A group of houses, or communities, as built by the Israelis on the West Bank, Golan Heights and in Gaza.

Stern Gang A Zionist terrorist group founded in 1939.

Superpowers The two biggest powers, the USA and the USSR, after the Second World War.

UN General Assembly The main body of the UN in which every member state is represented.

United Arab Republic (UAR) The union of Egypt and Syria formed in 1958.

USSR Communist Russia and states under its control, also known as the Soviet Union.

Vietnam War War between non-Communist South Vietnam (supported by the USA) and Communist North Vietnam and Communist allies in South Vietnam (1954–73).

War of attrition A war in which each side tries to wear the other out.

White Paper A government document making recommendations for discussion.

Yishuv A Hebrew word meaning 'settlement and community'; it was used to describe the Jewish community during the mandate.

Yom Kippur The Day of Atonement, an important Jewish religious day of fasting and an annual Jewish holiday.

Zionists Those who advocated the creation of a Jewish homeland and, later, an independent state, in Palestine.

Further reading

Works that are useful for more than one chapter

Bird, K., *Crossing Mandelbaum Gate*, Simon & Schuster, London, 2010

A personal and very engaging memoir of an American who grew up living among Arabs and Jews in the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s.

Bregman, A. and el-Tahri, J., *The Fifty Years War, Israel and the Arabs*, Penguin, London, 1998

Written jointly by a Jew and an Arab, this book accompanied the BBC television series in 1998.

Caplan, N., *The Israeli–Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2010

Caplan examines the major historiographical disputes in detail.

Cleveland, W., *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 2000

An excellent examination of the region from the rise of Islam to the Gulf War.

Fraser, T.G., *The Middle East 1914–1979*, Edward Arnold, London, 1980

A very useful collection of primary sources on the conflict in the series *Documents of Modern History*.

Fraser, T.G., *The Arab–Israeli Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004

A concise and impartial textbook account that focuses on the origins and consequences of the four main Arab–Israeli wars.

Gelvin, J.L., *The Modern Middle East: A History*, third edition, Oxford University Press, 2011

Gelvin's well-regarded book includes important documents, especially on the question of modernity. He also includes some pithy biographical sketches of important actors in the Middle East drama.

Gelvin, J.L., *The Israel–Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*, revised edition, Cambridge University Press, 2007

Gelvin, a professor at UCLA, provides a good overview of the struggle between competing nationalisms in the region.

Harms, G. and Ferry, M., *The Palestine Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, second edition, Pluto Press, London, 2008

While neither author is a historian, they provide a succinct analysis of the conflict as they examine not only modern history but also strife in biblical times.

Herzog, C., *The Arab–Israeli Wars*, Arms & Armour Press, London, 1982

A pro-Israeli historical perspective by someone who was, in turn, an Israeli army officer, diplomat and politician.

Laquer, W. and Rubin, B., editors. *The Israeli–Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, Penguin, London, 2008

Scores of documents in this excellent compendium of important sources. In print for more than 40 years.

Lesch, D., *The Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2008

A very good analysis of the history of the conflict that includes useful documents and a glossary.

Lukacs, Y., editor, *The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record 1967–1990*, Cambridge University Press, 1992

A large collection of, mostly official, documents representing the main parties involved in the conflict.

Mansfield, P., *The Arabs*, Penguin, London, 1982

A historical account by an author who spent many years living in, and writing about, the Middle East, particularly about the Arabs.

Mansfield, P., *A History of the Middle East*, Penguin, London, 1992

An incisive, lucid survey of the modern Middle East and of its politics, regional rivalries and international context.

Ovendale, R., *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, Pearson, Edinburgh, 2004

A very readable and well-researched study of the causes of conflict by a British historian who specializes in the history of the Middle East.

Polk, W., *The Elusive Peace*, Croom Helm, London, 1979

An incisive account which analyses the roots of the conflict and the impact of nationalism, Cold War and four ‘hot wars’ in the region.

Rogan, E., *The Arabs: A History*, Allen Lane, London, 2009

A wide-ranging book that explores Arab history from the Arab perspective and has excellent chapters on the Palestine disaster and Arab nationalism.

Shlaim, A., *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, Penguin, London, 2000

Respected by historians and commentators on both the Israeli and Arab sides, this is a critical and even-handed account of Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours.

Shlaim, A., The origins of Arab–Israeli wars, in *Explaining International Relations Since 1945*, edited by Ngaire Woods, Oxford University Press, 1996

A short article by an acknowledged expert.

Shlaim, A., *War and Peace in the Middle East*, Penguin, London, 1995

A concise, highly accessible account, focusing on the post-1945 period, particularly on US involvement in the politics of the Middle East.

Smith, C.D., *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, seventh edition, Bedford/St. Martin’s, Boston, Massachusetts, 2010

Smith provides more than 45 key documents to supplement his analysis of the conflict.

Smith, C.D., *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, Bedford/St. Martin's, Boston, Massachusetts, 2007

A comprehensive, balanced account of the conflict, written for undergraduates as well as general readers, it also includes over 40 of the most significant primary sources.

Tessler, M., *A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1994

A weighty tome that covers the problems in almost 750 pages. A good resource for teachers.

Yapp, M., *The Near East Since the First World War*, Pearson Education, London, 1996

A highly authoritative, well-balanced account by a historian who specialized in the history of the Middle East. It has chapters on individual countries as well as on the Arab–Israeli conflict generally.

Jews, Arabs and the British in Palestine before 1945

Pappe, I., *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples*, Cambridge University Press, 2004

As its subtitle suggests, this is a history of both Jews and Arabs living in Palestine, both before and after 1948. The Israeli author approaches events in a fresh, new way, producing a non-Zionist history of Zionism and of Palestine/Israel.

The final years of the British mandate in Palestine 1945–8

Khalidi, K., *Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of Palestine 1876–1948*, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010

The author has collected many photographs that illustrate life in Palestine before and during the British mandate.

Khalidi, K., *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006

This massive book traces the fates of several hundred villages occupied by the Israelis. It provides interesting photographic comparisons of the villages before and after the 1948–9 war.

Khalidi, R., The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure, in *The War for Palestine*, edited by E. Rogan and A. Shlaim, Cambridge University Press, 2001

An American–Palestinian historian, the author examines the weaknesses and divisions on the Palestinian side as civil war developed in 1947–8.

Morris, B., Revising the Palestinian exodus of 1948, in *The War for Palestine*, edited by E. Rogan and A. Shlaim, Cambridge University Press, 2001

One of Israel's foremost revisionist historians who identifies the use of force by Palestinian Jews as the main reason for the Palestinian exodus in 1947–8. For a longer version of this key topic, see Morris' book, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Pappe, I., *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, Oneworld, Oxford, 2004
 The Israeli historian Ilan Pappé provides a searing indictment of the Zionists in his exploration of how the Palestinians became refugees in 1948.

The Suez Crisis of 1956

Dayan, M., *Diary of the Sinai Campaign*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1966

The diary of Moshe Dayan, Israeli army general, which he kept during the fighting in the Suez War.

Heikal, M., *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes*, Arbor House, New York, 1987

A unique look at the Suez Crisis from the heralded Egyptian journalist.

Rhodes James, R., Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis, in *History Today*, Historical Association, London, 1986

This article focuses on the British role, especially that of Prime Minister Anthony Eden, and the reasons for British failure.

The Six-Day War of 1967 and the October War of 1973

Bowen, J., *Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East*, Simon & Schuster, London, 2003

The author is a war reporter who spent many years as the BBC's Middle East correspondent.

Heikal, M., *The Road to Ramadan*, Ballantine, 1976

Yet another work from the Egyptian journalist. In this volume, he explains the background to the 1973 war.

Segev, T., *1967: Israel, the War and the Year That Transformed the Middle East*, Abacus Books, London, 2008

This is an analysis of the background to, fighting during, and effects of the most dramatic of the Arab–Israeli wars. It explores the human aspect of the conflict as well as showing how political decisions led to a war that was far from inevitable.

Zionism and Arabism: the development of Israel and of Arab nationalism

Aburish, S.K., *Nasser: The Last Arab*, Thomas Dunne, New York, 2004

In this sympathetic portrayal of Nasser by the late Palestinian journalist, Aburish discusses the failures and achievements of the Egyptian leader.

Dawisha, A., *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2003

A very readable, illuminating account by an Iraqi-born historian which will enhance the reader's understanding of Arab politics, particularly in the era of Nasser.

Gilbert, M., *Israel: A History*, Transworld, London, 1998

A comprehensive and highly authoritative account by a leading British historian.

Kerr, M., *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970*, Oxford University Press, 1971

This short book examines Egypt's often turbulent relations with fellow Arab states in Nasser's era.

Sachar, H.M., *A History of Israel From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, third edition, Knopf, New York, 2007

At more than 1200 pages, this book covers the history of Israel from a Zionist perspective.

Shindler, C., *The Land Beyond Promise: Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2002

An interesting examination of the history of the hardline Zionists.

The Palestinian diaspora and the emergence of the PLO

Gilmour, D., *Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians*, Sphere, London, 1980

A history of the Palestinian diaspora and the development of the resistance, particularly of the PLO. The author lived, studied and worked with Palestinians in the 1970s.

Hirst, D., *The Gun and the Olive Branch*, Futura, London, 1978

An account by one-time correspondent for the *Guardian* newspaper, it examines the whole conflict and is particularly critical in its appraisal of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and its impact on, and the response by, the Palestinians. Revised third edition in 2003 brings the foreword up to date.

Khalidi, R., *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 2006

A very good overview of the history of the Palestinian quest for independence.

Nusseibeh, S., *Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life*, Picador, London, 2007

Nusseibeh provides a moving memoir of the difficulties faced by Palestinians.

Said, E., *The Question of Palestine*, Vintage, New York, 1979

An essential reading from the late Edward Said. Said discusses how Palestinians view Zionism and how they were victimized in the twentieth century.

Said, E., *The Politics of Dispossession*, Vintage, New York, 1994

An examination of the political methods by which Palestinians have had their lands taken from them.

The USA, the USSR, the UN and the Arab–Israeli conflict

Fraser, T.G., *The USA and the Middle East since World War 2*, Macmillan, London, 1989

An examination of the USA's wide-ranging, sometimes conflicting, interests in the region and its impact on the conflict.

Golan, G., *Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev*, Cambridge University Press, 1990

An excellent account of Soviet involvement in the Middle East with Chapters 3–7 being particularly useful on the period from the Suez War to the October War of 1973.

Hahn, P., *Crisis and Crossfire, The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, Potomac Books, Washington, DC, 2005

Written by an expert on the Middle East but highly accessible to an IB student who wishes to explore US diplomacy in the region.

Heikal, M., *Sphinx and Commissar – The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East*, Collins, London, 1978

An account of Egyptian–Soviet relations by an insider; Heikal was a journalist, newspaper editor and confidant of Egyptian President Nasser.

Khalidi, R., *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East*, Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 2010

An interesting analysis of the impact of the Cold War on the Middle East.

Meisler, S., *United Nations: A History*, Grove Press, New York, 1995

Has useful chapters on the UN's role in the creation of the state of Israel and in the Suez and October Wars.

Quandt, W., *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976*, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1977

An insightful examination of US policy during this key time period.

Camp David and the Egyptian–Israeli peace agreement 1978–9

Quandt, W., *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, third edition, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2005

A comprehensive account by a historian of the Middle East who was also one of President Carter's advisers at Camp David.

Internet resources

- Part of the Avalon Project at Yale University, this site has many of the key documents from 1916–2001: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/mideast.asp
- A UN site with over 30,000 documents relating to the question of Palestine: <http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/udc.htm>
- Documents and photographs relating to US President Truman's recognition of the State of Israel: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/israel/large/index.php
- A good starting point for primary sources: www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/modsbook54.asp
- Thousands of posters on the Arab–Israeli conflict can be found here: www.palestineposterproject.org
- A searchable database from the Central Zionist Archives which is part of the World Zionist Organization: www.zionistarchives.org.il/en/pages/default.aspx
- A good introduction to Britain's role in the Suez Crisis from the BBC: www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml

- A good addition to the many sources available at casahistoria.net: http://casahistoria.net/middle_east_home.htm
- Ted Thornton has created a great site for many Middle East topics. His Nasser pages are very good: www.nmhtthornton.com/mehistorydatabase/mideastindex.php
- At the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, one can find thousands of photographs of and speeches by Gamal Abdel Nasser: <http://nasser.bibalex.org/home/main.aspx?lang=en>

Films

50 Years of War: Israel and the Arabs, 1998

A PBS documentary on the Arab–Israeli conflict. Available on DVD.

The Other Side of Suez, 1956

An interesting BBC documentary on Britain's role in the Suez Crisis.

Belonging, 2006

Directed by Tariq Nasir. Nasir explores the Nakba and the Palestinian–American experience through Palestinian eyes. Available on DVD.

Chronicle of a Refugee, 2008

This three-DVD set by the Palestine Online Store is a collection of 250 interviews with Palestinian refugees in over 25 countries.

Six Days in June

This DVD by PBS explores the 1967 war.

Arab & Jew: Return to the Promised Land, 2010

Another interesting film by PBS available on DVD. While outside the timespan of the IB Arab–Israeli conflict, many of the issues have deeper historical roots.

Many other films can be found at www.arabfilm.com.

Internal assessment

The internal assessment is a historical investigation on a historical topic. This will first be assessed by your teacher. A selection of your school's internal assessments will be sent to IB to standardize the scores submitted by your teacher. Below is a list of possible topics on the Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–79 that could warrant further investigation. Keep in mind that there are many other possibilities. The following have been organized by chapter headings.

Chapter 1: Jews, Arabs and the British in Palestine before 1945

- 1 Why did Lord Balfour suggest that the British government was in favour of a 'Jewish home in Palestine'?
- 2 Why did some Arabs feel that the Sykes–Picot Agreement was a violation of previous agreements?
- 3 Why did violence break out in Jerusalem in 1929?
- 4 To what extent was the Arab Higher Committee unable to cope with confronting the Zionist challenge?
- 5 How did the Zionists prepare for a future state during the British mandate period?

Chapter 2: The final years of the British mandate in Palestine 1945–8

- 1 To what extent did Nazi persecution of Jews contribute to Jewish immigration in Palestine?
- 2 How effective were Zionist terrorist groups in forcing the British to leave Palestine?
- 3 Why did the USA support the Zionist movement for independence?
- 4 Why did the British decide to leave Palestine after almost 30 years?
- 5 To what extent was the expulsion of Palestinians from their villages official Zionist policy?

Chapter 3: The establishment of Israel and the war of 1948–9

- 1 Why was the United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, assassinated?
- 2 Why did the Egyptian forces perform so poorly in Israel's war for independence?
- 3 What role did King Abdullah play in the outcome of the 1948–9 war?
- 4 Why did the Jordanian Arab Legion perform better than other Arab units in the 1948–9 war?

Chapter 4: The Suez Crisis of 1956

- 1 Why did the British government perceive Nasser as a threat to their interests in the Middle East?
- 2 To what extent was General Naguib a pawn used by the Free Officers?
- 3 Why was the Czech arms deal a shock to western powers?
- 4 What role did President Nasser play in the Algerian war for independence?
- 5 Why did President Eisenhower respond negatively to the French–British–Israeli invasion of Egypt?

Chapter 5: The Six-Day War of 1967 and the October War of 1973

- 1 How important was Israeli access to the Straits of Tiran to its economy in 1967?
- 2 What role did Arab nationalism play in President Nasser's decision to force the United Nations out of the Sinai in 1967?
- 3 How was the Voice of the Arabs radio station an important element in Nasser's efforts to promote Arab socialism?
- 4 To what extent were Nasser's efforts to end the 1970 Jordanian–Palestinian violence successful?
- 5 What were the goals of President Sadat when he went to war in 1973?

Chapter 6: Zionism and Arabism: the development of Israel and of Arab nationalism

- 1 Why did hundreds of thousands of Jews leave their homes in Arab countries in the 1950s?
- 2 To what extent were Israeli Arabs a persecuted minority in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s?
- 3 How successful were the Gush Emunim in achieving their goals?
- 4 Why did the United Arab Republic fail within four years of its founding?
- 5 To what extent were Nasser's economic and social reforms successful?

Chapter 7: The Palestinian diaspora and the emergence of the PLO

- 1 Why were Arab countries not more welcoming towards Palestinian refugees?
- 2 To what extent was the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) successful in caring for Palestinian refugees from 1949 to 1964?
- 3 To what extent was the Battle of Karameh a victory for the Palestinians?
- 4 Why was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine created?
- 5 Why did King Hussein of Jordan expel the Palestine Liberation Organization from his country?

Chapter 8: The USA, the USSR, the UN and the Arab–Israeli conflict

- 1 To what extent did the US need for Arab oil drive its foreign policy from the 1950s to the 1970s?
- 2 Why did the USA send troops to Lebanon in 1958?
- 3 How key was Soviet aid in the construction of the Aswan High Dam?
- 4 What led President Sadat to expel tens of thousands of Soviet advisers and technicians in 1972?
- 5 How effective was the passage of UN Resolution 242 in achieving peace in the Middle East?

Chapter 9: Camp David and the Egyptian–Israeli peace agreement 1978–9

- 1 How successful was Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in achieving a lasting peace in the Middle East?
- 2 What led to Menachem Begin becoming Israel's prime minister in 1977?
- 3 Why did Anwar Sadat go to Jerusalem in 1977?
- 4 Why did the Arab world react negatively to Sadat's peace treaty with Israel?
- 5 To what extent did Israeli settlement policies in the 1970s and 1980s contribute to an end to Israeli–Palestinian peace talks?

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